Gavin J. Tighe

The plaintiffs sought to amend their claim to include Cara Vaccarino as a defendant and requested an order for the mirroring of her electronic devices and email account to preserve confidential and proprietary information.

This request arose after it was discovered that another defendant, Ms. Anderson, had forwarded confidential information to Ms. Vaccarino.

Despite Ms. Vaccarino's assertion that she did not recall opening or using the email, the court found it appropriate to order the mirroring to preserve evidence and determine the use of the information.

The court ordered the mirroring to cover the period from June 1, 2023, to the present, with counsel to coordinate the least disruptive process.

The defendants brought a motion for an order requiring the plaintiff to post security for costs on a pay-as-you-go basis, asserting the plaintiff was ordinarily resident outside Ontario.

The court found persuasive evidence supporting the defendants' contention, noting the plaintiff's weak rebuttal evidence and refusal to be examined.

Considering the serious allegations of collusion, fraud, deceit, and conspiracy made by the plaintiff against the defendants, and the potential for substantial indemnity costs if the claims were dismissed, the court determined it would not be unjust to order security for costs.

The motion was granted, and the plaintiff was ordered to post security for the defendants' partial indemnity costs.

The plaintiff sublessee brought an action against the defendant sublessor and its real estate broker, alleging they fraudulently concealed a latent defect regarding excessive noise from idling trains at the adjacent Union Station.

The defendants brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss the action.

The court granted the motions, finding that the train noise was a patent defect, not a latent one, and there was no evidence of a conspiracy to conceal it.

Furthermore, the plaintiff had acknowledged the proximity to the train station and agreed to an exculpatory clause in the lease that shielded the defendants from liability for train noise.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order requiring them to produce documents protected by solicitor-client and settlement privilege.

The underlying action involved allegations of professional negligence against the respondents regarding their representation in prior litigation.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge failed to provide sufficient reasons to justify the abrogation of privilege.

The lack of reasons prevented meaningful appellate review of whether privilege had been waived or if the pleadings were sufficient to destroy the privileges.

The portion of the order requiring production of the privileged documents was set aside.

The appellant, a formerly licensed lawyer, appealed the dismissal of his $15 million action against his former counsel for negligent legal advice and ineffective assistance during contempt proceedings.

The motion judge had dismissed the action under Rule 21.01(3)(d) as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the action constituted an impermissible collateral attack on previous contempt findings.

The court also upheld the motion judge's finding regarding the limited scope of the retainer, which did not obligate counsel to adduce the additional evidence the appellant claimed was missing, and concluded that such evidence would not have altered the original contempt finding based on the appellant's collusion with his former client.

The appellant's action for breach of fiduciary duty and negligence against real estate agents was dismissed on summary judgment due to being commenced outside the two-year limitation period.

The appellant argued she did not discover the material facts until later.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, affirming that the discoverability period begins when the plaintiff knows or ought to have known the material facts, not the legal conclusion.

The court noted the appellant had previously pleaded the agents were her agents in a prior action, indicating knowledge of the material facts.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The third parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Jaye Hooper J. dated February 27, 2023.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $4,000 to the responding parties.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal an order of Van Melle J. dated April 19, 2023.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal without costs.

The defendants brought motions seeking to remove the plaintiffs' counsel, Julian Falconer and Falconers LLP, and for the production of portions of their file concerning advice given to plaintiff Bradley Blair regarding a complaint to the Ombudsman and a related judicial review application.

The defendants argued that counsel was a potential witness, an "unsworn witness" or had a conflict of interest based on a duty of loyalty, and that solicitor-client privilege had been waived.

The court dismissed both motions, finding no deemed waiver of privilege, no likelihood of counsel being a material witness, no "unsworn witness" concern given the nature of prior interactions, and no duty of loyalty conflict.

The appellant appealed an order for the partition and sale of a home jointly owned with her elderly mother.

The appellant argued the mother had gifted her interest in the home and that the order was interlocutory, requiring leave to appeal.

The Divisional Court held that an order for sale under the Partition Act is a final order, meaning no leave was required.

On the merits, the court found no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's conclusion that the mother retained an interest in the property and that the sale was not oppressive.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendants, Borden Ladner Gervais LLP and Robb McNaughton, brought a motion to stay an Ontario action initiated by the plaintiff, Pesorama Inc., on the basis of forum non conveniens.

The defendants argued that a forum selection clause in the retainer agreement between the parties stipulated Alberta as the exclusive jurisdiction for disputes.

The court applied the two-step test for enforcing forum selection clauses, finding the clause valid, clear, and applicable.

It determined that Pesorama Inc. failed to demonstrate "strong cause" to override the clause, particularly given the sophisticated nature of the parties and the commercial context of the dispute.

The court also noted the ongoing taxation process in Alberta and the inefficiency of parallel proceedings.

The motion was granted, and the Ontario action was stayed, allowing the plaintiff to pursue its claim in Alberta.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's professional negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process under Rule 21.01(3)(d).

The plaintiff, a suspended lawyer, alleged negligent legal advice and breach of professional obligations by the defendants in defending him against a civil contempt application, which resulted in a jail sentence.

The court found that the plaintiff's action constituted an impermissible collateral attack on prior court orders that had already established his contempt.

The court accepted the defendants' evidence regarding the limited scope of their retainer and dismissed the plaintiff's claims, including a claim for recovery of legal fees, which the court suggested should be pursued under the Solicitors Act.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action for breach of fiduciary duty and negligence, arguing it was brought beyond the two-year limitation period.

The plaintiff contended the claim was discoverable later due to alleged fraudulent concealment of the defendants' agency status.

The court found the plaintiff knew or ought to have known the material facts earlier, as evidenced by her pleadings in a prior related action.

The court dismissed the action as limitation barred, emphasizing that knowledge of material facts, not legal conclusions, triggers the limitation period.

In a receivership proceeding, the Receiver brought a motion for declaratory relief regarding amounts owed under a loan and mortgage by the respondents.

The respondents brought a cross-motion arguing the Receiver's claim was barred by the two-year limitation period under the British Columbia Limitation Act.

The court found that while the respondents had not acknowledged liability to extend the limitation period, a prior petition commenced by the respondents in British Columbia within the limitation period preserved the claim.

The court held the Receiver's motion was not statute-barred and could proceed to be determined on its merits.

The plaintiffs/appellants brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Gorman J. dated June 6, 2022.

The Divisional Court allowed the motion for leave to appeal.

Costs of the motion were fixed at $5,000 and reserved to the panel hearing the appeal.

The plaintiff commenced an action against her husband's children and the lawyers who acted for him in prior divorce proceedings, alleging conspiracy, abuse of process, and other torts.

The defendants moved to strike or dismiss the claims under Rule 21.

The court dismissed the claims against the adverse lawyers, finding no duty of care was owed to the plaintiff.

The court also dismissed the tort claims for abuse of process, conspiracy, and intentional interference with economic relations as an abuse of process by relitigation, as they sought to undermine the final settlement reached in the divorce proceedings.

The defamation and intentional infliction of mental suffering claims were struck with leave to amend.

The moving parties sought a review of a motion judge's order that dismissed their request for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal.

The underlying appeal was from an order striking out their statement of claim.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's application of the test for an extension of time, agreeing that there was no apparent merit to the appeal and that granting an extension would prejudice the responding parties.

The Court noted that the Brampton action, which was struck, appeared to be an improper attempt to circumvent rulings made in prior Ottawa actions.

The motion for review was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion for leave to appeal an order of the lower court.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the plaintiff to pay costs of $2,500 to the defendant.

The Ontario Court of Appeal considered whether the Administrative Judge of the Small Claims Court has jurisdiction to make orders under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act (Anti-SLAPP provisions).

The court found that such jurisdiction lies exclusively with Superior Court judges, based on statutory interpretation, prior jurisprudence (Bruyea, Nanda, Ontario College of Teachers), and the incompatibility of the complex s. 137.1 process with the summary nature and rules of the Small Claims Court.

The appeals were allowed, confirming the Administrative Judge's lack of jurisdiction.

This decision addresses a special case brought under Rule 22.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to clarify the scope of the plaintiff's claim and damages following a Court of Appeal decision.

The plaintiff argued for a broad interpretation of her claim, including losses of pension, salary, benefits, and investment opportunity from 2008.

The defendants contended that the Court of Appeal's reasons, which upheld a finding that the limitation period commenced in 2011 upon the CRA's deregistration of the Individual Pension Plan (IPP), narrowed the claim to only damages related to the tax consequences of the IPP's deregistration.

The court agreed with the defendants, holding that the plaintiff's prior positions taken to avoid summary judgment and succeed on appeal were binding, thereby limiting the claim to tax-related losses from 2011 onwards and excluding earlier alleged damages.