Gavin J. Tighe

The plaintiff was defrauded by her spouse, who she met online.

She sued her former landlord (Minto) and her former law firm (Faskens), alleging they had a duty to protect her by warning her of her spouse's fraudulent background.

Minto had conducted a credit check on the plaintiff without her explicit consent when her spouse applied for a lease.

Faskens had been retained for estate planning prior to the marriage.

Both defendants brought motions for summary judgment.

The Superior Court of Justice granted the motions and dismissed the claims against both defendants, finding that neither the landlord nor the law firm owed a duty to investigate the spouse or protect the plaintiff from his fraud.

The plaintiff condominium corporation sued 53 defendants for construction deficiencies.

One defendant, Liberty, brought a motion for summary judgment.

The plaintiff brought a cross-motion to stay or quash the summary judgment motion, arguing Liberty failed to make proper documentary production and improperly refused questions on cross-examination.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's cross-motion, finding no grounds to restrict Liberty's right to advance its summary judgment motion, but established a procedure for the plaintiff to bring a specific motion regarding the refused questions and documentary production prior to the hearing of the summary judgment motion.

A secondary market misrepresentation class action was brought against a coal mining company and its former CFOs and directors following the company's restatement of financial statements for 2010-2012.

The motion judge granted leave to proceed against the company but denied leave against the individual defendants, finding they had established a reasonable investigation defence.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the motion judge erred by treating the leave motion as a mini-trial and failing to consider significant credibility issues and gaps in the evidentiary record.

The court found that the defendants' position—that they should evade liability because they previously made material misrepresentations in the restatement but are now telling the truth—was inconsistent with fundamental securities regulation principles requiring scrupulous continuous disclosure.

The applicant purchaser and respondent vendor entered into an Agreement of Purchase and Sale for land in Markham.

The agreement required the vendor to obtain a severance at its sole expense, unless the conditions imposed were 'onerous or unreasonable'.

The Committee of Adjustment granted the severance subject to the condition that the owner sign a Cost Sharing Agreement and pay $407,582.

The vendor argued this was onerous and unreasonable, while the purchaser argued it was the vendor's responsibility.

The court interpreted the agreement, specifically the zoning clause, and found that the parties intended for the land to be rezoned and operational at the time of sale, which required the cost sharing payment.

The court held the condition was not onerous or unreasonable and ordered the vendor to repay the $407,582 to the purchaser.

The defendant, Jameson Bank, successfully moved for summary judgment and opposed the plaintiff's motion to amend the statement of claim and add new defendants.

Jameson Bank sought costs on a partial indemnity basis up to its offer to settle date (September 11, 2014) and substantial indemnity thereafter, totaling $132,790.43.

The plaintiff, Yunsheng Du, argued for limited costs of $10,000, citing his partial success on the amendment motion and the defendant's unreasonable conduct and excessive rates.

The court found the plaintiff's litigation approach disproportionate and unnecessarily complicated, noting serious but unfounded allegations.

While the plaintiff's conduct was unreasonable, it was not egregious enough to warrant substantial indemnity costs.

The court awarded the defendant partial indemnity costs of $95,495.91, inclusive of HST and disbursements, finding the claimed rates and time spent reasonable given the complexity caused by the plaintiff's actions and counsel's experience.

The self-represented appellant appealed a Master's order dismissing his legal malpractice action for failure to pay costs awards, as well as the Master's award of substantial indemnity costs and refusal to permit cross-examination of an affiant.

The Divisional Court found no factual or legal errors in the Master's decisions, noting the appellant's failure to pay tens of thousands of dollars in costs and his vitriolic submissions.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

Lang Michener LLP was entirely successful on a motion and counterclaim for professional fees against Gregory P. King.

The counterclaim involved serious allegations against senior counsel and sought indemnity for an Italian judgment, making it a substantial and complex piece of litigation.

The court fixed Lang Michener's costs of the motion and counterclaim at $45,000, applying the proportionality principle and considering the seriousness and complexity of the issues.

The plaintiff, Yunsheng Du, sought damages from Jameson Bank after unauthorized wire transfers occurred due to his email account being hacked.

Jameson Bank moved for summary judgment, arguing it acted in accordance with the account agreement, which placed responsibility for email security on Du and contained an exclusion of liability clause for anything less than gross negligence or wilful misconduct.

Du also sought to amend his claim to add new causes of action and parties.

The court dismissed Du's proposed amendments for oppression remedy and breach of the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act, finding them untenable.

The court granted summary judgment in favour of Jameson Bank, concluding that the contractual terms barred Du's claims for breach of contract, fiduciary duty, negligence, gross negligence, and conversion, as Du failed to secure his email account and Jameson Bank had no reason to doubt the authenticity of the instructions.

The plaintiff, Lang Michener LLP, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the defendant, Gregory King's, counterclaims alleging professional negligence in the defense of an Italian judgment enforcement action and negligent advice regarding a limitation period for suing his insurer, LawPro.

The court granted summary judgment, dismissing the counterclaims.

The court found the negligence claim regarding the defense of the enforcement action to be an impermissible collateral attack on prior judicial decisions and devoid of substance.

The claim regarding negligent advice about LawPro was dismissed because King's claim against LawPro was already time-barred and not covered by the insurance policy, thus no damages were suffered.

The applicant lender sought a declaration of coverage under a title insurance policy after a private mortgage transaction was discovered to be an identity fraud.

The respondent insurer denied coverage, relying on an exception that applied if mortgage proceeds were paid to anyone other than the registered titleholder.

The funds had been disbursed to the borrower's lawyer in trust.

The court held that the exception was ambiguous and did not clearly require direct payment to the titleholder.

Construing the ambiguity against the insurer, the court found the exception did not apply and declared that the policy provided coverage for the loss.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' action for malicious prosecution, defamation, negligence, and misrepresentation.

The claims arose from the defendant reporting the plaintiffs to the police for alleged corporate fraud, which led to criminal charges that were later withdrawn.

The court granted summary judgment dismissing the misrepresentation claim, finding no reliance by the plaintiffs.

However, the court dismissed the motion regarding the remaining claims, concluding that a fair and just determination could not be made at this stage due to outstanding factual issues and incomplete discovery.

The defendants brought a motion seeking leave to bring a summary judgment motion and to amend their statement of defence to add a limitations defence.

The court granted leave to amend the statement of defence, conditional on the defendants paying $1500 to the plaintiff for associated costs.

However, the court denied leave to bring a summary judgment motion, emphasizing the plaintiff's right to a jury trial and the principles of proportionality and access to justice, particularly given the plaintiff's unique circumstances and the imminent trial date.

The court found that allowing a summary judgment motion would be unjust and unfair, potentially jeopardizing the scheduled jury trial.

The plaintiff brought a motion to exclude a defendant from her examination for discovery, citing intimidation and fear of tailored evidence.

The court dismissed the motion, affirming a litigant's inherent right to be present at discovery unless exceptional circumstances, such as a real and substantial probability of intimidation or evidence tailoring, are proven.

The court found the plaintiff's discomfort and anxiety insufficient for exclusion and noted the defendant's evidence could be impeached by prior statements.

Costs were awarded to the successful defendants on a partial indemnity basis.

The moving party sought an extension of time to bring an application for leave to appeal from the Divisional Court.

Prior to the hearing, the moving party demanded the presiding judge recuse himself, alleging bias, racism, and corruption based on previous decisions.

The moving party failed to attend the teleconference hearing.

The judge declined to recuse himself, finding no air of reality to the bias claims.

The motion for an extension of time was dismissed on the merits, as the proposed appeal raised no issues of public importance and had no realistic chance of success.

The defendant Constantine Glinos brought a motion for summary judgment on his cross-claim against Chicago Title Insurance Company.

Glinos, a lawyer, sought indemnity for legal costs incurred defending a professional negligence claim brought by purchasers (Small and Kondic) related to a real estate transaction.

The purchasers had also sued Chicago Title under a title insurance policy.

Glinos argued that Chicago Title's indemnity obligation to lawyers, established through an agreement with the Law Society of Upper Canada, applied because the purchasers' claims "arose under the title insurance policy" based on the pleadings rule from Stewart Title Guarantee Co. v. Zeppieri.

Chicago Title denied liability, arguing Glinos's alleged material misrepresentation in the application invalidated the policy and that the claim was for professional malpractice, not under the policy.

The court granted summary judgment to Glinos, finding that the purchasers' claims, as pleaded, arose under the title insurance policy, triggering Chicago Title's indemnity obligation for Glinos's defence costs.

The court also found no material misrepresentation that would invalidate the policy.

The defendant/moving party sought leave to appeal a decision dismissing his motion for costs.

The motion judge had found that the costs issue was already determined by a prior Master's decision, which was upheld on appeal.

The court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that the moving party failed to meet the test under Rule 62.02(4) as there was no reason to doubt the correctness of the decision, no conflicting decisions, and the issues did not extend beyond the immediate parties.

Costs were awarded to the responding party on a partial indemnity basis.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an order dismissing his appeal of a Master's order that had stayed his action pending payment of numerous outstanding costs orders.

The court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that the moving party failed to meet the strict two-part test under Rule 62.02(4).

Specifically, there was no conflicting decision of another judge or court, no reason to doubt the correctness of the order, and the proposed appeal did not involve matters of such importance that leave should be granted.

The applicant's employment was terminated and his union took the matter to arbitration.

After an inordinate delay, the arbitrator ordered reinstatement but denied compensation for lost wages.

The union, relying on legal advice, declined to seek judicial review of the award.

The applicant sought standing to bring his own application for judicial review, which was denied by a motions judge.

On a motion to a panel of the Divisional Court to vary that decision, the court dismissed the motion, finding no error in the motions judge's conclusion that the applicant did not fall within any of the exceptions to the rule of union exclusivity.

The applicant was terminated from his employment and his union, CUPE Local 79, represented him in an arbitration that resulted in his reinstatement without retroactive compensation.

The arbitrator's reasons were delayed by three years.

The union declined to seek judicial review of the decision.

The applicant sought to pursue judicial review on his own behalf, alleging a breach of natural justice due to the delay.

The respondents brought a motion challenging his standing.

The Divisional Court granted the motion and quashed the applications, holding that the applicant did not fall within the narrow exceptions to the principle of union exclusivity, as there was no evidence of inadequate representation by the union.

The appellants purchased a home and acquired a title insurance policy from the respondent.

Years later, they discovered a previous owner had removed load-bearing walls without a building permit, resulting in a municipal order to remedy an unsafe building.

The respondent denied coverage under the title policy.

The motion judge dismissed the appellants' summary judgment motion, finding the title remained marketable and that municipal work orders must be registered on title to trigger coverage.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the standard of review for standard form insurance contracts is correctness.

The Court found the motion judge erred in his interpretation of the policy and the nature of off-title defects, concluding that the unpermitted construction rendered the title unmarketable and was covered under the policy.