Gavin J. Tighe

The appellant appealed a summary judgment granted to his former employer for amounts due on two loans.

The appellant argued his termination was in bad faith to appropriate his book of business, but the court found no evidence to raise a triable issue, noting he committed a clear breach of corporate policy.

The Court of Appeal also upheld the motion judge's discretionary decisions denying equitable set-off and a stay pending the resolution of the counterclaim.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding an easement claim based on the doctrine of Lost Modern Grant.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in limiting the relevant 20-year period to the time before the property's conversion to the Land Titles system in 2001.

The Court of Appeal agreed the trial judge erred in law but found the error did not result in a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The sole witness relied upon by the appellant was deemed unreliable, and the evidence was insufficient to establish the required 20 years of open and continuous use.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her action against the respondents.

The motion judge had dismissed the action as an abuse of process and found no genuine issue for trial, as the underlying issue of forged guarantees had already been adjudicated in a previous action.

The appellant argued she was denied natural justice because the motion judge proceeded in her absence after she left the courtroom.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no apprehension of bias, agreeing that the action was an abuse of process, and upholding the substantial indemnity costs awarded by the motion judge due to the serious allegations of dishonesty.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment dismissing their claim for conveyance of lands and granting the respondent's counterclaim for occupation rent based on unjust enrichment, trespass, and registering a certificate of pending litigation without a reasonable claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's refusal to allow the appellants to discontinue their action on the first day of trial, her decision to allow post-trial pleading amendments, or her assessment of damages for trespass and the aborted sale.

The appellant, a self-represented litigant assisted by an agent, appealed the dismissal of her Small Claims Court action against her brokerage firm regarding a margin call.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge's constant interventions, antagonistic attitude toward the agent, refusal to permit cross-examination of adverse witnesses, and premature declaration of a non-suit without hearing submissions deprived the appellant of a fair trial.

The appellant, a self-employed lawyer, filed a proposal to his creditors under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act which was accepted.

Following the proposal, he made income tax installment payments to the CCRA for the 1999 taxation year and subsequently claimed a refund.

The CCRA prorated the installments over the entire year and applied a portion to his pre-proposal tax debt.

The Court of Appeal held that the CCRA had no legal basis to apply post-proposal installment payments to pre-proposal tax debt, as this would allow the CCRA to recover its pre-proposal claim at 100 cents on the dollar contrary to the terms of the proposal.

The appeal was allowed and the CCRA was ordered to pay the refund.

The appellant, a self-employed lawyer, filed a proposal to creditors under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (CCRA) was an unsecured creditor for unpaid income tax.

After the proposal date, the appellant made installment payments for his current-year tax obligations and subsequently claimed a tax refund.

The CCRA prorated the installment payments over the entire year, applying a portion to the pre-proposal tax debt, which eliminated the refund.

The Court of Appeal held that the CCRA had no statutory basis to apply post-proposal installment payments to pre-proposal tax liability, as doing so would allow the CCRA to recover more than its pro rata share under the proposal.

The appeal was allowed and the CCRA was ordered to pay the refund.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judgment awarding damages for constructive dismissal to the respondent employee and dismissing the employer's counterclaim.

The appellant argued that the trial judge's numerous interjections and premature comments on the merits of the case prevented a fair presentation of its defence and counterclaim.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the trial judge's conduct gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appeal was allowed, the judgment set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant developer appealed a judgment granting specific performance of an agreement of purchase and sale for a residential condominium unit.

The application judge had found the developer breached the agreement by improperly setting confirmed occupancy dates and terminating the agreement due to delay.

The Court of Appeal held that the application judge erred in interpreting the agreement and in making factual findings based on inference without a trial.

The judgment was set aside, and the application was converted into an action to proceed to trial on the disputed factual issues.

The cross-appellant elector appealed a judgment under the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act, seeking to introduce fresh evidence that the respondent mayor owned additional properties near a proposed highway extension.

The Divisional Court held that the normal test for fresh evidence is modified by s. 11(2) of the Act, which allows a new trial before the same judge to take additional evidence if it might have affected the initial disposition.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the trial judge to reconsider the judgment in light of the fresh evidence.

The cross-appellant, an elector, appealed a judgment that found the respondent mayor breached the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act but excused the breach as an error in judgment.

The cross-appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence on appeal showing the mayor had interests in other properties affected by the highway extension vote.

The Divisional Court modified the traditional test for fresh evidence due to the unique powers under s. 11(2) of the Act, admitted the evidence, and remitted the matter to the trial judge for reconsideration.