Gavin J. Tighe

The plaintiff appealed a Master's order that stayed his action pending the payment of several outstanding costs orders.

The plaintiff argued the Master lacked jurisdiction to vary a previous order to include additional costs awards reinstated by the Divisional Court.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Master had jurisdiction under section 106 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 59.06(1) to vary the order based on the changed factual landscape.

The court also reprimanded the self-represented plaintiff for making unauthorized audio recordings of the proceedings in violation of section 136 of the Courts of Justice Act.

A self‑represented defendant brought a motion seeking costs of an action after the action was administratively dismissed for delay under Form 48D.

The responding party argued that the issue of costs had already been determined in earlier proceedings before a master and upheld on appeal to the Divisional Court.

The court held that the doctrines of res judicata and issue estoppel barred the renewed request for costs because the entitlement had already been finally determined.

The administrative dismissal order was issued without knowledge of the prior rulings and did not reopen the issue.

The motion was dismissed and costs were awarded to the responding party on a partial indemnity basis.

In an application under the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act alleging multiple contraventions, the respondents brought a preliminary motion arguing that several alleged breaches were statute‑barred because the applicant knew or ought to have known the relevant facts more than six weeks before commencing the application.

The motion was dismissed in earlier reasons.

The court then addressed costs and held that the applicant, as the successful party on the motion, was entitled to costs.

However, because the motion raised legitimate legal uncertainty regarding the interpretation of the Act’s timing provision, the court ordered partial indemnity costs payable in any event of the cause rather than forthwith.

The appellant law firm appealed a Master's decision that varied an earlier costs order and awarded $1,000 in costs to the self-represented respondent upon the discontinuance of a fee recovery action.

The respondent also appealed, challenging the discontinuance and seeking higher costs.

The Divisional Court allowed the appellant's appeal regarding the variation of the costs order, finding the Master was functus officio and lacked jurisdiction to vary costs orders previously made by superior court judges.

The appeals regarding the $1,000 costs award were dismissed, as the Master reasonably approximated the respondent's disbursements and correctly applied the law regarding self-represented litigants' entitlement to costs for foregone income.

The plaintiff commenced an action against her former legal and financial advisors alleging negligence and breach of fiduciary duty in connection with advice provided during negotiation of a marriage contract.

The defendants brought summary judgment motions asserting that the action was statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002 and constituted an abuse of process because the plaintiff had a statutory remedy under s. 56(4) of the Family Law Act to set aside the marriage contract against her spouse.

The court held the plaintiff failed to rebut the presumption of discoverability and knew or ought to have known of the material facts giving rise to her claims more than two years before commencing the action.

The court further held that attempting to obtain, through damages against advisors, relief that should have been pursued through family law proceedings constituted an abuse of process.

Following summary judgment dismissing the action, the successful defendant sought costs of both the motion and the action.

The plaintiffs argued hardship and novelty, submitting that no Canadian court had previously considered the title insurance coverages in issue.

The court held that while costs generally follow the result, costs remain discretionary.

Exercising that discretion, the court declined to award costs because the matter was substantially a case of first impression.

Homeowners moved for summary judgment seeking coverage under a title insurance policy after discovering that load‑bearing walls had been removed during prior renovations, rendering the home structurally unsafe.

The municipality issued an order requiring temporary shoring under the Building Code Act, 1992, but no permanent remediation order was made and no order was registered on title.

The court held that the title insurance policy insured risks affecting ownership of title rather than the physical condition or market value of the property.

Because the municipal order did not affect title and was not registered on title, the claimed remediation costs were not covered.

The court also held that where no genuine issue requiring trial exists, the court may grant summary judgment against the moving party even if the responding party did not seek it.

Summary judgment was granted dismissing the applicants’ entire action.

Motions were brought to quash summonses issued by a litigant seeking to compel opposing counsel and a proposed estate trustee during litigation to testify in support of a motion alleging judicial duress in prior settlement proceedings.

The court considered the stringent requirements for summoning opposing counsel as witnesses, emphasizing that such a step requires a high degree of materiality and necessity and should be avoided unless demanded by the administration of justice.

The court found the evidence sought was neither material nor necessary, noting that the moving party had already filed affidavits, transcripts, and audio recordings addressing the relevant events.

The proposed examinations were characterized as a fishing expedition and potentially tactical, as they would force opposing counsel to withdraw and cause delay and expense.

The summonses were quashed and substantial indemnity costs were awarded.

The appellant, who was involved in operating a restaurant on City property, sued the respondent, a mayoral candidate, for libel over comments made during a newspaper editorial board interview.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the comments did not refer to the appellant and were not defamatory.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, noting the respondent's comments focused on the City Council process rather than the appellant personally, and explicitly disavowed accusing anyone of corruption.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his defamation action against a municipal election candidate.

The candidate had delivered a confidential letter to City Council referencing allegations of improper influence regarding an untendered lease agreement with the appellant's family business.

The trial judge found the letter defamatory but protected by qualified privilege, and found no express malice.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, concluding that the communication was reasonably appropriate to the occasion and that the appellant failed to prove malice.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Following an unsuccessful motion by certain defendants seeking removal of the plaintiff’s counsel from the record, the plaintiff sought costs.

The plaintiff requested substantial indemnity costs alleging the motion contained meritless allegations and misstatements of fact amounting to reprehensible conduct.

The court found the motion lacked merit and was ill‑conceived but declined to characterize the conduct as reprehensible.

The court held that reasonably generous partial indemnity costs were appropriate in the circumstances and fixed costs accordingly.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment setting aside a transfer agreement on grounds of undue influence, breach of fiduciary duty, misrepresentation, and unconscionability.

The appellants argued the trial judge exceeded his jurisdiction under a bifurcation order and made palpable and overriding errors of fact.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's order was within the scope of the bifurcation order and his factual findings were well-supported by the evidence.

The plaintiffs moved under Rule 48.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to restore an action to the trial list after it had been struck from the list for several years, while the defendants brought a cross‑motion to dismiss the action for delay.

Applying the conjunctive test articulated by the Court of Appeal in Nissar v. Toronto Transit Commission, the court held that the plaintiffs bore the burden of providing an acceptable explanation for the litigation delay and demonstrating that the defendants would suffer no non‑compensable prejudice if the action proceeded.

The plaintiffs argued that related litigation justified holding the matter in abeyance, but the court found no evidence that opposing counsel had been informed of such an intention and concluded the action had effectively been neglected for nearly four years.

Although the court found that the defendants had not established actual prejudice, the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the first branch of the Nissar test.

The motion to restore the action to the trial list was therefore dismissed.

A lawyer sought declarations that his professional liability insurer had a duty to defend him in underlying mortgage fraud litigation and that the insurer breached confidentiality by reporting allegations to the Law Society.

The underlying pleadings alleged negligence and breach of fiduciary duty arising from the lawyer signing a certificate of independent legal advice without meeting one of the mortgagors.

The insurer denied coverage relying on a policy exclusion for dishonest, fraudulent, criminal, or malicious acts.

The court held that the pleadings sounded in professional negligence rather than fraud and that the exclusion did not apply, triggering the insurer’s duty to defend.

The court also held the insurer did not act improperly in reporting the allegations to the Law Society and that PIPEDA did not apply because the insurer’s mandatory professional liability program was not a commercial activity.

Following the dismissal of two libel actions arising from statements made during a municipal election campaign, the successful defendants sought costs on a full indemnity basis.

They argued the actions were strategic lawsuits against public participation and constituted an abuse of process intended to interfere with the political process.

The court rejected the abuse of process allegation, finding the plaintiff was entitled to pursue legal remedies during an election campaign and that the evidence did not establish a political motive or distortion of the electoral process.

Adverse credibility findings against the plaintiff and litigation conduct did not justify elevated costs.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs, emphasizing proportionality, the public interest issues involved, and reasonable expectations of the unsuccessful party.

The plaintiff brokerage firm moved under Rule 25.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike several paragraphs of the defendants’ statement of defence as scandalous, frivolous, vexatious, or non‑compliant with pleading requirements.

The impugned allegations described a toxic workplace environment and managerial conduct said to have forced the individual defendants to submit resignation letters, and also alleged the action was brought for an improper purpose amounting to abuse of process.

The court held that most of the contested paragraphs were relevant to the central issue of whether the defendants voluntarily resigned or were effectively dismissed and therefore were necessary to allow a full defence.

Allegations relating to the plaintiff’s motive were also permitted because they supported a pleaded abuse of process defence.

Only one sentence describing the workplace atmosphere as widely known in the community was struck as irrelevant and included merely for colour.

The plaintiff sued for libel arising from an open letter delivered by the defendant, then a municipal council candidate, to Toronto councillors and the Mayor concerning alleged influence over a controversial City lease and related election finance questions.

The court held that the letter was defamatory and referred to the plaintiff, but found that the occasion of publication attracted qualified privilege and that portions of the letter also constituted fair comment on matters of public interest.

The court rejected the defence of responsible communication as unavailable on these facts, but held the plaintiff failed to prove express malice sufficient to defeat qualified privilege or fair comment.

The action was dismissed, with contingent general damages assessed at $22,500.

The plaintiff brought a libel action against a municipal councillor arising from statements made to a newspaper editorial board concerning an untendered municipal contract awarded to a corporation associated with the plaintiff.

The court held that although the statements could in law be capable of referring to the plaintiff, the reasonable reader would not conclude that they did so.

The defendant spoke only about the corporation and repeatedly stated he could not accuse anyone or pinpoint wrongdoing.

The court further found that the statements expressed suspicion of corruption without factual assertion and, when read in context, did not convey a defamatory meaning.

The plaintiff therefore failed to establish two essential elements of defamation: reference to the plaintiff and defamatory meaning.

The applicants sought a declaration that they validly exercised a shotgun buy/sell provision in a shareholders agreement, requiring the respondents to transfer their shares in the corporation.

The respondents argued the shotgun notice was invalid because it was issued jointly by two shareholders, and alternatively, that the applicants repudiated the agreement by demanding a release not required by the contract.

The court held that the shotgun provision, interpreted in its factual matrix, allowed for joint exercise by the applicants as a single shareholder group.

The court further found that the applicants did not repudiate the agreement, as they were ready and willing to close without the disputed release, whereas the respondents refused to close.

The application was granted, and the respondents were ordered to transfer their shares.

In a contested federal election application, the appeal examined whether voting process defects required annulment where the vote margin was narrow.

The majority adopted a substantive test requiring proof both of a statutory irregularity tied to entitlement and that a person not entitled to vote actually voted.

It held multiple disqualified ballots should be restored because the evidentiary record supported entitlement or failed to prove an entitlement defect on the required standard.

The remaining invalid votes did not meet the threshold to overturn the result.

The appeal was allowed, the cross-appeal was dismissed, and the fresh-evidence motion was dismissed.