Gavin J. Tighe

The plaintiff commenced an action against her former legal and financial advisors alleging negligence and breach of fiduciary duty in connection with advice provided during negotiation of a marriage contract.

The defendants brought summary judgment motions asserting that the action was statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002 and constituted an abuse of process because the plaintiff had a statutory remedy under s. 56(4) of the Family Law Act to set aside the marriage contract against her spouse.

The court held the plaintiff failed to rebut the presumption of discoverability and knew or ought to have known of the material facts giving rise to her claims more than two years before commencing the action.

The court further held that attempting to obtain, through damages against advisors, relief that should have been pursued through family law proceedings constituted an abuse of process.

Following summary judgment dismissing the action, the successful defendant sought costs of both the motion and the action.

The plaintiffs argued hardship and novelty, submitting that no Canadian court had previously considered the title insurance coverages in issue.

The court held that while costs generally follow the result, costs remain discretionary.

Exercising that discretion, the court declined to award costs because the matter was substantially a case of first impression.

Homeowners moved for summary judgment seeking coverage under a title insurance policy after discovering that load‑bearing walls had been removed during prior renovations, rendering the home structurally unsafe.

The municipality issued an order requiring temporary shoring under the Building Code Act, 1992, but no permanent remediation order was made and no order was registered on title.

The court held that the title insurance policy insured risks affecting ownership of title rather than the physical condition or market value of the property.

Because the municipal order did not affect title and was not registered on title, the claimed remediation costs were not covered.

The court also held that where no genuine issue requiring trial exists, the court may grant summary judgment against the moving party even if the responding party did not seek it.

Summary judgment was granted dismissing the applicants’ entire action.

Motions were brought to quash summonses issued by a litigant seeking to compel opposing counsel and a proposed estate trustee during litigation to testify in support of a motion alleging judicial duress in prior settlement proceedings.

The court considered the stringent requirements for summoning opposing counsel as witnesses, emphasizing that such a step requires a high degree of materiality and necessity and should be avoided unless demanded by the administration of justice.

The court found the evidence sought was neither material nor necessary, noting that the moving party had already filed affidavits, transcripts, and audio recordings addressing the relevant events.

The proposed examinations were characterized as a fishing expedition and potentially tactical, as they would force opposing counsel to withdraw and cause delay and expense.

The summonses were quashed and substantial indemnity costs were awarded.

The appellant, who was involved in operating a restaurant on City property, sued the respondent, a mayoral candidate, for libel over comments made during a newspaper editorial board interview.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the comments did not refer to the appellant and were not defamatory.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, noting the respondent's comments focused on the City Council process rather than the appellant personally, and explicitly disavowed accusing anyone of corruption.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his defamation action against a municipal election candidate.

The candidate had delivered a confidential letter to City Council referencing allegations of improper influence regarding an untendered lease agreement with the appellant's family business.

The trial judge found the letter defamatory but protected by qualified privilege, and found no express malice.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, concluding that the communication was reasonably appropriate to the occasion and that the appellant failed to prove malice.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Following an unsuccessful motion by certain defendants seeking removal of the plaintiff’s counsel from the record, the plaintiff sought costs.

The plaintiff requested substantial indemnity costs alleging the motion contained meritless allegations and misstatements of fact amounting to reprehensible conduct.

The court found the motion lacked merit and was ill‑conceived but declined to characterize the conduct as reprehensible.

The court held that reasonably generous partial indemnity costs were appropriate in the circumstances and fixed costs accordingly.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment setting aside a transfer agreement on grounds of undue influence, breach of fiduciary duty, misrepresentation, and unconscionability.

The appellants argued the trial judge exceeded his jurisdiction under a bifurcation order and made palpable and overriding errors of fact.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's order was within the scope of the bifurcation order and his factual findings were well-supported by the evidence.

A lawyer sought declarations that his professional liability insurer had a duty to defend him in underlying mortgage fraud litigation and that the insurer breached confidentiality by reporting allegations to the Law Society.

The underlying pleadings alleged negligence and breach of fiduciary duty arising from the lawyer signing a certificate of independent legal advice without meeting one of the mortgagors.

The insurer denied coverage relying on a policy exclusion for dishonest, fraudulent, criminal, or malicious acts.

The court held that the pleadings sounded in professional negligence rather than fraud and that the exclusion did not apply, triggering the insurer’s duty to defend.

The court also held the insurer did not act improperly in reporting the allegations to the Law Society and that PIPEDA did not apply because the insurer’s mandatory professional liability program was not a commercial activity.

Following the dismissal of two libel actions arising from statements made during a municipal election campaign, the successful defendants sought costs on a full indemnity basis.

They argued the actions were strategic lawsuits against public participation and constituted an abuse of process intended to interfere with the political process.

The court rejected the abuse of process allegation, finding the plaintiff was entitled to pursue legal remedies during an election campaign and that the evidence did not establish a political motive or distortion of the electoral process.

Adverse credibility findings against the plaintiff and litigation conduct did not justify elevated costs.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs, emphasizing proportionality, the public interest issues involved, and reasonable expectations of the unsuccessful party.

The plaintiff brokerage firm moved under Rule 25.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike several paragraphs of the defendants’ statement of defence as scandalous, frivolous, vexatious, or non‑compliant with pleading requirements.

The impugned allegations described a toxic workplace environment and managerial conduct said to have forced the individual defendants to submit resignation letters, and also alleged the action was brought for an improper purpose amounting to abuse of process.

The court held that most of the contested paragraphs were relevant to the central issue of whether the defendants voluntarily resigned or were effectively dismissed and therefore were necessary to allow a full defence.

Allegations relating to the plaintiff’s motive were also permitted because they supported a pleaded abuse of process defence.

Only one sentence describing the workplace atmosphere as widely known in the community was struck as irrelevant and included merely for colour.

The plaintiff sued for libel arising from an open letter delivered by the defendant, then a municipal council candidate, to Toronto councillors and the Mayor concerning alleged influence over a controversial City lease and related election finance questions.

The court held that the letter was defamatory and referred to the plaintiff, but found that the occasion of publication attracted qualified privilege and that portions of the letter also constituted fair comment on matters of public interest.

The court rejected the defence of responsible communication as unavailable on these facts, but held the plaintiff failed to prove express malice sufficient to defeat qualified privilege or fair comment.

The action was dismissed, with contingent general damages assessed at $22,500.

The plaintiff brought a libel action against a municipal councillor arising from statements made to a newspaper editorial board concerning an untendered municipal contract awarded to a corporation associated with the plaintiff.

The court held that although the statements could in law be capable of referring to the plaintiff, the reasonable reader would not conclude that they did so.

The defendant spoke only about the corporation and repeatedly stated he could not accuse anyone or pinpoint wrongdoing.

The court further found that the statements expressed suspicion of corruption without factual assertion and, when read in context, did not convey a defamatory meaning.

The plaintiff therefore failed to establish two essential elements of defamation: reference to the plaintiff and defamatory meaning.

The applicants sought a declaration that they validly exercised a shotgun buy/sell provision in a shareholders agreement, requiring the respondents to transfer their shares in the corporation.

The respondents argued the shotgun notice was invalid because it was issued jointly by two shareholders, and alternatively, that the applicants repudiated the agreement by demanding a release not required by the contract.

The court held that the shotgun provision, interpreted in its factual matrix, allowed for joint exercise by the applicants as a single shareholder group.

The court further found that the applicants did not repudiate the agreement, as they were ready and willing to close without the disputed release, whereas the respondents refused to close.

The application was granted, and the respondents were ordered to transfer their shares.

In a contested federal election application, the appeal examined whether voting process defects required annulment where the vote margin was narrow.

The majority adopted a substantive test requiring proof both of a statutory irregularity tied to entitlement and that a person not entitled to vote actually voted.

It held multiple disqualified ballots should be restored because the evidentiary record supported entitlement or failed to prove an entitlement defect on the required standard.

The remaining invalid votes did not meet the threshold to overturn the result.

The appeal was allowed, the cross-appeal was dismissed, and the fresh-evidence motion was dismissed.

Following a successful application contesting a federal election in which the court declared the election null and void due to voting irregularities, the applicant sought $90,000 in costs.

The court considered whether any respondent could properly be characterized as an unsuccessful party responsible for paying those costs.

The successful candidate was found to have done nothing wrong and stood in a similar position to the applicant, while the Chief Electoral Officer maintained neutrality and could not legally take positions favouring any candidate.

Given the public interest nature of the proceeding and the absence of a party properly liable for costs, the court declined to award costs.

Each party was ordered to bear its own costs, and the applicant’s security for costs deposit was ordered returned.

The applicant, an unsuccessful candidate in a federal election decided by a plurality of 26 votes, brought an application to contest the election under s. 524(1)(b) of the Canada Elections Act.

The applicant argued that irregularities in voter registration and vouching affected the result.

The court found that the onus was on the applicant to prove on a balance of probabilities that irregularities occurred and affected the result.

The court identified 79 votes that were cast irregularly due to failures in registration and vouching procedures.

Because the number of irregular votes exceeded the plurality, the court declared the election null and void.

The appellant appealed a decision striking its pleading.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the pleading was beyond repair.

The appellant failed to plead that the respondents joined with the original tortfeasor to continue a false publication, and the respondents' alleged failure to stop the falsehood did not make them joint tortfeasors.

The appellants' action was dismissed by a motion judge because they were two days late in paying an $8,000 costs award mandated by a peremptory scheduling order.

The appellants appealed the dismissal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge exercised her discretion unreasonably by failing to consider the justice of the case, the lack of prejudice to the respondents, and the minor nature of the breach.

The Court extended the time for compliance and reinstated the action.

The appellant, a law clerk, appealed a summary judgment dismissing his fourth party claim against a former articling student/associate for contribution and indemnity in a solicitor negligence action.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, agreeing the claim was misconceived as the principal solicitor was responsible for the associate's actions.

However, the Court allowed the appeal on costs, reducing the substantial indemnity costs award from $25,000 to $17,000, finding the appellant's counsel did not mislead the court and the allegations in the pleadings were not entirely irrelevant.