Gavin J. Tighe

The applicant, Jennifer Ann Leitch, brought a motion for a declaration of conspiracy and damages, while the respondent, Anthony James Charles Novac, brought a cross-motion for a decrease in child and spousal support.

The applicant's motion was dismissed, and the respondent's motion was granted.

This ruling addresses the significant costs sought by the successful respondent and third-party respondents (Novac/Sonco) against the applicant.

The court considered the parties' offers to settle, the complexity of the issues, the applicant's unreasonable litigation strategy, and the proportionality of the costs.

The court rejected the applicant's arguments for reducing costs based on the respondent's alleged misrepresentation of income or her limited means, emphasizing that the applicant, a litigation lawyer, understood the risks.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of three overlapping actions brought under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The actions arose from a family dispute concerning the appellant's exclusion from his grandfather's will and alleged undue influence and fraudulent conduct by family members and lawyers.

The motion judge dismissed the actions as frivolous and vexatious.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: (1) the motion judge failed to make explicit findings that the proceedings were frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process; (2) the harassment and defamation claims were supported by the pleadings; and (3) the motion judge failed to explain why the statements of claim could not be amended.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all three grounds of appeal and upheld the dismissals.

The applicant wife alleged that her former husband and his family (the third-party respondents) engaged in a complex civil conspiracy to hide his income and assets through corporate restructuring and family trusts, thereby defeating her claims for child and spousal support.

The third-party respondents brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the conspiracy claims, while the applicant brought a cross-motion for partial summary judgment.

The husband also brought a motion to retroactively reduce his interim support obligations, arguing his income had materially decreased.

The Superior Court of Justice granted the third-party respondents' motion, dismissing the conspiracy claims, finding that the corporate transactions were undertaken for legitimate tax and estate planning purposes, not to harm the applicant.

The court also granted the husband's motion to vary support, significantly reducing his child and spousal support obligations retroactively to January 1, 2017, based on a material change in his income.

The plaintiff sought to introduce preliminary inquiry transcripts as evidence in support of a pending Mareva injunction motion.

The defendants opposed, arguing that a publication ban from the criminal proceedings prohibited their use and that the transcripts were inadmissible hearsay.

The court ruled that filing the transcripts would breach the publication ban, they were not "otherwise admissible by law" under the Ontario Evidence Act, and their evidentiary purpose in the preliminary inquiry differed from the Mareva injunction motion, leading to actual prejudice for the defendants.

Consequently, the plaintiff was not permitted to rely on the transcripts.

The court issued its third and final set of reasons following a hearing on June 27, 2018, confirming an interim ruling and addressing costs.

The court drew negative inferences against Greyslone Ltd., Belview Management Ltd., and Mr. Czerlau due to evasive conduct and lack of corporate authority, disallowing claims of privilege over solicitors' files.

It ordered all solicitors' files (Assuras, Lof, Brown) to be delivered to an Independent Supervising Solicitor for review and production of relevant documents to the plaintiff.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs of $19,878.53 against Mr. Czerlau, Greyslone Ltd., and Belview Management Ltd. jointly and severally, and partial indemnity costs of $13,626.70 against Ms. Assuras, also jointly and severally with the others to that extent.

Raymond James Ltd. (RJL) successfully obtained summary judgment against Jayanth Noronha for a forgivable loan and dismissal of his $2.0 million counterclaim.

RJL sought costs on a full indemnity basis, relying on an indemnification clause in the Agency Agreement and Noronha's unsubstantiated allegations of bad faith.

The court awarded RJL full indemnity costs of $93,403.10, finding the indemnification clause valid and Noronha's conduct prolonged the litigation, making the requested costs reasonable and fair.

This endorsement determined the costs arising from a dismissed summary judgment motion brought by Liberty Development Corporation and several derivative motions.

The plaintiff, York Regional Standard Condominium Corporation No. 1206 (YRSCC No. 1206), was awarded $60,000 in partial indemnity costs for successfully resisting Liberty's summary judgment motion.

Conversely, Liberty Development Corporation was awarded a total of $34,261.12 in partial indemnity costs for various motions initiated by YRSCC No. 1206, including motions to stay, a pleading amendment motion, and an expert report motion.

The court dismissed YRSCC No. 1206's claim for restitution of previously awarded costs and found no basis for costs against or in favour of Darcon Inc. The decision applied the "costs follow the event" principle but declined to award substantial indemnity costs, noting that the parties' matching settlement offers regarding the withdrawal of motions effectively neutralized each other.

The plaintiff investment dealer, Raymond James Ltd. (RJL), terminated its agency agreement with the defendant investment advisor, Jayanth Noronha, after discovering he was involved in off-book investments and using personal email for business, contravening RJL's compliance manual and IIROC rules.

Upon termination, the outstanding balance of a forgivable loan to Noronha became immediately due.

RJL sued for this balance, while Noronha counterclaimed for wrongful termination and breach of good faith, alleging RJL sought to misappropriate his book of business.

The Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada (IIROC) subsequently found Noronha guilty of multiple rule violations, including off-book trading, undisclosed remuneration, conflict of interest, and deleting email records, leading to a lifetime ban.

RJL moved for summary judgment.

The court found no genuine issue for trial, holding that the loan was contractually due upon termination, and Noronha's termination was justified by his regulatory breaches, not a pretext to seize his client base.

The IIROC findings further confirmed the validity of RJL's actions.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, allowing RJL's claim and dismissing Noronha's counterclaim.

This decision addresses two motions: one by defendant Martini to compel the examination of Gheorghe Leferman (sole officer/director of the plaintiff, Romcan Limited) as a witness under Rule 39.03 for a pending motion for a further and better affidavit of documents, and another by defendant Shulgan to compel Mr. Leferman's examination for discovery.

The court granted Martini's Rule 39.03 motion, limiting the scope of examination to specific areas where Mr. Leferman had improperly introduced hearsay evidence, and deemed requests for personal documents premature.

Shulgan's motion for examination for discovery was also granted, finding that he had met the preconditions and the benefits of early discovery outweighed the burden of a second examination for Mr. Leferman.

Martini's motion for a further and better affidavit of documents was adjourned.

Costs were divided for Martini's motion due to mixed success, while Shulgan was awarded $5,000 for his entirely successful motion.

A case conference was held to address procedural issues following previous endorsements.

The court directed the parties to draft separate orders for six prior motions.

The court also scheduled a Rule 21 motion brought by the defendant Shapiro regarding the plaintiff's Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim, and scheduled the plaintiff's renewed motion for a Mareva injunction.

Finally, the court set a timetable for written submissions regarding the Atkinson defendants' request to pay outstanding costs orders from funds held in trust.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision dismissing her claims against Minto Group Inc. (her penthouse landlord) and Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP (her lawyers).

The appellant had been defrauded by a man she met online who misrepresented his age, wealth, and background.

She sought damages from various parties, alleging they failed to protect her from the fraudster.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment, finding that the appellant's claims against both Minto and Faskens lacked merit.

Against Minto, the court found no genuine issue requiring trial on claims for intrusion upon seclusion, breach of contract, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, or infliction of mental distress.

Against Faskens, the court found that the lawyer had no obligation to conduct background investigations on the appellant's fiancé absent explicit instructions, and that the scope of the retainer did not include such duties.

The plaintiff condominium corporation brought an action for $75 million in damages for construction deficiencies against 53 defendants.

One defendant, Liberty Development Corporation, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the claims against it, arguing it had no contractual or operational connection to the project.

The plaintiff brought a preliminary motion to admit an expert report, which was dismissed for failing to meet the Mohan criteria.

The court dismissed Liberty's motion for summary judgment, finding genuine issues requiring trial regarding Liberty's operational involvement, representations of its involvement, and its relationship with the construction manager.

The court also held that partial summary judgment was not advisable in the context of the litigation as a whole due to the risk of duplicative and inconsistent findings.

The defendants in a solicitor negligence action brought a motion to remove the plaintiff's counsel of record, arguing that counsel would inevitably be required to testify as a witness regarding advice he gave the plaintiff in the underlying real estate litigation.

The court applied the factors from Essa (Township) v. Guergis and concluded that counsel's evidence regarding the plaintiff's decision to proceed with the underlying action was highly relevant to the defendants' defence that the plaintiff's losses were caused by his current counsel's advice.

The court ordered the removal of the plaintiff's counsel and directed the production of counsel's file and accounts from the underlying action based on a deemed waiver of solicitor-client privilege.

The defendant lawyers brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's claim against them for professional negligence under Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff, a lender in a private mortgage transaction, alleged that the defendant lawyers, who represented the borrower, owed it a duty of care and failed to conduct adequate due diligence.

The court granted the motion, finding that opposing counsel generally owe no duty of care to an opposing party, especially when both parties are represented by independent counsel.

The court concluded that there was no special relationship or sufficient proximity to establish a duty of care, and struck the pleadings against the defendant lawyers.

The appellant, a lawyer, appealed from a summary judgment dismissing his counterclaim against his former counsel, Lang Michener LLP.

The counterclaim alleged negligent advice regarding a potential claim against his professional liability insurer (LawPro) for coverage of an Italian judgment based on fraud.

The motion judge found no coverage existed under the policy because the Italian judgment was based on fraud rather than professional negligence or error.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding the Italian court had explicitly declined jurisdiction over professional liability claims and the judgment was based on extra-contractual fraud, not professional services.

The court also upheld the costs award of $45,000 against the appellant.

The appellant, a vendor of undeveloped land, appealed a Superior Court judgment requiring it to pay $407,582 in development-related costs as a condition of obtaining a severance consent from the municipality.

The Agreement of Purchase and Sale contained a clause permitting the vendor to refuse onerous or unreasonable severance conditions.

The application judge decided the case on the basis of a zoning clause not raised by the parties, constituting a denial of procedural fairness.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that requiring a non-developing vendor to pay development costs was unreasonable under the contract, and that the respondent purchaser bore the obligation to satisfy such conditions or terminate the agreement.

A private mortgage lender purchased mortgage insurance from an insurer and became the victim of mortgage fraud.

The lender's lawyer paid mortgage proceeds to the borrower's lawyer in trust rather than directly to the borrower.

The insurer denied coverage based on an exception clause requiring proceeds to be paid to the registered title holder.

The application judge found the exception did not apply.

The insurer appealed.

The majority of the Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision, holding that payment to the borrower's lawyer in trust constitutes payment to the borrower for purposes of the insurance policy.

The dissent argued the exception clause was unambiguous and applied because the funds were not paid directly to the registered title holder.

The plaintiff corporation brought a motion for leave to register a certificate of pending litigation on an adjacent commercial property.

The plaintiff alleged it had a binding agreement of purchase and sale with the defendant owner, which the defendant repudiated after the tenant purportedly exercised a right of first refusal.

The court found the plaintiff raised a triable issue regarding its interest in the unique adjacent land and granted the motion, ordering the plaintiff to pay its promised deposit into court.

The defendants brought motions to dismiss the plaintiff trade union's action for lack of standing, to stay the action pending related criminal proceedings, and to strike the statement of claim.

The plaintiff union alleged the defendants misappropriated funds intended for the union's Retiree's Cancer Claim Fund.

The court found the plaintiff had standing as a trade union acting within its labour relations functions.

The court declined to stay the civil action, finding no extraordinary circumstances despite pending criminal charges against two defendants.

On the motions to strike, the court upheld most claims against the primary defendants but struck the claims against the defendant lawyer with leave to amend, finding insufficient material facts pleaded regarding his involvement.

The applicant, having been entirely successful in the underlying application, sought partial indemnity costs of $89,703.50.

The respondent argued for no costs or a maximum of $50,000, citing the applicant's failed allegation of bad faith.

The court noted that much of the parties' submissions were not directed to the determinative issue, which the court identified independently based on the Agreement of Purchase and Sale.

The court also questioned the necessity of multiple counsel.

Costs were awarded to the applicant in the reduced amount of $68,407.68 plus HST.