Frank Au

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault and uttering a threat against his wife.

At trial, the judge relied on a letter written by the complainant's family law lawyer to the appellant's lawyer, which referenced a history of violence, to confirm the complainant's allegations and bolster her credibility.

The Court of Appeal held that the statements in the letter were hearsay and not admissible for the truth of their contents.

Because the trial judge impermissibly used the letter to confirm the history of violence, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for aggravated assault and forcible confinement, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to ensure he was represented by counsel and by inadequately assisting him as a self-represented litigant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant, an experienced criminal litigant, had clearly chosen to represent himself and that the trial judge had provided adequate and fair assistance throughout the trial.

The court also upheld the 4.5-year sentence as fit given the violent nature of the offence and the appellant's substantial criminal record.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery, extortion, attempted robbery, and failure to comply with probation.

He argued the trial judge provided inadequate reasons and failed to properly assess eyewitness identification evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against the convictions, finding the trial judge's reasons sufficient and the identification evidence reliable.

However, applying the Kienapple principle, the court stayed the extortion conviction and quashed a duplicate probation breach conviction.

The appellant appealed an Ontario Review Board disposition ordering his continued detention.

The Board found that the appellant would stop his medication and abuse substances if given an absolute discharge, but failed to consider a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Board's failure to specifically inquire into the availability and propriety of a conditional discharge as the least onerous disposition was an error of law.

The Court also noted the Board improperly considered non-conviction charges in its risk assessment.

The disposition was quashed and the matter remitted for a new hearing.

The appellant appealed his 18-month sentence for retrieving, loading, and firing a rifle in close proximity to his wife during a domestic dispute.

He sought a reduction to time served (four months) followed by probation, noting he had been released on the Temporary Absence Program.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the offence very serious and holding that the trial judge did not err in concluding that denunciation required incarceration.

The Crown appealed a sentence of ten months' imprisonment and three years' probation imposed on the respondent for trafficking cocaine and ecstasy and possessing a loaded handgun.

The trial judge had reduced a five-year global sentence by one-third for the respondent's guilty plea, followed by further deductions for pre-trial custody and police assistance.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in principle by applying a formulaic discount for the guilty plea, resulting in a manifestly inadequate sentence.

However, because the respondent had already served his sentence, resumed his education, and demonstrated excellent prospects for rehabilitation, the Court concluded it was not in the interests of justice to return him to jail and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed her convictions for possession of cocaine and marijuana for the purpose of trafficking.

She argued that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate and that he improperly rejected her evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons adequate for appellate review.

The court held that the surveillance evidence corroborated the Crown's evidence, supporting the conclusion that the appellant was selling cocaine from her apartment and possessed the drugs for the purpose of trafficking.

The appellants appealed their convictions and sentences for drug-related offences.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction for possession for the purpose of trafficking, finding a sufficient factual basis including the quantity of marijuana, cash, scales, and bags.

The court also declined to interfere with Count 7 due to trial counsel's concession.

However, the convictions of one appellant on Counts 4 and 5 were quashed because the absence of reasons by the trial judge prevented meaningful appellate review, as guilt was not the only possible verdict on the evidence.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of participating in a sophisticated marijuana growing operation and sentenced to nine months' imprisonment.

She appealed both the conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the evidence, the verdict was unreasonable, and the trial judge erred in principle by presuming a conditional sentence was unavailable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge reasonably inferred her involvement from circumstantial evidence, including her access to the house and items found in her car.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge properly considered a conditional sentence but concluded denunciation and deterrence mandated a custodial sentence.

The appellant, a taxi driver, was convicted of trafficking heroin and conspiracy to traffic heroin alongside two co-accused.

He appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred by failing to give a Vetrovec warning regarding the testimony of his co-accused and by failing to properly explain the defence's position to the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly exercised discretion in not giving the Vetrovec caution, as the co-accused were not prosecution witnesses and trial fairness considerations were implicated.

The Court also held that the jury charge was fair, balanced, and thorough in presenting the defence's theory that the appellant did not know what his passengers were doing.

The appellant appealed his conviction for a drug offence, arguing the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge was entitled to rely on surveillance evidence of probable drug transactions and the appellant's presence near a barbecue to infer he was aware of and in control of the cocaine hidden inside it.

The appellant appealed his conviction for a narcotics offence, arguing that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the totality of the evidence supported the trial judge's finding that the appellant was the only occupant with knowledge of the narcotics.

The court concluded that the verdict was one that a properly instructed jury, acting judicially, could reasonably have rendered.

The appellant appealed his conspiracy convictions on the basis that the trial judge erred in refusing to permit cross-examination of the affiant and sub-affiants during an application to exclude wiretap evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge applied too strict a test, requiring a showing of fraud or misrepresentation, rather than the correct standard of showing a basis that cross-examination would elicit testimony tending to discredit a pre-condition to the authorization, such as investigative necessity.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.