Frances P. Kiteley

The applicant, a Justice of the Peace, sought judicial review of a decision by the Justices of the Peace Review Council regarding his inappropriate conduct.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application primarily due to an unexplained 18-month delay in bringing the proceeding.

The court also considered the merits, finding no procedural unfairness in the complaint or investigation process, and rejecting the applicant's claim of ineffective counsel, noting there is no right to effective counsel in civil proceedings.

The defendant appealed a trial judgment finding it liable for injuries the plaintiff sustained after falling at its roller skating rink.

The trial judge found the defendant breached its duty under the Occupiers' Liability Act by failing to adequately address a leaking roof, which caused water to pool on the rink floor.

On appeal, the defendant challenged the trial judge's findings on causation, credibility, treatment of corrected discovery evidence under Rule 31.09, and damages.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's assessments of mixed fact and law.

The appellant appealed a trial decision regarding spousal support, arguing the trial judge erred in applying the rule against double recovery, imputing income, and weighing medical evidence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the Boston principle in light of the parties' separation agreement and the appellant's reckless depletion of assets.

The court also upheld the imputation of $5,000 in annual income due to the appellant's poor financial decisions and found no error in the trial judge's treatment of the medical evidence.

The landlord brought a motion to quash the tenant's appeal of a Landlord and Tenant Board order terminating her tenancy.

The tenant had submitted a notice to terminate but later tried to rescind it, which the landlord refused.

The Board ordered termination and dismissed the tenant's motion to set aside.

The tenant appealed, arguing the project was a condominium conversion giving her security of tenure under s. 51 of the Residential Tenancies Act.

The Divisional Court found the appeal manifestly devoid of merit as the project was clearly a demolition, not a conversion.

The motion to quash was granted and the certificate of stay was lifted.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing her complaint of discrimination and harassment.

The complaint arose from sexist blog posts made by a union president during a labour dispute.

The Divisional Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, finding it reasonable to conclude that the blog posts were not made 'in the workplace' and that the Tribunal appropriately considered the union president's Charter rights to freedom of expression and association when determining the posts did not constitute discrimination with respect to employment.

The applicants sought judicial review of an interlocutory ruling made by a coroner at the outset of an inquest into a police shooting.

The ruling limited the scope of cross-examination of two police officers regarding their consultations with counsel prior to making their notes.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application on the basis of prematurity, holding that courts should not intervene in ongoing administrative proceedings, particularly coroner's inquests, absent exceptional circumstances that would result in a fundamental failing of justice.

The applicant physician sought judicial review of a decision by the Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee (ICRC) requiring him to be cautioned and to participate in a behavioral program.

He argued he was denied procedural fairness because the ICRC failed to disclose 13 interview summaries, 20 internal complaints, and hospital policies considered by its medical inspector.

The Divisional Court found that while the applicant was aware of the complaints and policies, the failure to disclose the 13 interview summaries breached the duty of procedural fairness.

The application was allowed, the ICRC decision was set aside, and the matter was remitted for reconsideration following proper disclosure.

The appellant private career college appealed a decision of the Licence Appeal Tribunal directing the Superintendent to refuse to renew its registration.

The Tribunal's decision was based on findings related to student refunds and compliance issues.

The Divisional Court found that there was ample evidence to support the Tribunal's conclusion that the appellant failed to operate the college in accordance with the law and with honesty and integrity.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants, former counsel for the respondent in family law proceedings, appealed an order and a subsequent costs endorsement.

The Divisional Court found no palpable and overriding error of fact or law in the motions judge's findings regarding the advancement of funds.

The court also determined that leave was not required to appeal the costs endorsement under s. 133(b) of the Courts of Justice Act, and found no error in the motions judge's exercise of discretion.

The appeals were dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellants, acting as a general contractor, appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent electrical contractor payment for certain extras.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred in law by finding that formal approval or documentation was not required for the extras.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's conclusion was a finding of mixed fact and law based on the parties' course of dealing, and there was no palpable and overriding error.

Costs were awarded to the self-represented respondent.

The appellant landlords appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board finding that their mobile home park was subject to rent control.

The landlords argued that the property was exempt under section 6(2)(c) of the Residential Tenancies Act because it was not used as a trailer park before November 1, 1991.

The Board found that because a bungalow on the property had been used for residential purposes before 1991, the exemption did not apply.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review and upheld the Board's interpretation, dismissing the appeal.

The appellant wife appealed a temporary order requiring her to advance $100,000 to the respondent husband for interim disbursements and legal fees.

The wife argued that the motions judge erred in his discretion and that there was a lack of procedural fairness because the notice of motion did not specifically request interim disbursements.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no denial of procedural fairness and that the motions judge appropriately exercised his discretion given the serious credibility issues and the need for documentary disclosure.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee dismissing a motion to reconsider its order suspending the mandatory revocation of the respondent pharmacist's certificate of registration for sexual abuse.

The appellant argued the Committee lacked jurisdiction to suspend a mandatory revocation under the Health Professions Procedural Code.

Applying a reasonableness standard of review, the Divisional Court held that the Committee's interpretation of its home statute was reasonable.

The Court found that the mandatory revocation provision did not preclude the Committee from exercising its general power to suspend penalty orders.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Attorney General moved under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to set aside a motion judge's order refusing to consolidate a pharmacist's constitutional challenge in the Superior Court with his professional misconduct appeal in the Divisional Court.

The Attorney General sought to have the consolidated proceeding stayed and the constitutional issue remitted to the College's Discipline Committee.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no error of law and no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's conclusion that exceptional circumstances justified allowing the constitutional challenge to proceed in the Superior Court, particularly given the Discipline Committee's inability to grant a general declaration of invalidity.

Following a family law motion addressing disclosure, child support, interim disbursements, and the sale of a jointly owned property, the court determined costs.

The responding party on the underlying motion had been largely successful and had made reasonable offers to settle under the Family Law Rules.

The court found that the opposing party’s resistance to disclosure and last‑minute concessions increased the costs of the litigation, although the conduct did not amount to bad faith.

While the successful party sought full recovery costs exceeding $76,000, the court held that such an amount would be disproportionate to the issues.

Costs were fixed at $35,000 payable from the opposing party’s share of the sale proceeds of the property or before trial.

Following the dismissal of an action on summary judgment, the successful defendant sought costs.

The self-represented plaintiff did not respond to the requested amount and instead indicated an intention to appeal.

The court reviewed the defendant’s detailed bill of costs, which included internal chargeback rates for in-house counsel and law clerks.

While accepting that the defendant was entitled to substantial costs given the seriousness of the allegations and procedural history, the court made a global reduction to account for overlapping time entries and travel-related fees.

Costs were fixed and ordered payable jointly and severally by the plaintiffs.

The appellant in a wrongful dismissal action sought to review a single Divisional Court judge's order dismissing her motion to admit fresh evidence on her pending appeal from a Master's order.

The Master had refused to allow amendments to the statement of claim, finding the limitation period had expired and rejecting the appellant's argument that she was incapable due to mental health issues.

The Divisional Court panel held that the motion judge made a palpable and overriding error by applying the Palmer test to reject the fresh evidence before the appeal was heard on its merits.

The panel set aside the order, directing that the admissibility of the fresh evidence be determined by the judge hearing the appeal.

The applicant, a former student, sought judicial review of York University's actions, including issuing a trespass notice and a cease and desist letter, and its handling of his records.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for lack of jurisdiction, finding that judicial review is a public law remedy and the University's actions were taken as a private landowner.

The court also held that the Charter did not apply to the University's actions as they were not governmental in nature, and noted that complaints regarding criminal conduct, human rights, or privacy must be pursued in other forums.

The court released a decision allowing the appeal and awarding the appellant $15,000 in agreed costs for the appeal.

The parties were invited to make written submissions on the costs of the original application.

The applicant sought $15,000, while the respondent sought costs on a substantial or partial indemnity basis, citing an informal settlement offer and the improper naming of condominium directors as individual respondents.

The court found that while the applicant had a technical victory regarding the status certificate, the practical result favoured the respondent.

Consequently, the court ordered that each party bear its own costs of the original application.

The appellants appealed an interlocutory order requiring the appellant corporation to pay the respondents' interim legal fees and disbursements in an oppression remedy application pursuant to s. 249(4) of the Business Corporations Act.

The Divisional Court upheld the motions judge's decision to order payment of unpaid and future accounts at face value without an approval process, finding no palpable and overriding error.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part, finding that the motions judge erred in ordering the reimbursement of accounts already paid by the respondents, as there was no evidence that failing to reimburse those specific amounts would preclude them from pursuing their claims.