Frances P. Kiteley

The corporate plaintiff was ordered to pay $15,000 into court as security for costs.

The sole officer and director paid the amount with his own personal funds.

The defendant later obtained judgment against the plaintiff on its counterclaim and sought an order under the Creditors' Relief Act that the money paid into court be paid out to it as an execution creditor.

The motion judge granted the order.

On appeal, the Divisional Court set aside the order, finding that the funds were impressed with a Quistclose trust in favour of the director who advanced them for a specific purpose.

The funds never belonged to the execution debtor and were not available for distribution to its creditors.

The parents appealed a summary judgment finding their newborn child in need of protection and making the child a Crown Ward without access.

The child was apprehended at birth due to the parents' extensive history with the children's aid society, which included four other children being removed from their care.

The motions judge relied on past parenting evidence and found no genuine issue for trial.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the motions judge's application of the summary judgment rules or reliance on past judicial findings.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Law Society Appeal Panel decision dismissing his appeal from a Hearing Panel that denied his application for a paralegal licence.

The Hearing Panel found he did not meet the good character requirement because he had breached a previous undertaking not to provide unauthorized legal services.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applicant's motion to introduce fresh evidence and dismissed the application for judicial review, finding the Appeal Panel's decision was reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The applicants sought judicial review of four decisions of the Ontario Labour Relations Board, including procedural decisions denying an adjournment and change of venue, and a final decision declaring the applicants to be one employer bound to certain collective agreements.

The applicants argued the Board breached natural justice by refusing to adjourn the hearing from Toronto to Thunder Bay.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Board's travel policy reasonable and noting the applicants failed to provide adequate reasons for their non-attendance when invited to do so.

The Court also upheld the Board's document production order.

The appellant, who sustained a severe traumatic brain injury, appealed a decision of the Health Services Appeal and Review Board denying her request for pre-approved funding for in-patient rehabilitative services at an Alberta facility.

The facility was not licensed as a hospital and did not accept public funding.

The appellant argued the denial breached her rights under sections 7 and 15 of the Charter.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that section 7 does not impose a positive obligation on the government to fund out-of-province medical treatments, and that the denial was based on the facility's licensing status, not the appellant's disability, thus not engaging section 15.

Following the dismissal of their judicial review application, the applicants argued they should not pay costs because the application was public interest litigation.

The Divisional Court rejected this argument, finding the application was motivated by the practitioner applicants' commercial interests.

The court awarded costs of $30,000 to the Transitional Council and $15,000 to the Minister of Health and Long-Term Care, finding the Transitional Council's initial claim of up to $125,297.56 excessive.

The court ordered all applicants, including patient applicants, to be jointly and severally liable for the costs.

The defendant appealed the trial judge's decision to grant a non-suit dismissing its third-party claim against the plaintiff's son.

The plaintiff, a 92-year-old woman, was injured when she slipped on ice outside her apartment building after her son dropped her off.

The defendant argued the son owed a duty of care based on his past habit of assisting her.

The Divisional Court upheld the trial judge's finding that there was no factual foundation to impose a legal duty of care on the son, as the mother was an independent person capable of caring for herself, and voluntary past assistance does not create a legally binding duty.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Financial Services Tribunal dismissing his claim for a pension from his former employer.

The appellant argued that the pension plan's locking-in provision was clear and entitled him to a pension, or alternatively, that the ambiguous provision should be interpreted in his favour using the contra proferentem rule.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Tribunal's interpretation of the ambiguous provision was reasonable and consistent with the legislative context, and that the Tribunal made no error in declining to apply the contra proferentem principle.

The applicants sought judicial review of an interlocutory order from a Small Claims Court Deputy Judge, who had dismissed their motion to strike the respondent's claim for lack of jurisdiction and expiry of a limitation period.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that judicial review of interlocutory Small Claims Court decisions is only available in narrow circumstances, such as when the court acts without jurisdiction.

The court found that the Deputy Judge's provisional determination of jurisdiction based on allegations of theft did not warrant judicial review, as the Small Claims Court generally has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction.

The defendant insurer brought a motion for summary judgment and to strike the plaintiffs’ action alleging damages arising from alleged unpaid commissions and wrongful conduct in terminating an insurance producer agreement.

The court found the claim was commenced well beyond the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff argued that psychiatric illness rendered him incapable of commencing proceedings, but the evidence, including medical records and his own conduct, did not establish incapacity sufficient to suspend the limitation period.

The court also held that the pleadings failed to disclose reasonable causes of action for mental distress damages, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of duty of good faith, punitive damages, or loss of business.

The motion was granted and the action dismissed without leave to amend.

Following the dismissal of the applicants' application for judicial review, the court determined the issue of costs.

The applicants argued no costs should be awarded as the proceeding was of broader public interest.

The court rejected this argument, finding the issue was entirely personal to the applicants' positions as cottage owners.

The court awarded the respondent costs of $12,500, reducing the requested amount of $16,565.50 to reflect the respondent's lack of success on a jurisdictional issue raised during the hearing.

The appellants, former students of Grenville Christian College, appealed a decision refusing to certify their class action for institutional abuse.

The motions judge had found that all certification criteria were met except for the preferable procedure, concluding that individual issues would overwhelm common ones.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the motions judge made a palpable and overriding error by failing to properly analyze the access to justice barrier and by incorrectly assuming common issues would need to be relitigated.

The Court certified the class action and awarded costs to the appellants.

The landlord defendants appealed an order certifying a class action against them founded on common law negligence following a series of devastating propane explosions.

The appellants argued that as landlords, they owed no duty of care to third parties in the surrounding residential neighbourhood.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding it was not plain and obvious that the landlords had no obligation to act, given allegations that they knew of the highly dangerous propane business and the foreseeable risk of catastrophic harm to nearby residents.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding a $90,000 rent deposit.

The Divisional Court upheld the application judge's finding that the deposit was voluntary and therefore not 'required' under section 106 of the Residential Tenancies Act, meaning there was no contravention of section 135.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part, finding that section 106(6) requires interest to be paid on the deposit, calculated on the monthly declining balance.

The appellant tenant appealed a decision regarding a landlord and tenant dispute, raising an issue of estoppel based on a 2012 final order concerning the description of the premises.

The Divisional Court found the issue to be hypothetical and, applying the doctrine of mootness from Borowski, declined to exercise its discretion to hear the appeal.

The appeal was dismissed as moot with no order as to costs.

The applicants sponsored family members immigrating to Canada and signed undertakings to provide for their financial needs.

The sponsored family members received social assistance, resulting in debts owed by the applicants to the Province of Ontario.

The applicants sought judicial review of the Ministry's decisions to enforce the debts, arguing a breach of procedural fairness because the Ministry provided boilerplate responses and no proper reasons.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications, applying the Supreme Court's decision in Mavi, which held that the duty of fairness in these debt collection matters is minimal and does not require reasons.

The court found the Ministry considered individual circumstances and complied with the required procedural fairness obligations.

The Municipal Property Assessment Corporation (MPAC) appealed a decision of the Assessment Review Board, arguing that the presiding member breached procedural fairness by conducting an independent investigation into property listings.

The Divisional Court found that while the member did conduct an independent investigation, he disclosed this fact to the parties during the hearing and they proceeded without objection.

The Court held that the parties waived the potential apprehension of bias and dismissed the appeal without costs.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board denying his claim for compensation following two assaults by another resident in his apartment building.

The Board denied the claim based on the appellant's credibility, reliability, reckless behaviour, and extensive criminal record, finding he had put himself in harm's way.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board's consideration of the appellant's criminal record and behaviour under section 17(1) of the Compensation for Victims of Crime Act was reasonable.

The applicants sought a declaration that Ontario Regulation 27/13 under the Traditional Chinese Medicine Act, 2006 was ultra vires and breached sections 7 and 15 of the Charter.

They argued the regulation failed to create a 'doctor' class of practitioners and imposed discriminatory English or French language fluency requirements.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the regulation was intra vires, there is no section 7 Charter right to practice a profession unfettered by regulation, and language alone is not a protected ground under section 15.

The applicants, cottage owners in Rondeau Provincial Park, sought a declaration that the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006 applied to their land leases with the Crown, thereby invalidating a regulation terminating their leases in 2017.

The Divisional Court first determined it had jurisdiction to hear the application as it involved the validity of a regulation.

On the merits, the court held that the Residential Tenancies Act does not expressly bind the Crown, nor does the benefit/burden exception apply.

Consequently, the regulation terminating the leases was valid and the application was dismissed.