Edward M. Morgan

The applicant sought an order for partition and sale of four co-owned properties with the respondents (her daughter and the daughter's life partner) due to an irreconcilably deteriorated relationship.

The court granted the application for partition and sale, finding no reason to exercise its narrow discretion to refuse.

Given the animosity between the parties, the court ordered a neutrally conducted judicial sale of the properties under Rule 55.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, referring the matter to an Associate Judge to oversee the sale process and determine the disbursement of proceeds for each property.

The Plaintiffs, vendors in an aborted residential real estate sale, moved for summary judgment against the Defendants, purchasers who failed to close the transaction.

The purchasers sought an abatement or extension due to a decrease in appraised value and financing issues, which the vendors refused.

The vendors subsequently re-sold the property at a lower price and claimed damages.

The court granted summary judgment to the Plaintiffs, finding the Defendants had repudiated the Agreement of Purchase and Sale and that the Plaintiffs had made reasonable efforts to mitigate their losses.

Damages were awarded, including the loss on resale, interest on a bridge loan, and legal fees, with the deposit to be applied against the total.

A motion to amend the style of cause to correct a defendant's name was also granted.

The Plaintiff, a commercial lender, sought summary judgment against John McCrindle, the personal guarantor of a defaulted business loan.

The co-defendant, 1521105 Ontario Inc. o/a System Fitness, was already subject to a default judgment.

Despite the respondent's counsel having no instructions, the court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, noting admissions in the respondent's Statement of Defence and the plaintiff's supporting evidence.

Summary judgment was granted for the outstanding loan balance plus contractual interest and costs, affirming that partial summary judgment is appropriate when there is no risk of conflicting findings.

The defendant sought to stay proceedings and a decade-old summary judgment obtained by the plaintiff for a credit card debt, along with the seizure and sale of her property.

The defendant argued for an adjournment to review the case due to new information about her former lawyer's professional misconduct and alleged delay by the plaintiff in enforcing the judgment.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no grounds for an adjournment or to set aside, vary, or stay the judgment, noting the plaintiff had properly renewed its writ of seizure and sale and the defendant's recourse, if any, was against her former lawyer.

Costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

The applicants purchased a boat from the respondent, Roman Korytski, which was later discovered to be stolen.

The respondent Aviva Canada Inc. claimed ownership by right of salvage.

The applicants sought compensation from Korytski for breach of contract (nemo dat principle) and reimbursement of expenses from Aviva for the boat's upkeep.

The court found Korytski liable for the original purchase price of $33,200, rejecting the claim for current market value due to lack of expert evidence.

The claim against Aviva for expenses was dismissed, as the applicants had possession and use of the boat during the period the expenses were incurred.

The defendant, His Majesty the King in Right of Ontario, brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's, Scott McAnsh's, proposed class action claim.

The plaintiff, a former adjudicator with a fixed-term appointment to the Assessment Review Board, sued for breach of contract, alleging that the government's failure to reappoint him after his term expired constituted a termination of employment and violated a promise of extended tenure.

The court dismissed the action, holding that statutory appointments to administrative tribunals are not employment contracts, and there is no legal obligation or right to reappointment after a fixed term expires.

The court affirmed that the decision to reappoint rests solely with Cabinet's discretion, which cannot be fettered by alleged promises or political considerations, and that fixed-term appointments are consistent with adjudicative independence.

This endorsement addresses the costs arising from a denied urgent Norwich motion brought by the plaintiffs.

The court found no urgency for the Norwich order and determined that the defendant was entitled to costs.

The defendant sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis, while the plaintiffs argued for partial indemnity and payment in the cause, with a reduction for the defendant's alleged delay in retaining counsel and a cross-motion.

The court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments, finding no reason to delay the costs award or discount the defendant's costs.

The court ordered the plaintiffs to pay the defendant $50,000 in all-inclusive costs forthwith on a substantial indemnity scale.

This is a costs endorsement following the dismissal of the defendants' anti-SLAPP motion under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The plaintiffs, who successfully resisted the anti-SLAPP motion, sought costs.

The court awarded costs to the plaintiffs, finding "compelling facts" to justify the award, including the significant reputational harm caused by the defendants' malicious and widely broadcast statements, particularly to a professional lobbyist.

The decision emphasized the need to deter meritless anti-SLAPP motions and fixed costs at $50,000, aligning with the Court of Appeal's suggested ceiling.

The defendants brought a motion to decertify a class action, arguing that a mass opt-out of 66 out of 69 potential class members meant the action no longer met certification criteria, particularly the "preferable procedure" requirement.

The plaintiff opposed, seeking further production and challenging the class list.

The court found the plaintiff's objections to the class list meritless and an abuse of process, given the late timing.

It held that with only one or a few remaining class members, the class action no longer served the goals of access to justice, judicial economy, or behavioral modification, as individual claims were economically viable and the class action could potentially harm the interests of those who opted out.

The motion to decertify was granted.

The Applicants sought a declaration that the Respondents were responsible for coverage of a professional liability claim under an excess liability policy.

The policy was a "claims made and reported" policy, requiring claims to be made and reported during the policy period.

The Applicants' insurance broker failed to report the claim to the Respondents until three years after the policy period expired.

The court found that the "claims made and reported" requirement was a condition precedent to coverage and was not met.

The court rejected arguments that the Respondents suffered no prejudice or that other policy conditions were inconsistent.

The court also declined to grant relief from forfeiture, noting that the Applicants would not suffer prejudice as their broker had admitted negligence and agreed to indemnify them.

The application was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the Respondents.

The applicants sought to set aside two consent judgments obtained by Owens Wright LLP against its insolvent clients, Greenvilla, arguing abuse of process and fraudulent preference under the Assignments and Preferences Act.

The court found that Owens Wright obtained the judgments through abusive maneuvers, including failure to provide proper notice and ignoring a Notice of Intent to Defend from Greenvilla's receiver.

The court also found the transactions to be fraudulent preferences, citing numerous indicia of fraud and the non-arm's length relationship between Owens Wright and Greenvilla.

The judgments were declared null and void, and Owens Wright was ordered to repay the funds.

This costs endorsement followed a successful application by commercial landlords (Applicants) against Cerieco Canada Corp., a second indemnifier, for payment of garnished funds and outstanding rent.

Cerieco unsuccessfully defended the application.

The Applicants sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis, as contractually provided in the lease.

The court found no "good reason" to deviate from the contractual right to costs, despite the court's inherent discretion.

The Applicants were awarded $56,000 in all-inclusive costs.

The Plaintiff, Nordik Windows Inc., was successful in a certification motion and related motions.

This endorsement addresses the costs for these motions, which involved two rounds of hearings due to a recusal by the initial judge.

The court determined the appropriate costs, considering the re-usable work from the first hearing and the work for the second hearing, ultimately awarding the Plaintiff $1,000,000.00 in all-inclusive costs.

The Appellant appealed an Assessment Officer's report which found the Respondent's legal account proven and awarded costs.

The Respondent brought a preliminary motion to quash the appeal due to procedural defects and delay.

The court dismissed the motion to quash, accepting the Appellant's counsel's personal circumstances as justification for delay and applying a liberal construction of procedural rules.

However, the court dismissed the appeal on its merits, deferring to the Assessment Officer's credibility findings which favoured the Respondent, and finding no error in principle or misapprehension of evidence.

The court also amended the title of proceedings to include the Appellant's aliases and awarded costs to the Respondent.

This appeal concerned a decision by the Consent and Capacity Board (the "Board") confirming the appellant's incapacity to consent to treatment.

Subsequent to the Board's decision, the appellant regained capacity, leading both parties to seek to admit new evidence.

The court admitted the new evidence but ultimately dismissed the appeal, finding it moot as the live controversy regarding the appellant's capacity had disappeared.

In the alternative, the court found no palpable and overriding error in the Board's original decision, which had correctly applied the legal test for capacity under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996.

The plaintiff, a commercial tenant, sought an interlocutory injunction to prevent the defendant landlord from terminating its tenancy and repossessing the premises due to alleged discrepancies in square footage and other complaints.

The plaintiff was in significant rent arrears, having unilaterally abated rent based on its claims.

The court found no serious issue to be tried, emphasizing the tenant's obligation to pay rent in full under a commercial lease, and that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate irreparable harm.

The motion for an interlocutory injunction was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the defendant.

The defendant law firm moved for security for costs against the self-represented plaintiff, who resides outside of Ontario and Canada.

The plaintiff claimed impecuniosity, but the court found his evidence insufficient, noting similar findings in prior family law proceedings.

The court also considered the plaintiff's low likelihood of success in his solicitors' negligence claim and the defendant's incurred and projected legal fees.

The motion for security for costs was granted, requiring the plaintiff to pay $85,000 into court, but no costs were awarded for the motion itself.

The plaintiffs brought an urgent motion for a Norwich order to compel disclosure of information related to alleged defamation and intrusion upon seclusion, stemming from internet postings and domain name purchases.

The court found no urgency, questioned the validity of the intrusion upon seclusion claim regarding dormant domain names, and noted the defamation claim was weak as the articles had been removed.

The motion was deemed a potential tactical move related to ongoing commercial litigation between the parties.

The court dismissed the motion, finding it was not justified for a Norwich order and was akin to a fishing expedition.

The plaintiff brought a motion for a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) against a property, alleging that the defendant Tong Zang was fraudulently hiding her interest in it by having her son, Lawrence John Roy, take title.

The plaintiff had previously obtained a judgment against Zang and other CPLs on different properties, and despite Zang's assignment in bankruptcy, the plaintiff obtained an order under section 38 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to continue the action.

The court found that the plaintiff had established a reasonable chance of proving its claims that Zang was the true beneficial owner or that Lawrence's title was fraudulent.

The motion was granted, and a CPL was ordered to be issued against the property.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action for breach of fiduciary duty and negligence, arguing it was brought beyond the two-year limitation period.

The plaintiff contended the claim was discoverable later due to alleged fraudulent concealment of the defendants' agency status.

The court found the plaintiff knew or ought to have known the material facts earlier, as evidenced by her pleadings in a prior related action.

The court dismissed the action as limitation barred, emphasizing that knowledge of material facts, not legal conclusions, triggers the limitation period.