David Wayne Trenholm Levangie

Collingwood Aviation Partners Ltd. (CAPL) applied for a declaration that it had a common law easement and contractual rights to full access to the adjacent airport lands owned by Winterland Airfield Holdings Ltd. (WAH).

WAH had erected fences restricting CAPL's access, citing safety concerns, and sought to impose user fees and increased insurance requirements.

The court found that CAPL had both contractual and common law easement rights to unimpeded access, as the properties had a symbiotic historical relationship.

The court ordered the removal of the restrictive fencing, declared that WAH could not charge user fees for access, and dismissed WAH's application regarding insurance.

The plaintiff brought a motion under Rule 5.04(2) to amend the title of proceedings to correct an alleged misnomer, seeking to substitute 'Downtown Auto Collision Centre Inc.' for the named plaintiff 'Dealer’s Choice Preferred Collision Centre Inc.'.

The action alleged breach of a 2013 agreement.

The court found that the defendants had specifically rejected the inclusion of Downtown Auto as a party to the agreement during negotiations.

Applying the 'litigating finger' test, the court concluded the defendants would have had no reason to think the intended plaintiff was Downtown Auto.

The motion was dismissed with costs awarded to the defendants.

The plaintiff sought costs of $89,304.86 on a partial indemnity basis following a successful motion for declaratory relief regarding an easement over the defendant's property.

The defendant argued for each party to bear its own costs due to divided success, or alternatively, a reduced amount.

The court rejected the divided success argument, finding the plaintiff was the successful party, but reduced the costs award to $45,000 all inclusive, finding the plaintiff's claim excessive and noting the abandoned claim against the municipality.

The plaintiff Medical Centre and defendant JD Development owned abutting properties subject to a system of easements.

Both submitted redevelopment site plans to the City of Markham.

The Medical Centre's plan relied on paving an easement over JD Development's property for vehicular access, while JD Development's plan showed the easement as partially sodded, which would block vehicular access.

The Medical Centre brought a motion for declarations regarding its right to use and pave the easement.

JD Development argued the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal (LPAT) had exclusive jurisdiction.

The Superior Court held it had jurisdiction to determine property rights, declared the Medical Centre had the right to use the easement for vehicular traffic and to pave it at its own expense, but declined to order JD Development to amend its site plan.

The defendants moved for an order compelling the plaintiff to re-attend discovery and for the defendants to be present during her examination.

The plaintiff cross-moved to exclude the defendants from her discovery and from each other's discoveries, citing psychological distress.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion, affirming the inherent right of parties to attend discoveries.

While not finding exceptional circumstances for full exclusion, the court ordered the plaintiff's examination to proceed via video conference, with the plaintiff and her counsel in one room and the defendants and their counsel in another, to mitigate potential distress.

The plaintiff was ordered to pay costs thrown away due to the cancellation of the original examinations.

The landlord and tenant brought competing applications regarding the interpretation of a commercial lease renewal.

The tenant argued the lease renewed automatically, while the landlord argued a 2012 Renewal Agreement required the tenant to give six months' notice.

The court found that the tenant had established a claim for rectification based on unilateral mistake, as the landlord's agent had inserted the notice requirement without instructions and without drawing it to the tenant's attention, which amounted to unconscionable conduct.

The court ordered the lease rectified to reflect an automatic right of renewal.

This endorsement addresses the costs of a successful motion brought by the defendant to set aside a judgment obtained by the plaintiff.

The court ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendant $12,000 in costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The decision emphasized the plaintiff's breach of its duty of full and fair disclosure on a motion brought without notice, and its failure to consent to set aside the judgment when offered without costs.

The court applied factors under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act, balancing indemnity for the successful party with access to justice.

The court also dismissed the plaintiff's request to pay costs into court due to the defendant's bankruptcy, finding no basis to hold funds for a potential trustee claim.

The defendant moved to set aside a judgment granted without notice, which included a declaration under s. 178 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act that the debt survived bankruptcy due to fraud.

The court found that the plaintiff had no right to seek judgment without notice, as the defendant had not been noted in default, and there were significant credibility issues regarding service and the underlying fraud allegation.

The court emphasized that s. 178 declarations should not be made on default judgment motions or without a proper assessment of the fraud claim.

Applying the test for setting aside default judgments, the court found the defendant moved promptly, had a plausible excuse for default (disputed service), and an arguable defence on the merits (credibility issues regarding fraud and limitations).

The judgment was set aside due to non-disclosure, failure to give notice, and improper use of s. 178 BIA.

The appellant electrical contractor appealed the dismissal of its action against the respondent regional municipality.

The appellant alleged the municipality breached its procurement bylaws by engaging in contract-splitting to award work to a competitor.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the municipality's task-oriented approach did not violate the bylaws and that there was no evidence of unfair treatment or contract-splitting.

Furthermore, the appellant failed to prove any damages.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendant, a cosmetic plastic surgeon, brought a motion to set aside a default judgment obtained by the plaintiff for unpaid anesthesiology services.

The defendant argued he failed to respond to the statement of claim because he was negotiating with the plaintiff, and raised defences of economic duress and potential violations of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

Applying the five-part test from Mountain View Farms, the court found the defendant moved promptly, had an arguable defence on the merits, and that the balance of prejudice and the interests of justice favoured having the action defended on its merits.

The motion was granted and the default judgment was set aside.

The defendants brought a motion to remove the plaintiff’s counsel and law firm as solicitors of record on the basis of an alleged conflict of interest.

They argued that the lawyer had previously interacted with one defendant while representing a related corporation during regulatory proceedings involving dealership licence suspensions, and had allegedly received confidential information and provided legal advice.

The court applied the principles governing disqualification of counsel, including the test from MacDonald Estate v Martin regarding prior relationships and confidential information.

The court found no solicitor-client relationship between the lawyer and the defendants and no evidence that confidential information about the defendants had been imparted.

As no conflict of interest or breach of duty of loyalty was established, the motion to remove counsel was dismissed.

The defendant brought a motion to set aside a default judgment arising from a claim for unpaid gambling credit advanced by a casino.

The motion relied on an exclusive jurisdiction clause in the underlying credit agreement favouring Singapore courts and on a hearsay assertion that the defendant never received the statement of claim served by substituted service.

The court held that a forum selection clause does not render proceedings void and cannot justify setting aside a judgment absent other grounds, particularly where the defendant delayed and produced no evidence of a defence on the merits.

Applying the factors governing motions to set aside default judgment, the court found no credible explanation for the defendant’s delay, no evidence of non‑service, and no arguable defence.

The interests of justice therefore did not favour granting relief.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order granting a conditional stay of proceedings in Ontario.

The motion judge found that while Ontario had jurisdiction simpliciter, other actions in Nevada and British Columbia were relevant to the forum non conveniens analysis, and ordered a temporary stay that would become permanent if the respondent commenced an action in those jurisdictions within 60 days.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge's application of the Van Breda factors and the resulting disposition to be reasonable and fair.

The appellant private career college appealed a decision of the Licence Appeal Tribunal directing the Superintendent to refuse to renew its registration.

The Tribunal's decision was based on findings related to student refunds and compliance issues.

The Divisional Court found that there was ample evidence to support the Tribunal's conclusion that the appellant failed to operate the college in accordance with the law and with honesty and integrity.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following a successful fraud trial brought under s. 38 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, the court determined the appropriate scale and quantum of costs payable to two successful creditor plaintiffs.

The defendants had engaged in fraudulent conveyances, document alteration, and litigation conduct that delayed the trial and attempted to mislead the court.

The court held that such conduct justified an award of full indemnity costs, an exceptional remedy reserved for egregious dishonesty and abuse of the judicial process.

After reviewing the draft bills of costs, the court reduced certain duplicative and insufficiently documented claims but fixed substantial full indemnity costs payable to each plaintiff.

The defendants were held jointly and severally liable for the costs, payable forthwith.

The plaintiffs, creditors of the bankrupt defendant, brought an action to set aside the conveyances of multiple real properties as fraudulent.

The defendant had transferred the properties to related individuals and shell corporations for nominal consideration shortly after defaulting on a business loan.

The court found that the defendant engaged in a pattern of dishonest conduct, including forging documents and manipulating trust declarations, to shield her assets from creditors.

Applying the balance of probabilities standard, the court held that the conveyances were fraudulent and void under the Fraudulent Conveyances Act.

The properties were ordered to be sold with proceeds distributed to the plaintiffs and the bankruptcy trustee.

The plaintiff supplier brought a motion for summary judgment seeking payment of outstanding invoices for wholesale jewelry sold to the corporate defendant and enforcement of alleged personal guarantees by the individual defendants.

The defendants argued that returned merchandise and diamonds supplied to the plaintiff eliminated the debt and that factual disputes required a trial.

Applying the summary judgment framework under Rule 20 and the guidance in Combined Air Mechanical Services Inc. v. Flesch, the court weighed the evidence and made credibility findings on the paper record.

The court rejected the principal defendant's evidence, found the return inventory had been properly credited at original sale prices, accepted a limited credit for diamonds, and held that the corporate defendant remained indebted.

The court also found an enforceable oral personal guarantee by one individual defendant but not by the others.

A creditor brought a motion to compel the bankrupt to satisfy an undertaking given during an examination under s. 163(1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The undertaking required production of complaints made by the bankrupt to the Law Society and the Human Rights Tribunal to clarify the nature of his relationship with another individual, an issue relevant to the bankrupt’s family unit status and estate.

The bankrupt sought to provide the documents only to the trustee and argued they contained confidential information.

The court held that where examining counsel conducts a s. 163 examination on behalf of the trustee and creditors, undertakings must be fulfilled by delivering documents to that examining counsel.

The bankrupt was ordered to obtain and deliver the documents, with directions that the trustee not file them in the public record without further court order due to potential confidentiality concerns.

A creditor sought an order under s. 163 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act requiring a third party to attend for examination regarding the affairs of a bankrupt estate.

The responding party argued that s. 163(1) did not permit a creditor to conduct such an examination.

The court held that, where the trustee lacks funds and creditors authorize the examination, a creditor’s counsel may conduct the examination in the trustee’s name.

In the alternative, the evidentiary record satisfied the “sufficient cause” threshold under s. 163(2) because the proposed examination concerned potential estate assets and conflicting evidence about corporate ownership and loans involving the bankrupt.

The motion was granted and the third party was ordered to attend for examination.