David R. Aston

The applicant union sought judicial review of a labour arbitrator's decision dismissing a national policy grievance.

The grievance alleged the employer's policy regarding the transfer of employees with permanent partial disabilities violated the collective agreement.

The union argued the arbitrator breached procedural fairness due to a five-year delay in rendering the decision and by relying on a provision of the collective agreement not raised by the parties.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the delay did not cause significant prejudice and the arbitrator was entitled to consider the entire collective agreement.

The court also held the arbitrator's interpretation of the collective agreement and the duty to accommodate was reasonable.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal decision dismissing her discrimination complaint against the respondent accounting bodies.

The applicant, whose second language is English, failed a final accounting exam and alleged constructive discrimination based on language ability and ethnic origin.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Tribunal's hearing was procedurally fair and its decision reasonable, as language ability is not a prohibited ground of discrimination and the applicant failed to establish a nexus between her language ability and her ethnic origin.

The applicants sought judicial review of the Ottawa Public Library's decision to cancel their room rental agreement for the screening of a controversial movie.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application on a preliminary issue, finding that the library's decision was private and contractual in nature.

Applying the Air Canada factors, the court concluded that the decision lacked the sufficient public character required to be amenable to judicial review, as it did not involve the exercise of a statutory power.

The appellant tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board order evicting her.

The eviction was based on an application for causing serious problems and committing an illegal act by interfering with the hydro supply to her unit after it was disconnected for non-payment.

The Board found she or someone on her behalf cut the deadbolt off the protected hydro switch to restore electricity, creating an extreme danger.

The Divisional Court found no error of law in the Board's reliance on circumstantial evidence, noting she was the only one to benefit from the restored electricity.

The appeal was dismissed, but the eviction enforcement date was delayed.

The plaintiffs were beneficial owners of a property held in trust by the defendant Bertrand, who was the registered owner.

Bertrand sold the property to 670 without the plaintiffs' consent and signed a false affidavit to clear executions against his name.

The trial judge found the transfer was a 'fraudulent instrument' under the Land Titles Act, declared it void, and ordered rectification of the register.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that the trial judge erred in law.

Bertrand was not a 'fictitious person' and did not forge the transfer, as he was the true registered owner with legal authority to convey the property.

Furthermore, 670 was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice, protected by s. 62(2) of the Act, which states that describing an owner as a trustee does not constitute notice of a trust.

The appeals by 670 and the Director of Titles were allowed, confirming 670's ownership, while Bertrand's appeal against the findings of fact was dismissed.

The matter was remitted to the trial court to assess damages against Bertrand.

The appellant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision terminating his tenancy for non-payment of rent, which included parking charges.

He argued that the Board member was biased, denied him procedural fairness, and erred in finding that parking charges could be included in rent geared to income.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no denial of procedural fairness and holding that the Board correctly applied a binding 2017 Divisional Court decision between the same parties.

The court also upheld the Board's finding that the parking agreement was not signed under duress.

The applicant sought judicial review of an arbitration award interpreting a collective agreement provision regarding salary protection for downwardly reclassified employees.

The arbitrator found the provision unambiguously entitled these employees to economic increases and revisions.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the arbitrator's interpretation, treatment of estoppel, and refusal to use extrinsic evidence to create ambiguity were reasonable.

The court also rejected the applicant's argument that the arbitrator breached natural justice by citing authorities not provided by the parties, as no novel issue was raised.

The motion judge previously awarded costs against the respondent and, on his own initiative, raised the issue of whether the respondent's lawyer should be personally liable for those costs under Family Law Rule 24(9).

The matter was adjourned to a different judge.

The court found that while the lawyer's conduct met the threshold of running up costs without reasonable cause due to incompetence, there was no bad faith or unethical conduct.

Exercising extreme caution, the court declined to order costs against the lawyer personally.

The defendant pleaded guilty to robbery with an imitation firearm and challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence under s. 85 of the Criminal Code, arguing it violated s. 12 of the Charter.

The court applied the R. v. Nur framework, determined a proportionate sentence of five months' incarceration, and found that the mandatory minimum of one year consecutive (resulting in a 17-month sentence after considering pre-trial credit) was grossly disproportionate, thus violating the defendant's s. 12 Charter rights.

The mandatory minimum was declared of no force and effect, and a sentence of 5 months imprisonment (less 38 days credit) plus probation was imposed.

The appellants appealed two orders: a dismissal of an application for financial disclosure and a finding of contempt for breaching a prior court order by placing a clown with a crucifix on their lawn and yelling at neighbours.

The Divisional Court quashed the appeal of the dismissal order for lack of jurisdiction.

The court upheld the contempt finding against the husband but set aside the finding against the wife, as there was no evidence she actively placed the clown on the lawn.

The self-represented appellant brought a motion to review a single judge's order requiring him to post $10,000 in security for costs for his pending appeal of a Small Claims Court decision.

The Divisional Court found no error of law or palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's conclusion that the appeal was frivolous and vexatious and that the appellant had insufficient assets to pay a costs award.

The motion to review was dismissed with costs.

The applicant sought judicial review of two costs orders made by FSCO adjudicators after her claim for a $1,378.68 medical assessment expense was dismissed due to her failure to attend a required medical examination.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application regarding the first-instance costs order as premature because an internal appeal was still pending.

The court dismissed the application regarding the appeal costs order on its merits, finding the Director's Delegate's decision was reasonable, procedurally fair, and justified given the applicant's complete lack of success and conduct that prolonged the proceedings.

The appellant appealed a decision reducing her spousal support, arguing the motions judge erred by not directing a trial and by failing to properly account for the compensatory nature of her support.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh evidence of her historical tax returns.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion to introduce fresh evidence, finding it did not meet the Palmer test.

The court dismissed the appeal, holding that the motions judge made no palpable and overriding error in her factual findings, including the finding that the appellant had cohabited with her new partner prior to marriage, and correctly applied the law regarding material change in circumstances.

This is a motion for leave to appeal an order certifying a class action proceeding, specifically challenging the certification of oppression-based common issues.

The moving parties (Baffinland Iron Mines and three individual defendants) argued that previous decisions precluded class proceedings based on oppression claims due to the need for individual shareholder expectation assessments.

The court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions and no reason to doubt the correctness of the original order.

The court held that the motions judge correctly applied appellate precedent that oppression claims do not necessarily require explicit evidence of each individual shareholder's expectations at the certification stage, provided common shareholder expectations are objectively reasonable and specifically pleaded.

This child protection trial concerned two boys, N. and D., who had been in the child protection system since infancy due to parental drug addiction and domestic violence.

The Children's Aid Society sought an order for extended society care (crown wardship), while the father, maternal grandmother, and paternal grandparents each proposed alternative plans of care.

The court found that none of the respondents could provide a stable and safe environment due to ongoing drug addiction, emotional volatility, and persistent family conflict that placed the children in loyalty binds.

The maternal grandmother was found to have actively undermined the father's access and court orders.

The paternal grandparents were deemed deluded about their son's capacity.

The court granted the Society's request for extended society care, emphasizing the children's long-term best interests for stability and insulation from conflict, and leaving access decisions to the Society's discretion.

The father brought motions for contempt, to strike an affidavit, and to enforce Skype access.

The mother brought motions for final custody, to terminate access, and to strike the father's pleadings for failure to pay support and costs.

The court dismissed the father's motions, finding no contempt and that forced Skype access was not in the children's best interests.

The court granted the mother final custody, noting the children had been in her exclusive care for nine years.

The court struck the father's financial and property claims due to his ongoing failure to pay over $100,000 in support arrears and costs, and prohibited him from taking further steps regarding access until he complied with prior financial orders.

In a family law proceeding, the respondent husband brought a motion to remove the applicant wife's solicitor of record, alleging the solicitor knowingly commissioned a false affidavit and backdated correspondence.

Following cross-examination of the solicitor and his assistant, the court found that the assistant had backdated the letter and lied in her affidavit without the solicitor's knowledge.

The motion to remove the solicitor was dismissed.

The court awarded $5,000 in costs to the applicant, noting the respondent's bad faith in seeking a Law Society investigation and barring the solicitor from future cases.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for impaired driving, arguing that a 19-minute delay between his detention by a transit officer and the administration of an approved screening device (ASD) test by a dispatched police officer violated the immediacy requirement of s. 254(2)(b) of the Criminal Code and his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that the delay was reasonably necessary given the unusual circumstance that transit officers do not carry ASDs.

The court also upheld the finding that the appellant had no realistic opportunity to consult counsel at the roadside and would not have done so even if properly advised.

The applicant sought permission to add six witnesses to the trial list shortly before the scheduled family law trial, despite an order from the trial management conference restricting witnesses to those listed.

The proposed witnesses were intended to testify about the applicant's physical and emotional condition following separation.

The court refused permission, noting the lack of a reasonable explanation for the delay, the potential prejudice to the respondent, and the lack of detailed 'will say' statements, while leaving the ultimate evidentiary rulings to the trial judge.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision dismissing his complaint that his former employer violated s. 50 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act by dismissing him in reprisal for raising harassment allegations.

The Board found the applicant was dismissed for insubordination and failure to follow employer rules, not for asserting rights under the Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Board's decision was reasonable, based on clear and logical reasons, and supported by the evidence.