James D. S. Whyte

The respondent husband brought a motion to compel the applicant wife to accept his offer to purchase the matrimonial home.

The wife opposed the motion, seeking to enforce a prior consent order that required the home to be listed for sale on the open market.

The court found that the husband's agreement to list the home was disingenuous and that he had unilaterally cancelled viewings to force the acceptance of his offer.

The husband's motion was dismissed, and the parties were ordered to comply with the prior consent order to list the property for sale.

The respondent brought a cross-motion seeking an order or declaration that $24,000 paid to the applicant in the first six months of 2019 constituted spousal support, primarily to secure tax relief for his 2019 tax return.

The court found insufficient evidence to infer the payments were spousal support, noting the lack of agreement, incomplete financial disclosure, and the interim nature of subsequent support orders.

The cross-motion was dismissed without prejudice to the respondent raising the issue at trial.

The parties, parents of three daughters, sought resolution on child support overpayments, special and extraordinary expenses (s. 7 expenses), and summer access.

The court found the applicant's s. 7 expense claims reasonable but accepted the respondent's revised calculation of child support overpayment, resulting in a net amount owed to the respondent.

The respondent's request for increased summer access was denied.

The motion judge previously awarded costs against the respondent and, on his own initiative, raised the issue of whether the respondent's lawyer should be personally liable for those costs under Family Law Rule 24(9).

The matter was adjourned to a different judge.

The court found that while the lawyer's conduct met the threshold of running up costs without reasonable cause due to incompetence, there was no bad faith or unethical conduct.

Exercising extreme caution, the court declined to order costs against the lawyer personally.

The applicant sought costs fixed at $4,500 for a motion heard on October 22, 2018, where the respondent was the moving party and was substantially unsuccessful.

The court found the applicant was the successful party on the underlying motion and was entitled to costs.

The respondent's arguments for deferring the costs decision, including an alleged apprehension of bias, the assignment of a case management judge, and an attempt to re-argue the motion, were rejected.

Applying the Family Law Rules and appellate guidance on proportionality and reasonableness, the court fixed the applicant's costs at $3,470, at the upper end of the partial recovery range, considering the respondent's errors in the underlying motion.

The respondent, David Blair Watts, brought a motion seeking extensive disclosure and procedural relief from the applicant, Karen Enid Elaine Martin, in a family law proceeding.

The motion primarily sought bank statements, credit card records, and proof of certain financial transactions, alleging a "money laundering scheme" and misrepresentation of matrimonial home value.

Watts also requested an order for interim disbursements.

The court largely dismissed Watts's motion, finding many disclosure requests unsubstantiated, factually misguided, or relating to records equally available to him.

The court ordered the applicant to produce specific proof for one sum and a cheque copy if not already provided.

The request for interim disbursements was denied due to Watts's financial capacity, prior unsuccessful motions, and the applicant's compliance with disclosure obligations.

Leave was granted for amended pleadings.

The moving party sought to re-open a previously dismissed motion by introducing fresh evidence of alleged mortgage fraud, and also brought an unscheduled disclosure motion.

The court dismissed the motion to re-open, finding the proposed evidence did not meet the Palmer test as it could have been discovered with due diligence and would not have changed the outcome.

The court declined to hear the unscheduled disclosure motion.

Costs of $5,500 were awarded to the responding party.

The court adjourned the issue of whether the moving party's counsel should be personally liable for costs under Rule 24(9) to allow counsel to obtain independent legal advice.

The applicant mother and respondent father separated after nine years of marriage.

The mother sought sole custody of their nine-year-old child, supervised access for the father, and child support.

The father sought shared custody.

The court found that the father had unresolved mental health issues, exhibited aggressive behaviour towards third parties, and was entirely unable to communicate effectively with the mother.

Applying the best interests of the child test, the court awarded sole custody to the mother and ordered that the father's access be supervised, subject to a review in six months.

The court also maintained a restraining order against the father and ordered him to pay child support and arrears.

The complainant union alleged that the grievor was discharged from her employment as a waitress at a Swiss Chalet restaurant because of her support for the union, contrary to section 66 of the Labour Relations Act.

The employer contended that the grievor was a probationary employee who was discharged for complaining about cleaning duties and interfering with other employees' work.

The Board found that the employer's evidence regarding the reasons for discharge was contradictory and lacked credibility.

Applying the reverse onus under section 89(5) of the Act, the Board concluded that the employer failed to prove that the discharge was not tainted by anti-union animus.

The Board ordered the grievor reinstated with compensation.

The applicant union applied for certification to displace an incumbent union.

A group of employees filed a petition opposing certification long after the terminal date, requesting an extension due to alleged lack of information and delay in the proceedings.

The Board refused to extend the terminal date, emphasizing the need for a fixed point in time to ascertain employee wishes and noting that mere passage of time or change of heart does not justify an extension.

Furthermore, because the incumbent union had abandoned its bargaining rights, the Board declined to order a representation vote and granted outright certification based on the applicant's membership evidence.

The complainant union filed unfair labour practice complaints alleging that the respondent employers violated section 64 of the Labour Relations Act by permitting an incumbent union to post disparaging notices on company bulletin boards during an organizing campaign.

The respondents brought a motion to dismiss the complaints for failing to disclose a prima facie case.

The Board granted the motion, finding that the posting of notices was permitted under the collective agreements and section 46(1)(c) of the Act, and therefore could not constitute a violation of section 64.

The complainant, a member of the respondent union, filed a complaint under section 85 of the Labour Relations Act seeking the release of the union's audited financial statements.

The union opposed the complaint, arguing that the complainant was acting as an agent for a rival union, the United Food and Commercial Workers Union (UFCW), which she actively supported.

The Board held that the complainant's support for a rival union did not disentitle her to access the financial information of her own union under section 85.

The Board ordered the respondent union to deliver the audited financial statements to the complainant.