David M. Brown

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault following an altercation between boaters that resulted in the complainant losing sight in his left eye.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge misapprehended material evidence regarding the intentional application of force and consent, and failed to consider the defence of accident.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence and concluding that the trial judge's findings on intentional force and consent foreclosed the defence of accident.

The appellant pleaded guilty to defrauding his employer of over $2.3 million and was sentenced to two years' imprisonment and ordered to pay $1.3 million in restitution.

After serving his sentence, he appealed the restitution orders, arguing inability to pay and that the orders hindered his ability to obtain a record suspension.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the appellant's failure to explain where the stolen funds went, his breach of trust, and his choice to prioritize significant discretionary spending over making restitution payments.

The appellants sued the respondent physicians for damages, including the difference between their actual legal fees and the costs awarded in prior proceedings regarding the withdrawal of life support, as well as damages for various torts based on a pre-litigation letter sent by the respondents' counsel.

The motion judge dismissed the action as an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the claim for legal fees was barred by issue estoppel and the tort claims were barred by the doctrine of absolute privilege, as the letter was intimately connected to contemplated judicial proceedings.

The Ministry of Community and Social Services and the Ontario Public Service Employees Union appealed a Divisional Court decision upholding an Information and Privacy Commissioner order.

The order required the Ministry to disclose records containing the full names of Family Responsibility Office (FRO) employees to a requester.

The appellants argued that disclosure posed a health and safety risk to the employees and conflicted with a prior Grievance Settlement Board order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Commissioner reasonably concluded that the evidence did not establish a reasonable expectation of harm to the employees, and that the disclosure order did not conflict with the prior grievance settlement.

The Ontario College of Trades moved to set aside an order refusing to quash a summons to witness issued by PowerServe to the Chair of the College's Electrician Ratio Review Panel.

PowerServe sought to examine the Chair regarding his prior professional relationship with a union involved in the review, alleging a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Divisional Court allowed the motion and quashed the summons, finding that the proposed areas of inquiry were either irrelevant, amounted to a fishing expedition, or would require the disclosure of communications protected by solicitor-client privilege.

The landlord appealed a decision declaring its Notice to Vacate void and granting a permanent injunction restraining it from re-entering the leased premises.

The landlord sought to demolish the building and argued the lease limited the tenant's remedies to damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the limitation clause did not apply to the landlord's arbitrary repudiation and trespass, and upheld the permanent injunction as an appropriate remedy to protect the tenant's property rights.

The appellant appealed a decision striking her statement of claim against counsel for the Public Guardian and Trustee, who acted as her litigation guardian in prior litigation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the action was a collateral attack on the prior proceedings and an abuse of process.

The court also dismissed the appellant's motion to introduce fresh evidence and dismissed the appeal with costs.

The appellant employer appealed a summary judgment order awarding damages for wrongful dismissal to a 31-year employee.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred by using a 'bridging-to-retirement' approach to calculate the notice period and by failing to deduct mitigation income.

However, the Court upheld the motion judge's alternative finding of a 22-month notice period, as well as the awards for loss of pension benefits and a contractual retirement allowance.

The appeal was allowed in part to deduct mitigation income and adjust the notice period calculation, and the cross-appeal was allowed to increase the notice period to 22 months and remit the costs issue.

The appellant architect appealed a summary judgment dismissing its third party claims for contribution and indemnity against two sub-trades in a complex construction delay dispute.

The motion judge had dismissed the claims on the basis that there was no firm evidentiary foundation for the sub-trades' liability.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge committed an error in principle by failing to assess the advisability of summary judgment in the context of the litigation as a whole.

Because the sub-trades' responsibility for project delays remained a live issue in the main actions, granting partial summary judgment created an unacceptable risk of duplicative proceedings and inconsistent findings of fact.

The applicant sought judicial review of a FSCO Delegate's decision upholding an arbitrator's finding that his entitlement to WSIB benefits precluded him from receiving statutory accident benefits (SABS).

The applicant argued the insurer was estopped from relying on his suspended licence to deny benefits and that the arbitrator erred in interpreting the onus under s. 59(2) of the SABS Schedule.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Delegate's decision reasonable.

The insurer did not mislead the applicant, and the applicant failed to discharge his onus to prove his civil action was not commenced primarily for the purpose of claiming SABS.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment in favour of the respondent bank for a credit card debt and the dismissal of his counterclaim.

The appellant argued that documents he sent to the bank constituted an accord and satisfaction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the appellant could not unilaterally dictate the terms of repayment and finding no procedural unfairness in the denial of cross-examination where no notice of examination was served.

The appellant appealed his convictions for failing to stop at the scene of an accident involving bodily harm and death.

He argued that he rebutted the presumption of intent to escape civil or criminal liability under s. 252(2) of the Criminal Code because he pulled over after the accident.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly concluded the appellant knew his vehicle had been struck, stopped only to assess the damage, and left to avoid liability because he was driving without the requisite licence.

The respondent pleaded guilty to trafficking in a substance held out to be cocaine and faced a mandatory minimum sentence of one year.

The sentencing judge imposed the mandatory minimum but illegally granted 2:1 credit for pre-sentence custody.

The Crown appealed the illegal sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, correcting the pre-sentence custody credit to the maximum permitted 1.5:1 ratio.

However, considering the Crown's failure to raise the error at sentencing, the delay in the appeal, and the fact that the respondent had already served the imposed sentence, the Court permanently stayed the execution of the remaining balance.

The appellant, a resident of the United States, appealed the dismissal of her motion to dismiss or stay an action on a debt for lack of jurisdiction.

The respondent, an Ontario resident, sued the appellant for repayment of a loan.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the contract was made in Ontario when the respondent received telephone confirmation of the acceptance of her offer to lend funds.

This established a presumptive connecting factor for jurisdiction simpliciter under the Van Breda framework, which the appellant failed to rebut.

The appellants appealed from a judgment made at an undefended trial, arguing they were not properly served with notice of two preceding orders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellants had actual knowledge of the proceedings and had failed to move to set aside the underlying orders.

The court noted that an order made without notice is not a nullity but remains an order of the court until set aside.

The 15-year-old appellant commenced an application for child support against her father.

The motion judge ordered that the appellant must be represented by a litigation guardian, relying on the Rules of Civil Procedure.

On appeal, the Divisional Court set aside the order, finding that the Family Law Rules provide a complete code for the participation of children in family law proceedings.

The court held that under the Family Law Rules, a capable minor who is a party to a child support proceeding is a 'special party' who may be represented by a lawyer without the need for a litigation guardian.

The applicant union sought judicial review of a grievance arbitration award that denied meal expense reimbursements for employees commuting daily to temporary work headquarters.

The applicant argued the arbitrator breached procedural fairness by adopting an interpretation of the collective agreement not advanced by either party, and that the decision was unreasonable.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the arbitrator's interpretation was within the range of reasonable outcomes and that an arbitrator is not bound to choose only between the interpretations advanced by the parties.

The appellants, residents living near three proposed wind turbine farms, appealed decisions of the Environmental Review Tribunal (ERT) that confirmed the Director's issuance of Renewable Energy Approvals (REAs) for the projects.

The appellants argued that the statutory test requiring them to prove the projects would cause 'serious harm to human health' violated section 7 of the Charter.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeals, finding that the statutory test aligned with the jurisprudential threshold for section 7 claims and did not depart from the consensus scientific view on wind turbines.

The Court also upheld the ERT's treatment of lay witness evidence, its finding that it lacked jurisdiction to review the Director's REA issuance process for Charter compliance, and its discretionary decisions denying adjournments.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Ontario Municipal Board decision that dismissed parts of her appeal regarding a municipal Official Plan.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application on the basis that the applicant had an adequate alternative remedy.

Specifically, the applicant failed to request a review or rehearing under section 43 of the Ontario Municipal Board Act, which provides a statutory mechanism to address her claims of procedural unfairness.

The court noted that allowing the judicial review would undermine the legislative scheme, which requires leave to appeal Board decisions.

The appellant lawyer appealed a decision of the Law Society Appeal Panel revoking his license to practice law after he was found to be ungovernable.

The appellant argued that the panels misapprehended evidence regarding his remorse, character, discipline history, and a proposed supervision plan, and failed to consider systemic racism.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the disciplinary panels' decisions were reasonable, entitled to deference, and that the appellant failed to establish a causal connection between his race and the professional misconduct.