David L. Corbett

The plaintiff grocery store sought an interlocutory injunction preventing the municipality from removing a lay-by used for valet parking on a public street during planned road improvements.

The court applied the test for interlocutory injunctions from RJR-MacDonald and held that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm, or that the balance of convenience favoured relief.

The alleged causes of action—injurious affection and an easement—could not support the requested injunction, as any remedy for injurious affection lay in damages before the municipal tribunal and no easement could exist over a public highway.

The court also held that potential economic losses from removal of the lay-by were compensable in damages and that municipal authority over public highways weighed heavily against judicial interference.

The court issued an addendum correcting a numerical error in an earlier endorsement concerning damages.

The original endorsement referenced an amount of $80,000 in paragraph 42.

The court clarified that the correct amount was $90,000 and amended the decision accordingly.

The addendum forms part of the reasons and corrects the earlier judgment.

The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing a claim arising from an alleged oral land development partnership.

The plaintiff alleged breaches of fiduciary duty and sought rescission and return of capital contributions after withdrawing from the partnership before completion of the project.

The court held that the motion could not be determined on summary judgment because the key issues—including alleged misrepresentations, disclosure obligations between partners, the terms of the plaintiff’s withdrawal, and limitation issues—turned largely on credibility and disputed factual narratives.

Applying the “full appreciation” test for summary judgment, the court concluded that the evidence required the trial process.

The motion was dismissed and the matter directed to trial.

The plaintiff sought damages arising from a motor vehicle collision in which liability was admitted.

A jury assessed general damages at $35,000 but awarded nothing for competitive disadvantage or handyman services.

The trial judge was required to determine whether the claim met the statutory threshold under s.267.5 of the Insurance Act for recovery of non‑pecuniary damages.

The court held that the plaintiff failed to prove that his ongoing symptoms were caused by the collision, given significant prior back injuries and more persuasive defence expert evidence.

In any event, the alleged impairments did not amount to a permanent serious impairment of an important physical, mental, or psychological function.

The action was dismissed for failure to meet the statutory threshold.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment seeking remedies under a mortgage relating to a motel business, alleging the mortgagor breached a restriction on transferring interests by entering into a trust agreement transferring shares to a new spouse.

The defendants argued the trust agreement did not constitute a default, that it was signed under duress, and that the plaintiff knew of and consented to it.

Additional issues arose concerning whether the mortgage provision restricting transfers to a new spouse was contrary to public policy and whether the interest waiver clause constituted an unenforceable penalty.

The court held that the dispute involved significant factual and credibility issues, including duress, consent, and the surrounding context of the agreements.

As these issues required assessment of witness credibility and the broader factual matrix, summary judgment was inappropriate.

The respondents brought a motion to dismiss an application challenging the constitutionality of public funding for Ontario Catholic separate schools.

The applicant argued that such funding violated Charter freedoms and equality rights and sought declarations eliminating or reducing funding for Catholic schools.

The court held that the applicant lacked private interest standing as a taxpayer and declined to grant public interest standing.

Binding Supreme Court of Canada and Court of Appeal jurisprudence confirmed that funding for Catholic separate schools is constitutionally protected under the Constitution Act, 1867 and immune from Charter scrutiny.

The application was dismissed for lack of standing and lack of any reasonable prospect of success.

The applicant commenced a Charter challenge against an Ontario regulation that terminated OHIP funding for sex reassignment surgery.

After years of complex litigation and shortly before the hearing on the merits, the government repealed the impugned regulation, rendering the application moot.

The applicant sought her costs thrown away.

The court held that the applicant was substantially successful in achieving her goal through the policy change and awarded her partial indemnity costs fixed at $200,000, noting the importance of not penalizing pro bono counsel in public interest litigation.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the plaintiffs' statement of claim, which alleged malicious prosecution, negligent investigation, and other torts arising from criminal charges related to a 1992 arson.

The court found the 63-page statement of claim to be prolix, repetitive, argumentative, and replete with evidence, violating the rules of pleading.

The court struck the entire statement of claim but granted the plaintiffs 60 days leave to amend, providing detailed guidance on how to properly plead the causes of action.

The court declined to strike the negligent investigation claims without leave to amend, noting the law in this area is unsettled.

Unit owners sought an order compelling mediation and arbitration under s.132 of the Condominium Act, 1998 regarding directions issued by the condominium corporation concerning interactions with neighbours, security staff, and board members, and use of common facilities.

The corporation argued the dispute should proceed in court rather than through the Act’s mandatory mediation/arbitration process.

The court held that the impugned directions were minor administrative measures relating to day‑to‑day condominium management and did not give rise to a genuine dispute requiring mediation, arbitration, or litigation.

Applying the de minimis principle, the court concluded the issues were too insignificant to justify legal proceedings.

The application was dismissed with reduced costs payable to the condominium corporation.

A condominium corporation sought a declaration that a developer agreement and related by-law limiting the developer’s liability for construction deficiencies were void and ultra vires under the Condominium Act, 1998.

The impugned agreement limited claims against the developer to those available under the Ontario New Home Warranties Plan Act and had been disclosed to purchasers and registered on title.

The court held that the pre-turnover board had authority to enter into such an agreement and that limiting developer liability in this manner was not inconsistent with the Condominium Act.

The arrangement was part of the commercial framework under which the condominium project was developed and sold, and purchasers had notice of the limitation.

The application was dismissed and costs awarded to the respondent.

Two accused were jointly tried for the homicide of a young teenager.

The principal accused admitted causing the death but contested whether the killing constituted first degree murder, second degree murder, or manslaughter.

The co‑accused was alleged to have participated in a plan to lure the victim to the residence and assist in the killing.

The trial involved numerous evidentiary rulings, including admissibility of a fictional story written by the co‑accused as potential motive evidence, disclosure and partial admission of the victim’s diary, admission of edited autopsy photographs, and applications concerning prior consistent statements under the Edgar doctrine.

The jury ultimately convicted the principal accused of first degree murder and acquitted the co‑accused.

The decision records extensive reasons on pre‑trial and mid‑trial evidentiary and procedural rulings made throughout the proceeding.

The respondent father applied in Ontario to vary a final consent order respecting the primary residence of the parties' six-year-old daughter.

The applicant mother moved to transfer the variation application to Manitoba under s. 6(3) of the Divorce Act.

The court found that the child, who had lived in Manitoba for almost her entire life, was most substantially connected to Manitoba.

The court concluded that transferring the proceeding was in the child's best interests and would not impede the proper administration of justice.

The motion to transfer was granted.

The appellant, a city councilor, appealed a trial judgment finding him liable for defamation arising from an email exchange with the respondent, a community activist.

The trial judge had found that the appellant's email was defamatory and that the defence of qualified privilege was defeated by malice.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge failed to state and apply the correct legal tests for qualified privilege and malice.

Specifically, the trial judge erred by conflating the objective and subjective standards for honest belief and by failing to determine whether an improper purpose was the appellant's dominant motive.

The City of Toronto sought judicial review of two interim decisions by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, which had rejected the City's request for early dismissal of a human rights application challenging municipal zoning by-laws regarding group homes.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for judicial review, finding that the Tribunal's decision to defer the jurisdictional challenge until a full evidentiary record was established was reasonable.

The Court also held that the application for judicial review was premature, as there were no exceptional circumstances warranting intervention in the Tribunal's interim procedural decisions.

The appellant warranty corporation appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision ordering it to undertake remedial work on a new home's radiant floor heating system.

The Tribunal found the system was a major structural defect and ordered repairs estimated at $245,000.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the Tribunal erred in law by failing to apply the $100,000 statutory cap on compensation for major structural defects under Regulation 892.

The matter was remitted to the Tribunal for a rehearing on the issue of remedy alone.

The plaintiff tenant sought an extension of time to appeal an eviction order issued by the Landlord and Tenant Board.

The tenant was approximately one month out of time to file the appeal.

The court found that the tenant was aware of the deadline and the appropriate route to appeal.

The court declined to extend the time, noting that the appeal lacked merit as it turned on findings of fact and credibility regarding the tenant's disruption of other tenants' quiet enjoyment.

The motion was dismissed with no order as to costs.

The appellants appealed a decision dismissing their application to reopen a dispute over solicitor fees.

The dispute had previously been resolved through Minutes of Settlement during an assessment proceeding under the Solicitors Act.

The Divisional Court upheld the application judge's finding that attempting to reopen the settled dispute was an abuse of process, noting that a settlement of an assessment is not itself subject to assessment.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding him liable for breaching a non-competition clause in his employment contract and ordering him to repay a $20,000 non-compete payment.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in interpreting the contract.

The appellant had met the conditions for the payment by remaining employed for one year and not competing during that time.

Although the non-competition clause was enforceable and breached later, the respondent proved no damages, so the action was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment resolving a deadlock in a family-owned ice cream business.

The trial judge ordered the majority shareholder to sell her shares to the minority shareholder for fair market value.

On appeal, the appellants argued the trial judge ignored the majority shareholder's reasonable expectations, her security interest in the business, and the minority shareholder's alleged misappropriation of a corporate opportunity.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings or application of the law, including the conclusion that the appellants were more responsible for the deadlock.

The plaintiff appealed a motion judge's order substituting a former employee as the discovery witness for the corporate defendant instead of its president and CEO.

The plaintiff argued the former employee was not an eligible witness under Rule 31.03(2)(a) and that he should have been granted an adjournment.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the plaintiff could not raise the eligibility issue for the first time on appeal and that the motion judge did not err in refusing the adjournment.