David L. Corbett

The Divisional Court issued a costs endorsement following an appeal and motion for leave to appeal.

The appellant was awarded $50,000 inclusive for the appeal and leave motion.

The costs of the underlying certification motion were remitted to the motion judge, who had extensive experience with the matter, to determine a fair and reasonable amount.

The applicant sought to be relieved from paying costs under the public interest principle after its application was dismissed.

The Divisional Court declined to deprive the respondents of costs, noting that while the applicant had no pecuniary interest, the application was without legal basis given clear and recent precedent.

The applicant was ordered to pay partial indemnity costs of $10,000 to each of the respondents.

The moving party sought leave to appeal the dismissal of its motion for summary judgment.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, noting that the underlying decision was interlocutory and the final rights of the parties would be determined at trial.

The court emphasized that appellate review would be available later on a full record, and extensive interlocutory appeals cause unnecessary delay and cost.

The court also set a timetable for the remaining steps to ready the matter for trial.

This was an amended costs endorsement and directions decision arising from a prior trial judgment involving fraud-related allegations, counterclaims, and title issues concerning a business property.

The court proceeded in the absence of one defendant, corrected typographical errors in the earlier reasons, confirmed the principal judgment amount, and fixed prejudgment and post-judgment interest under the Courts of Justice Act.

The self-represented plaintiff was awarded $100,000 inclusive in substantial indemnity costs against one opposing party for the action and counterclaim, with compensation for his own time at an hourly rate.

No costs were awarded as between the plaintiff and one defendant, but substantial indemnity costs of $75,000 were awarded against the plaintiff in favour of another defendant based on Rule 49 and an earlier offer to settle.

The court also gave directions concerning the form of a title transfer order, future assessment proceedings, potential sale steps, and settlement of the formal judgment.

The plaintiff and defendant entered into a business agreement to build and operate a wood-drying kiln.

The plaintiff advanced funds for construction, while the defendant contributed land.

The plaintiff sued for fraudulent misrepresentation, breach of contract, and conversion, alleging the defendant lied about his experience, grossly overstated the land's value, failed to account for construction costs, and wrongfully transferred the business property to his own holding company.

The court found the defendant made fraudulent misrepresentations and fundamentally breached the agreement.

The court granted rescission, ordering the defendant to pay restitution of the plaintiff's advanced funds, plus punitive damages for his atrocious conduct.

Claims against the real estate agent were dismissed, while the company's lawyer was found to have breached his duty by facilitating the wrongful property transfer.

The plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sued her long-term disability insurer after being denied benefits.

She was receiving income replacement benefits from her accident benefits insurer.

The accident benefits insurer successfully moved to be added as a defendant to help the plaintiff secure long-term disability benefits, which would reduce its own payment obligations.

The long-term disability insurer appealed.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the accident benefits insurer was not a necessary party under Rule 5.03 and had no direct cause of action against the long-term disability insurer.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing his motion to change and terminate his $1,000 monthly spousal support obligation following his voluntary retirement at age 55.

He argued his retirement constituted a material change in circumstance and that paying support from a previously divided pension amounted to double dipping.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the motions judge's finding that the retirement was a voluntary, self-engineered withdrawal from the workforce partly motivated by a desire to avoid support obligations.

A cross-appeal by the respondent to remove a court-imposed termination date of age 64 was granted on consent.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent employee six months' reasonable notice for wrongful dismissal and $23,000 in partial indemnity costs.

The employer argued the trial judge erred by considering the employee's prior service, finding he mitigated his damages by accepting a lower-paying role, and awarding Superior Court costs for a judgment under $25,000.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the six-month notice period was reasonable given the circumstances, the employee properly mitigated his damages, and the costs award was an appropriate exercise of discretion despite the trial judge's error in including prejudgment interest to meet the Small Claims Court threshold.

The applicant sought judicial review of an arbitrator's interim procedural ruling that issued a summons compelling the production of a Wagg brief in a grievance arbitration.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that it is premature to judicially review interlocutory decisions of administrative decision-makers.

The court found that the arbitrator has the authority to rule on her own jurisdiction and procedural matters, and that fragmenting the arbitration process would frustrate legislative goals.

The appellant association appealed a decision of the Deputy Director of Titles (DDT) fixing the southern waterfront boundaries of two lots on a registered plan of subdivision at the water's edge instead of the 'high water mark' shown on the plan.

The appellant argued the DDT exceeded her jurisdiction and that her decision was unreasonable.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the DDT reasonably interpreted her jurisdiction under the Boundaries Act to determine the true intention of the original subdivider.

The Court held that the DDT's conclusion that the subdivider intended to convey all the land he owned to the water's edge, but mistakenly believed the Crown owned the land between the high water mark and the water's edge, was supported by the evidence and reasonable.

The appellant mother appealed a consent order making her daughter a Crown ward without access for the purpose of adoption.

She argued that she did not understand she was consenting to adoption and believed the children's aid society was withdrawing its application.

The Divisional Court reviewed the record, including the signed consent document and the appellant's subsequent communications, and found that she had independent legal advice, read the document, and understood its contents.

The court concluded the consent was valid and dismissed the appeal.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision dismissing his claim that his union breached its duty of fair representation.

The union had refused to seek judicial review of an arbitration award that upheld the applicant's termination for insubordination and time theft.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Board reasonably concluded the union's decision was not arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Forestry's alleged decision to exempt a wind farm project from compliance with the Endangered Species Act regarding the Redside Dace.

The Ministry had communicated via email that there were no Redside Dace issues in the project area, and thus the proponent did not need to apply for a permit.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Ministry's emails did not constitute an exercise of a statutory power of decision subject to judicial review, applying the precedent from Sierra Club.

The appellant appealed a decision upholding the Chief Building Officer's revocation of a building permit.

The appellant argued the judge erred by precluding an appeal to the OMB, finding the revocation mandatory rather than discretionary, and failing to grant relief based on promissory estoppel.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the judge did not adumbrate OMB appeal rights, the revocation was mandatory due to non-compliance with the Building Code Act, and neither the Chief Building Officer nor the judge on appeal had the authority to apply promissory estoppel.

The plaintiffs settled wrongful dismissal claims with the defendant, which included confidentiality provisions.

A court order directed the settlement to be filed.

The plaintiffs filed the settlement agreements for costs submissions.

The defendant claimed this breached confidentiality and sought to appeal a judge's endorsement that the filing was 'required by law'.

The appeal was quashed as the endorsement was not an order, or alternatively was interlocutory.

The defendant moved to set aside the quashing order and brought a motion for contempt.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding the endorsement was not an order and there was no merit to the contempt claim.

The court ordered the settlement documents sealed and awarded substantial indemnity costs against the defendant.

The plaintiff appealed a motion judge's decision refusing to certify a negligent misrepresentation claim as a class proceeding.

The proposed class consisted of investors in the defendant's investment fund who received an information folder containing an allegedly misleading statement about replicating a stock index.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that a class action was the preferable procedure because it would overcome economic barriers to access to justice for tens of thousands of potential class members and would promote judicial economy by resolving common issues.

The appellant employee appealed the dismissal of his motion for partial summary judgment in a wrongful dismissal action.

He argued that the termination provision in his employment contract was ambiguous, failed to oust his common law entitlement to reasonable notice, and violated the Canada Labour Code.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the contractual language clearly rebutted the common law presumption and did not contravene the Code, as it explicitly incorporated statutory minimums if the contractual severance fell short.

The appellant mother appealed a Crown wardship order.

At the hearing, a non-party requested to observe the proceedings.

The Divisional Court allowed the non-party to observe, finding the open court principle prevailed, subject to a strict publication ban under the Child and Family Services Act.

The court also granted the appellant's request for an adjournment to retain counsel or prepare, noting insufficient time remained to hear the appeal and fresh evidence motions that day.

The court seized itself of the matter and ordered the appellant to have no contact with the child pending the final determination.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's order for child and spousal support, arguing the judge erred in allowing a late amendment to claim spousal support, imputing too little income to the respondent, and creating undue hardship.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error.

The trial judge properly exercised discretion in allowing the amendment, had an evidentiary basis for the imputed income given the respondent's mental health issues, and the undue hardship argument was not raised at trial and could be addressed at an upcoming review.

The self-represented appellant failed to attend the hearing of her appeal regarding the sale of the matrimonial home, having apparently left the country.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal as abandoned and noted that, in any event, the appeal was from an interlocutory order for which no leave had been sought or granted.

Costs of $5,000 were awarded to the respondent, payable from the appellant's share of family assets upon equalization at trial.