David L. Corbett

The plaintiffs appealed an interlocutory order bifurcating the trial of their personal injury action into separate liability and damages phases.

The motion judge had ordered the bifurcation over the plaintiffs' objections.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that Rule 6.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires the consent of all parties to bifurcate a trial.

The clear and unambiguous language of the rule occupies the field, thereby ousting the court's inherent jurisdiction to order bifurcation without consent.

The appellants appealed three decisions of the Ontario Securities Commission regarding a sanctions hearing.

After a merits hearing found the appellants contravened the Securities Act, the terms of the presiding panel members expired.

The OSC appointed a new panel for the sanctions hearing.

The appellants argued the original panel's terms were deemed extended under s. 4.3 of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the OSC's interpretation of its own procedures and the SPPA—that the merits and sanctions hearings were separate—was reasonable.

The court also upheld the admission of merits hearing transcripts and the ultimate sanctions imposed.

The appellant appealed an eviction and rent arrears order made by the Landlord and Tenant Board, as well as a subsequent order upholding it on review.

The appellant argued she was a member of the housing co-operative, not a tenant, and that she had obtained money orders for the rent which were never cashed.

The Divisional Court found that the respondent's agent engaged in sharp practice at the review hearing by misrepresenting the appellant's position and the resolution of the jurisdictional issue.

The Court set aside both orders due to breaches of procedural fairness and natural justice.

The applicant, a pharmaceutical wholesaler, sought judicial review of a Varied Rebate Order imposing a financial penalty of over $2.9 million for receiving unlawful rebates from generic drug manufacturers.

The applicant argued that the payments were professional allowances or wholesaler fees, and challenged the Executive Officer's jurisdiction and the procedural fairness of the process.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Executive Officer had jurisdiction to regulate wholesalers and enforce the anti-rebate provisions.

The court also rejected the procedural fairness arguments, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias, and no actual prejudice resulting from delay or redacted disclosure.

The appellant lawyer appealed a decision of the Law Society Appeal Panel, which had set aside a Hearing Panel's dismissal of professional misconduct complaints related to mortgage transactions.

The Appeal Panel found the Hearing Panel erred in law by incorrectly defining fraud and by concluding a lawyer need not disclose material facts if they reasonably believe the lender already knows them.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, agreeing that a lawyer has a strict duty to disclose all material facts to a lender client, and that the Appeal Panel reasonably concluded the Hearing Panel's legal errors rendered its factual findings unsafe.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an arbitration award that determined two policy grievances regarding the employer's Nuclear Resourcing Policy.

The arbitrator had found that the employer's reassignment of employees to available work within their job classification did not violate the job posting provisions of the collective agreement.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review and held that the arbitrator's interpretation fell within a range of reasonable outcomes, as it followed established arbitral jurisprudence and considered the collective agreement as a whole.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The defendants appealed a Small Claims Court decision finding them jointly and severally liable for a $25,000 deposit paid by the plaintiff for equipment that was never delivered.

The defendants argued they were denied procedural fairness when the trial judge excluded documents due to non-compliance with a production order, and that they were acting as agents for a corporation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no procedural unfairness and upholding the trial judge's conclusion that the defendants were personally liable as parties to the contract, given the deliberate obfuscation of corporate identities and the non-existence of the purported corporate entity.

Following an application brought by a condominium corporation to compel a unit owner to bring a fireplace into compliance with fire regulations, the substantive dispute became moot when the respondent completed the required remediation before the court hearing.

The remaining issue concerned the appropriate costs award payable to the condominium corporation.

The applicant initially claimed $30,000 in partial indemnity costs but reduced the request during argument.

The court held that although the respondent’s refusal to comply earlier necessitated the litigation, costs must remain proportionate and limited to those reasonably necessary for the litigation itself.

Partial indemnity costs were fixed at $9,000 inclusive, payable in monthly instalments while the respondent remained the unit owner.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Social Benefits Tribunal that upheld the cancellation of his income support and assessed an overpayment of $25,712.30 for allegedly failing to declare his income and assets.

The Divisional Court found that the Tribunal fundamentally misapprehended the evidence, including ignoring documentary proof that the appellant had disclosed his real estate partnership to Ontario Works at the outset.

The Court set aside the Tribunal's decision, cancelled the overpayment for the period prior to the sale of the partnership interest, and remitted the remaining calculations back to the Director.

The defendant landlord moved for summary judgment dismissing a personal injury action as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff had sued a nightclub within the limitation period after falling from an elevated dance floor but only later added the landlord after discovering during examinations for discovery that the landlord participated in the design and construction of the stage.

The court considered the discoverability provisions under s. 5 of the Limitations Act, 2002 and the extent of reasonable pre-discovery investigation required of plaintiff’s counsel in occupiers’ liability claims.

The court held that the plaintiff was not required to seek information from adverse parties before discovery where those parties had no obligation to provide it.

The limitation period began when the plaintiff first learned of the landlord’s involvement during discovery, rendering the action timely.

The Attorney General applied for the civil forfeiture of a leisure-use sailboat under the Civil Remedies Act, 2001, after the owner was charged with operating the vessel while impaired.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the general forfeiture provisions of the Act were intended to target organized crime and serious criminal offences, not leisure boating.

The Crown failed to establish that it was likely the sailboat would be used for unlawful activity in the future or that such activity would likely result in serious bodily harm.

The appellant contractor's construction lien expired after it failed to set the action down for trial within two years.

The respondent owner brought a motion without notice under section 46 of the Construction Lien Act, resulting in the dismissal of the entire action, including the appellant's breach of contract claims.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that while the lien claims were properly dismissed, the contract claims should not have been summarily dismissed without notice.

The court varied the order to allow the breach of contract claims to proceed, noting that the Act does not mandate the dismissal of non-lien claims upon the expiry of a lien.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision that set aside a Registrar's order dismissing the respondents' action for delay.

The motion judge had set aside the dismissal because he found the respondents were not given notice of the dismissal proceeding.

On appeal, fresh evidence showed notice was sent but returned because the respondents had moved and failed to update their address with the court.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the respondents could not use their failure to update their address as an excuse, and reinstated the Registrar's order dismissing the action for delay.

The applicant sought a declaration that its proposed expansion of insurance business would not contravene s. 2(5) of the Architects Act.

The declaration was intended to address a concern raised by the Financial Services Commission of Ontario regarding the applicant’s plan to expand its insurance offerings beyond architects.

The court held that although it had jurisdiction to interpret the statutory provision, the issue arose within a comprehensive regulatory scheme under the Insurance Act assigning decision‑making authority to the Superintendent of Financial Services.

Applying principles of administrative law and deference to specialized tribunals, the court declined to exercise jurisdiction.

The matter should first be determined through the statutory licensing process before the regulator, subject to subsequent review or appeal.

The applicant sought leave to appeal an Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) decision dismissing her appeal of a municipal by-law regarding proposed hospital lands.

The OMB found she lacked standing because she did not make oral or written submissions to City Council when the by-law was considered, as required by s. 34(19) 2 of the Planning Act.

The Divisional Court held that the OMB's interpretation of the standing requirement was reasonable and dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

The moving party sought leave to appeal the dismissal of her motion for summary judgment.

The underlying action involved a motor vehicle accident where the moving party owned the vehicle driven by her uninsured daughter.

The moving party sought summary judgment on the basis that she did not consent to her daughter driving the vehicle.

The motions judge dismissed the summary judgment motion, refusing to admit discovery evidence and declining to apply the summary judgment framework.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding good reason to doubt the motions judge's evidentiary rulings and concluding it was a matter of general importance to consider whether the motions judge's approach was consistent with the principles in Hryniak v. Mauldin.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order staying his action for non-payment of previous costs awards.

The moving party had initially appealed to the Court of Appeal, which quashed the appeal, and then delayed three months before bringing this motion.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding it utterly without merit and noting the moving party's long delays and failure to pay costs.

Costs of the motion were awarded to the responding parties in the amount of $8,000.

The defendant brought a motion to set aside two default judgments arising from a breach of contract action involving a technology services agreement.

The court applied the established test for setting aside default judgments, considering delay, explanation for the default, and the existence of a triable defence.

The court held that the motion to set aside the first partial default judgment for the liquidated portion of the claim was brought with undue delay and lacked a reasonable explanation or evidence of a meritorious defence.

However, the court accepted a limited explanation regarding the second judgment for the unliquidated portion of damages and found that issues relating to quantum and equitable remedies warranted adjudication on the merits.

The second judgment was set aside on conditions, including payment of the first judgment and costs.

The appellant appealed a family arbitration award that terminated a previously established education fund for the parties’ children and ordered the remaining funds returned to the parents.

The appellant argued procedural unfairness, an error in determining that the youngest adult child was not a “child of the marriage” due to disability, and a failure to apply constitutional and human rights norms requiring accommodation of disability.

The court held that the arbitrator applied the correct legal principles and reasonably concluded that the appellant had not proven the adult child met the statutory definition of “child of the marriage” under the Divorce Act at the relevant time.

The court also found no procedural unfairness in the arbitrator’s summary process and refused to admit fresh evidence regarding the child’s evolving educational plans.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment granting the respondent monies due under a defaulted mortgage.

The appellants argued the judgment should not have been granted or should have been stayed because of an ongoing 2011 action alleging misappropriation of funds by a financial advisor who allegedly controlled the respondent.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence linking the respondent to the defendants in the 2011 action and no triable issues regarding liability under the mortgage.

The court also denied leave to appeal the motion judge's costs award.