David L. Corbett

The applicant insurer sought a declaration that a proposed expansion of its insurance business was not inconsistent with s. 2(5) of the Architects Act.

During the hearing, the court raised concerns regarding whether it had jurisdiction to determine the issue in the absence of an adverse regulatory decision from the Financial Services Commission of Ontario.

The court noted the need to avoid undermining the statutory administrative regime by creating an alternate forum for determining issues within the regulator’s mandate.

Because the record and submissions were insufficient to resolve the jurisdictional question, the court adjourned the application and directed further materials and supplementary factums addressing jurisdiction.

The corporate plaintiff, acting through unrepresented agents, brought multiple motions seeking relief from various orders in a long-standing mortgage default dispute.

The plaintiff sought to appeal a Court of Appeal costs order, extend time to appeal a Master's security for costs order, obtain leave to appeal a judge's order permitting a power of sale, and extend time to oppose confirmation of a Master's reference report.

The Divisional Court dismissed the requests regarding the Court of Appeal order, the security for costs order, and the power of sale order.

The court granted an extension of time to oppose the Master's report, but only on strict terms requiring payment of all outstanding costs and security into court.

The plaintiffs sued the defendants, including the opposing party's law firm, for negligent misrepresentation regarding an equity raise condition in a loan agreement.

During discovery, the defendants sought communications between the plaintiffs and their own counsel, arguing that the plaintiffs' allegation of detrimental reliance constituted a deemed waiver of solicitor-client privilege.

The Master upheld the privilege, but the appeal judge reversed, finding a deemed waiver.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, noting a conflict in the jurisprudence regarding whether alleging detrimental reliance equates to a waiver of privilege.

The applicant school board appealed decisions of the City’s Chief Building Official concluding that a proposed refurbishment of school sports facilities with a private operator did not fall within a zoning by‑law exemption for land used only for teaching or instructional purposes.

The proposal would allow a private company to operate the facilities commercially for the majority of the time.

The court held that while incidental non‑school uses of school facilities may fall within the exemption, intensive commercial exploitation does not.

Given the scale and commercial nature of the proposed use, the project did not qualify for the exemption and required a zoning variance through the municipal planning process.

An experienced private mortgage lender advanced $100,000 secured by a first mortgage in a property transaction that proved to be fraudulent.

The borrower admitted participating in the fraud but died without assets.

The central issue at trial was whether the solicitor who acted for both borrower and lender or the mortgage broker was responsible for orchestrating the scheme.

The court accepted corroborated evidence that the solicitor was the architect and principal beneficiary of the fraud, drawing adverse inferences from his failure to testify and from suspicious documents in his file.

Judgment was granted for the lender for her losses with prejudgment interest and punitive damages, and the third‑party claim against the broker was dismissed.

The plaintiff corporations moved to restore an action to the trial list after it had been struck by a judge several years earlier.

The defendants opposed the motion, arguing that the delay in restoring the action was excessive and unexplained.

The court held that the proper framework under Rule 48.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure is guided by Rule 1.04(1), emphasizing the just and expeditious determination of cases on their merits.

The court concluded the action was ready for trial and that the limited period of delay following removal of prior counsel had been adequately explained.

The action was therefore restored to the trial list.

A third party sought summary judgment dismissing a negligence claim arising from a fuel oil tank leak that contaminated neighbouring properties.

The moving party argued that its role in promulgating industry standards constituted a policy decision for which it was immune from civil liability.

The court held it was not plain and obvious that no duty of care could exist, particularly regarding allegations of inadequate standards, failure to warn of known hazards, negligent investigation, and proximity between the regulator and affected parties.

Given the incomplete evidentiary record and the novelty of the duty-of-care issue, the court declined to grant summary judgment.

The matter was left open for reconsideration after discovery and a fuller factual record.

The plaintiff, a scooter retailer, sued a competing retailer for defamation based on statements made by the defendant's principal to private investigators hired by the plaintiff.

The court found that the statements, which accused the plaintiff of unethical and illegal business practices, were defamatory and published.

The court awarded $10,000 in general damages but declined to grant a permanent injunction, finding no evidence that the defendants would continue to make defamatory statements after the judgment.

Following a liability determination in favour of the plaintiff contractor, the court addressed a motion and cross‑motion concerning undertakings, refusals, and production relevant to the upcoming damages phase of trial.

The court limited relevance to matters affecting damages.

Several undertakings were ordered answered and certain disclosure ordered, including financial statements and notes referencing the litigation.

Some questions were declined as unnecessary or premature, and counsel were directed to attempt agreement on the scope of further production.

The moving municipality was largely successful and awarded partial indemnity costs.

Two insurers disputed liability for indemnity arising from a motor vehicle accident and whether the plaintiff insurer’s claim against the defendant insurer was statute‑barred.

The issue was when the claim was discovered for the purposes of the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court held that discoverability occurs when the plaintiff knows or ought to know that the at‑fault driver was insured under a valid policy.

The plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence and did not discover the existence of applicable insurance until 2010 despite earlier related litigation.

The action commenced shortly thereafter was therefore within the limitation period.

The plaintiff supplier brought a motion for summary judgment for unpaid invoices and breach of trust under the Construction Lien Act arising from the supply of electrical equipment to several related contractor companies.

The court found the defendants had received goods without payment and provided no evidence disputing the invoiced amount.

Because the corporate defendants operated as iterations of the same family-run business and attempted to attribute liability to a dormant company, the court treated them as alter egos and held them jointly and severally liable.

However, the court declined to grant summary judgment on the alleged breach of statutory trust, finding further production and cross-examination necessary to determine whether trust funds had been received and improperly disbursed.

Judgment for the invoiced amount was granted, with the trust claim adjourned for further evidence.

In mortgage enforcement litigation, the defendants advanced a counterclaim alleging their former solicitor improperly retained mortgage proceeds and should be responsible for repayment of the loan.

The moving parties sought dismissal of the counterclaim on the basis that identical claims had previously been struck without leave to amend in earlier proceedings.

The court held that the prior decision constituted a final determination on the merits and therefore barred the renewed claim under the doctrine of res judicata.

Although the original mortgage enforcement action had been administratively dismissed and recommenced, that procedural history did not reopen the already-determined claims against the solicitor.

The counterclaim was dismissed.

The defendant moved to discharge a certificate of pending litigation registered against his matrimonial home.

The plaintiff bank agreed the certificate should be removed after discovering the alleged fraudulent conveyance had already been reversed, but sought a charging order against the defendant’s interest in the property as a term of discharge.

The court found the bank had a strong prima facie claim under a personal guarantee for corporate debt and that circumstances surrounding property transfers created a real risk the defendant might render himself judgment‑proof.

The court also rejected allegations that the bank had obtained the original certificate through material misrepresentation on the without‑notice motion.

The certificate of pending litigation was discharged but replaced with a limited form of security akin to a Mareva injunction.

The Burnbrae defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims against them.

The plaintiffs, who were competitors in the egg industry, alleged that Burnbrae conspired with others to drive them out of business by supplying deficient eggs, misusing confidential information, and interfering with contractual relations.

Applying the new summary judgment framework from Hryniak v. Mauldin, the court found no evidence to support the plaintiffs' sweeping allegations against Burnbrae.

The court concluded that Burnbrae's actions were legitimate competitive behavior and dismissed the action against the Burnbrae defendants.

A proposed intervenor sought leave to participate extensively in a constitutional application challenging the Restoring Mail Delivery for Canadians Act, legislation enacted to end a postal workers’ strike.

The proposed intervenor requested rights to adduce evidence, cross‑examine witnesses, and make full submissions similar to the parties.

The court applied Rule 13.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the governing intervention principles, including whether the intervenor would make a useful contribution without causing injustice to the existing parties.

The court held that the proposed evidence was largely argumentative and duplicative of arguments available to existing parties, particularly Canada Post and the Attorney General.

Finding the intervention would not assist the court and could expand the record unnecessarily, the motion was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of an adjudicator's decision ordering the disclosure of parts of a bus services contract between the applicant and a municipality.

The adjudicator found that the third party exemption under s. 10(1) of the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act did not apply because the information was mutually generated through negotiation, rather than supplied by the applicant.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the adjudicator's decision was reasonable and that the applicant failed to establish that the inferred disclosure or immutability exceptions applied.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Licence Appeal Tribunal directing the Registrar to revoke his registration as a real estate broker due to serious and repeated dishonest conduct.

The Tribunal found the appellant engaged in mortgage fraud, forged signatures, and made false statements on his broker renewal applications.

On appeal, the appellant argued the Tribunal erred in admitting certain evidence and misapprehended other evidence.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review and found the Tribunal's factual conclusions were supported by the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

A former law firm partner brought an application disputing liability for goodwill payments and accounting fees following his withdrawal from the partnership.

The central issue was whether the goodwill buy‑in constituted a fixed obligation payable over five years or annual payments contingent on continued partnership membership.

The court held that the parties had not expressly addressed early departure and that the available documentation and surrounding circumstances supported the interpretation that goodwill payments were contingent on partnership earnings during each year.

As the applicant left the partnership after two years, he was not liable for the remaining goodwill payments.

The court also held that accounting services incurred to resolve disputes regarding the firm's records were firm expenses, not the applicant’s personal liability.

The moving defendant sought summary judgment dismissing the action on the basis that the claim was barred by the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff alleged that a former business partner misrepresented that a joint electricity transmission project had been abandoned while secretly continuing the project through other corporations.

The court held that the discoverability principle applied and that the plaintiff did not learn facts giving rise to the claim until after a reporter’s inquiry in 2007, after which he conducted due diligence.

On the record before the court, there was evidence capable of supporting a discoverability date after April 2007, making the 2009 action potentially timely.

The summary judgment motion was dismissed and substantial indemnity costs were awarded due to the unmeritorious nature of the motion.

The insurer applied for a declaration that the respondent pedestrian was not an insured under his mother’s automobile policy because he was not a “dependant” at the time of a catastrophic accident.

The court assessed dependency under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule using a functional analysis considering financial support, duration of dependency, needs, and the ability to be self‑supporting.

The evidence showed the respondent remained primarily financially supported by his mother despite attempts to establish independence.

The court further held the insurer was estopped from denying coverage after paying statutory accident benefits for five years while the respondent relied on that assumption and lost the opportunity to pursue benefits against another insurer.

The application to terminate benefits was dismissed.