Daniel Z. Naymark

The Gerstel parties brought a motion to adjourn a scheduled five-week trial after the Berkovits parties indicated they intended to call Hosseini, a defaulting party who had previously failed to attend discoveries, as a witness.

The moving parties argued they would be prejudiced if forced to proceed without examining Hosseini.

The court dismissed the adjournment request to avoid further delay, but ordered that Hosseini must submit to a two-day examination for discovery prior to trial, failing which he would be barred from testifying.

The applicants, judgment creditors of the respondents for over $26 million USD arising from a fraudulent lending scheme, moved to discontinue the payment of living expenses and legal fees to the respondents and their related trusts from the receivership estate.

The trusts brought a cross-motion to strike the Receiver's Eleventh Report, arguing the Receiver exceeded its mandate by tracing funds and making observations about badges of a sham trust.

The court dismissed the motion to strike, finding the Receiver acted within its court-ordered investigatory powers and did not usurp the court's role.

The court granted the applicants' motion to terminate funding, holding that the respondents had exhausted their appeals, were now judgment debtors, and failed to meet the test for funding from frozen assets, as they had not provided full disclosure and the funds belonged to their creditors.

The Plaintiff sought costs for a motion to compel discovery answers, which was ultimately resolved through case management rather than judicial determination.

Despite the settlement, the court found exceptional circumstances warranted a costs award due to the Defendants' conduct in unnecessarily prolonging the motion and delaying answers to refusals.

The court also affirmed the principle that costs are available where counsel acts pro bono.

The Plaintiff was awarded $5,000 in costs on a partial indemnity scale.

The moving parties requested to schedule a motion to bar a witness from testifying at the upcoming trial, alleging the witness had previously perjured himself and ignored court orders.

The case management judge declined to schedule the motion, finding that admissibility of evidence is a matter for the trial judge.

The judge emphasized that allowing the interlocutory motion would only cause further delay and tactical gamesmanship in an already protracted litigation.

The plaintiff, a candidate for the leadership of the Conservative Party of Canada, was disqualified by the Dispute Resolution Appeals Committee (DRAC) following a complaint about his campaign materials.

He brought a summary judgment motion seeking to restore his candidacy, arguing breach of contract, procedural unfairness, and bad faith.

The court found that while the process was fair and there was no bad faith, the DRAC lacked the authority under the party's rules to disqualify a candidate.

The court set aside the disqualification and restored the Chief Returning Officer's original ruling, which imposed a penalty but not disqualification, without prejudice to the Leadership Election Organizing Committee's right to consider the matter.

The applicant, Dimitrious Karahalios, a disqualified leadership candidate for the Conservative Party of Canada, brought an application seeking reinstatement and release of campaign funds.

The respondents, including the Conservative Party and its Fund, brought a preliminary motion to strike the application, arguing it was barred by the Leadership Rules and disclosed no reasonable cause of action, and that individual committee members were not proper parties.

The court dismissed the motion to strike the application for not disclosing a reasonable cause of action, finding it was not plain and obvious that the Leadership Rules contractually precluded the applicant's claims.

The individual respondents (members of the Dispute Resolution Appeals Committee and Chief Returning Officer) were removed as parties by agreement.

The court converted the application into an action and scheduled a summary judgment motion to efficiently determine the merits of the dispute, given the complex and novel legal issues regarding the judicial review of unincorporated associations.

The court addressed an urgent application challenging a candidate's disqualification from a national political party's leadership race.

Despite the global COVID-19 pandemic affecting court operations, the court deemed the matter necessary and appropriate to hear due to its time-sensitive nature and implications for the national political process.

The court designated a specific judge to hear the application and issued procedural directives for electronic filing, email service, and remote hearings to facilitate the urgent progression of the case.

The plaintiffs sought production of banking, income tax, and municipal records from the defendants in two civil actions alleging conversion of millions of dollars in assets.

A preliminary motion by the defendants to strike the plaintiffs' extensive affidavit evidence was partially successful, but the court decided to proceed with the main production motion, ignoring irrelevant evidence.

The court granted the production order for tax records and CIBC banking records, finding them relevant to the alleged breach of fiduciary duty and fraud, and that the need for information outweighed privacy concerns.

Municipal and county records were produced by consent.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for a status hearing and timetable, while the defendants brought a cross-motion to dismiss the 2013 action for delay.

The plaintiffs' former counsel, who were suspended by the Law Society, caused significant delay and misled the plaintiffs.

The court found the plaintiffs had an acceptable explanation for the delay.

However, the court found the defendants would suffer non-compensable prejudice because the plaintiffs' former counsel lost the majority of the relevant documents, making complete documentary disclosure impossible.

The action was dismissed for delay.

The plaintiff, an 81-year-old widow, brought a motion to continue and expand a Mareva injunction and obtain further Norwich orders against her deceased husband's former bookkeeper, who allegedly misappropriated funds.

The court continued the existing Mareva injunction freezing $185,000 related to the sale of a restaurant property, finding a strong prima facie case.

However, the court dismissed the request to expand the injunction to cover the sale of a farm property due to conflicting evidence.

The court also dismissed the request for further Norwich orders, noting the litigation was no longer at the pre-action stage, and ruled that much of the plaintiff's evidence, provided via a law clerk's affidavit, was inadmissible hearsay.

The moving parties, creditors of a bankrupt company (Acorn), sought to set aside the registrar's dismissal for delay of three actions originally brought by Acorn against the Crown.

The actions were dismissed while subject to an automatic stay due to Acorn's bankruptcy.

The court found that the registrar lacked jurisdiction to dismiss the actions while they were stayed.

Alternatively, applying the Reid factors, the court found the explanation for delay adequate, the motion brought promptly given the circumstances, and no uncompensable prejudice to the Crown, whose own actions contributed to any alleged prejudice.

The dismissals were set aside.

The Attorney General of Canada sought an order requiring a lawyer to reimburse approximately $500,000 in costs for a Monitor's investigation into his practice regarding Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement (IRSSA) claims.

The lawyer resisted and sought a public statement clearing his name, along with costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court found that while the lawyer had breached the IRSSA by facilitating third-party loans, he had not misappropriated funds or acted with malicious intent.

The court dismissed both Canada's request for investigation costs and the lawyer's request for costs and a public statement.

In complex commercial litigation involving a Mareva injunction motion, counsel attended the court without following the Commercial List’s procedure for requesting an urgent appointment.

The court emphasized that counsel must contact the Commercial List Office before appearing urgently before a judge and may not bypass the process by attending unannounced in an attempt to vary a prior order.

Although the parties agreed to adjourn the Mareva motion and vary certain procedural timelines, the court criticized the improper attendance and ruled that the plaintiffs would not be entitled to claim costs for the unnecessary appearances.

The court granted the adjournment on consent with modifications and provided further scheduling directions for cross-examinations and the motion return.

The interim injunction remained in effect pending the rescheduled hearing.

The moving party brought a motion under Rule 57.07 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to hold opposing counsel personally liable for litigation costs allegedly caused by misconduct, including advancing false evidence, suppressing documents, and encouraging clients to give perjured testimony.

The court conducted a detailed review of the history of the litigation and the governing principles for imposing personal cost liability on counsel.

While the court found that counsel had made some serious litigation errors, including failing to properly list privileged documents in an affidavit of documents and mishandling document preservation, it held that the conduct did not cause costs to be incurred without reasonable cause within the meaning of Rule 57.07.

The court emphasized the adversarial nature of civil litigation, the extreme caution required before awarding costs personally against lawyers, and the availability of procedural remedies to address discovery issues.

The motion was dismissed.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendants for fraud, breach of trust, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, and breach of contract arising from a fraudulent investment scheme.

The court found the defendants liable on a joint and several basis, as the uncontested evidence established that the defendants accepted funds for investment but did not invest them as promised, instead providing forged financial statements.

The court awarded damages based on the net principal invested plus compound interest, general damages for investigation costs, and punitive damages.

The defendants appealed a master's order compelling answers and document production arising from an examination for discovery in a commercial dispute involving alleged misuse of confidential information and solicitation of a former employer’s client.

The defendants argued the production order was based on unsubstantiated pleadings, speculation regarding misuse of confidential information, and the discredited doctrine of inevitable disclosure.

The court held that relevance for discovery is determined by the pleadings and that the allegations in the statement of claim sufficiently grounded the requested discovery.

The master properly exercised discretion in balancing proportionality and determining that the information sought was relevant.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment dismissing a counterclaim on the basis that it was barred by the Limitations Act, 2002 and disclosed no reasonable cause of action against individual plaintiffs.

The court held that the evidentiary record did not establish when the counterclaiming party discovered the alleged misrepresentations concerning the product at issue, and therefore the limitation issue required a full evidentiary record at trial.

The court also found that the pleadings alleged misrepresentations through corporate communications and other channels and were not limited to personal communications with the individual plaintiffs.

The allegations were sufficiently particularized to sustain causes of action including fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, and disgorgement.

Summary judgment was therefore inappropriate.

The plaintiff brought an urgent motion for an interlocutory injunction against the vendor of its IT business and several former employees who joined a newly established direct competitor.

The vendor had signed a non-competition and non-solicitation agreement upon the sale of the business.

The court found that the strong prima facie case standard applied to the restrictive covenant in the context of a sale of a business.

The court held that the non-competition clause was reasonable, except for a 10 km geographic extension which was severed using the blue-pencil doctrine.

The court granted the injunction against the vendor and the other defendants, finding they were impressed with fiduciary duties, and ordered the preservation and forensic review of electronic devices due to a strong prima facie case of misappropriation of confidential information.

A receiver was appointed over a fraudulent investment scheme where the deposits of 24 investors were commingled.

The receiver sought directions on how to distribute the remaining funds, which had a significant shortfall.

One group of investors argued for a pro rata distribution based on original contributions, while another argued for the Lowest Intermediate Balance Rule (LIBR).

The court held that LIBR is the general rule for resolving competing claims to commingled funds unless it is unworkable.

Finding that the receiver could practically calculate the LIBR distributions, the court ordered the funds to be distributed according to LIBR.

Following earlier motions seeking to set aside or vary an ex parte order and discharge certificates of pending litigation registered against properties connected to bankrupt estates, the trustee sought costs.

The moving parties argued they had achieved partial success and that costs should be in the cause or borne by each party.

The court found the trustee had been essentially successful in maintaining the certificates of pending litigation and defending the scope of the production order, notwithstanding limited clarification provided in the earlier endorsement.

After considering objections regarding time spent on cross-examinations and the factors in rule 57.01(1), the court fixed partial indemnity costs in favour of the trustee.