Daniel Guttman

The applicant alleged discrimination on the basis of disability regarding the special diet allowance provided under Ontario's social assistance system.

The applicant argued that the special diet schedule failed to recognize his environmental and chemical sensitivity disorders and that the allowance amounts were too low.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing and found that there was no reasonable prospect that the applicant could establish discrimination under the test set out in Ball v. Ontario.

The application was dismissed.

The applicants alleged discrimination on the basis of disability regarding the special diet allowance provided under Ontario's social assistance system.

They argued that the special diet schedule failed to recognize their environmental and chemical sensitivities, that the allowance amounts were discriminatorily low, and that the removal of their grandparented status was discriminatory.

The Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario held a summary hearing and dismissed the applications, finding no reasonable prospect that the applicants could establish discrimination under the test set out in Ball v. Ontario.

The appellant was convicted of impaired driving.

Following his arrest, he was subjected to a routine strip search before being lodged in cells, which the Crown conceded violated his s. 8 Charter rights.

The trial judge refused to grant a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1), finding that the search did not impact trial fairness and that police had reasonable and probable grounds to conduct the search due to safety concerns.

The summary appeal court dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeal denied leave to appeal, finding no error of law in the trial judge's application of the objective standard for strip searches.

The applicant sought access to a sealed information used to obtain a search warrant executed at his residence, where no firearms or contraband were found and no charges were laid.

A prior order had directed that the warrant materials be unsealed and disclosed in redacted form, leaving the issue of which public institution was responsible for vetting the materials to protect confidential informer privilege.

The Attorney General of Ontario and the police each argued the other bore the responsibility.

The court held that informer privilege is jointly owned by the Crown and the informer and that the Attorney General bears the legal responsibility for protecting the privilege.

Accordingly, the Attorney General must perform the editing of the sealed search warrant materials, with assistance from the police as necessary.

The appellant appealed a conviction for impaired driving and argued that the trial judge erred in dismissing an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Superior Court reanalyzed the delay and found that several periods had been mischaracterized by the trial judge, including delay attributable to the Crown’s failure to disclose an expert toxicology report and institutional delays related to scheduling and transcript availability.

The court concluded that approximately 15 months and 10 days of delay were attributable to the Crown or institutional causes, exceeding the guideline for provincial court trials.

The appellant demonstrated both actual and inferred prejudice from the delay.

The conviction was therefore stayed for breach of the right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding the legal limit.

At trial, defence counsel filed a Charter challenge to amendments enacted through Bill C‑2 but intentionally led no evidence and made no substantive argument, inviting the court to dismiss the application in order to preserve the issue pending appellate decisions on the legislation’s constitutionality.

The trial judge dismissed the Charter application due to the absence of an evidentiary record and convicted the appellant relying on statutory presumptions of accuracy and identity.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge should have required a proper evidentiary record or withdrawal of the application.

The court held that constitutional challenges require a factual record and that the trial judge properly dismissed the application where no evidence supported it.

The conviction and dismissal of the Charter application were upheld.

The appellant appealed multiple Criminal Code convictions arising from incidents involving criminal harassment, assault, threats, theft, mischief, and breaches of recognizance.

The sole issue pursued on appeal was whether the trial judge failed to provide sufficient reasons for conviction following a lengthy multi-day trial involving numerous witnesses.

The appellate court held that although the trial judge’s oral reasons were brief in parts, they sufficiently explained the route to conviction and allowed meaningful appellate review.

The judge’s acceptance of the complainant’s evidence, corroborated by other witnesses and independent evidence, and rejection of the appellant’s testimony demonstrated application of the principles in R. v. W. (D.).

The appeal was therefore dismissed.

A self-represented applicant sought costs against a provincial court judge personally after successfully obtaining relief relating to the judge’s refusal to remove him as counsel during a criminal trial.

The Superior Court considered whether costs could be awarded against the judge and whether the Crown should receive costs against the applicant.

The court held that judges enjoy absolute immunity from civil liability for acts performed in their judicial capacity under s. 82 of the Courts of Justice Act, barring any costs award against the judge.

The court also declined to award costs to the Crown against the applicant despite concerns about the merit of the motion.

Both costs requests were dismissed.

The complainant, a 15-year-old mother of twins, lived with and was dependent on her parents.

She applied for social assistance under the Ontario Works Act.

She was denied benefits for herself and received reduced benefits for her children because she lived with her parents.

She alleged discrimination on the basis of family status.

The Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario dismissed the claim regarding benefits for herself, finding that minors living with their parents are generally ineligible.

However, the Tribunal found that reducing the benefits for her children solely because she lived with her parents constituted discrimination on the basis of family status.

The Tribunal ordered the respondent to pay the lost benefits and to cease considering whether a minor parent lives with their own parents when calculating benefits for the minor parent's children.

The Criminal Lawyers' Association sought access to a police report and legal advice regarding an investigation into alleged police misconduct in a murder case.

The Minister refused disclosure under the law enforcement and solicitor-client privilege exemptions of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The CLA argued that the Act's failure to apply a public interest override to these exemptions violated freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 2(b) does not guarantee access to all government documents, but only where access is necessary for meaningful public discussion and does not encroach on protected privileges.

The Court found no Charter violation, as the exemptions themselves already incorporate public interest considerations.

The matter regarding the law enforcement exemption was remitted to the Commissioner for reconsideration of the Minister's exercise of discretion.

The appellant was convicted of multiple counts of sexual assault and sexual exploitation.

He appealed on the grounds that the trial judge's jury instructions failed to review the evidence, relate it to the positions of the parties, and adequately outline factors relevant to the complainant's credibility.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred by not reviewing the evidence for each discrete count and failing to instruct the jury to treat each count separately.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed a 12-month conditional sentence imposed on a young first offender who suffered from a mental illness.

Although the law now requires a custodial sentence for the offence in question, the Court of Appeal declined to interfere because the respondent had successfully served the conditional sentence and addressed his mental health issues through prescribed medication.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting a videotaped police station statement that was allegedly tainted by earlier inadmissible statements made in a police cruiser, and in instructing the jury on the defence of accident and intent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the station statement was a 'fresh start' separated by time, location, and consultation with counsel, and that the jury was properly instructed on the requisite intent for murder.

The appellant appealed his sexual assault conviction, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate and that the trial judge erred in assessing credibility.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge's reasons were inadequate, the basis for rejecting the appellant's testimony was apparent from the record.

The court also held that the trial judge did not err in his credibility findings.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of multiple counts of armed robbery and related offences following two trials.

He appealed his convictions, arguing that his s. 11(b) Charter rights were violated by a 56-month delay, that the trial judge erred in admitting similar fact evidence and refusing to sever the charges, and that bad character evidence was improperly admitted.

He also appealed his sentence of life imprisonment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding that the delay was largely attributable to the appellant's own conduct and that the trial judge made no reversible errors in his evidentiary rulings or jury instructions.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the Court holding that a life sentence was fit given the appellant's extensive violent criminal record, incorrigibility, and the need to protect the public.

The accused appealed his convictions for sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching involving three young complainants.

The Crown appealed the conditional sentence of 18 months imposed by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the accused's evidence.

However, the Court allowed the Crown's sentence appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in finding exceptional circumstances to justify a conditional sentence for these offences.

The sentence was varied to 14 months' imprisonment.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge improperly considered an unproved allegation that he used a beer bottle as a weapon during an attack.

The Court of Appeal accepted this argument for the purpose of the appeal but found that, even disregarding the use of the bottle, the sentences were fully justified.

The assaults were vicious and life-threatening, and occurred in the context of serious assaults on good Samaritans who tried to intervene.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder.

On appeal, he argued that his right to the assistance of an interpreter under s. 14 of the Charter was violated because his assigned interpreter was not accredited.

He also raised several grounds of appeal relating to the trial judge's jury instructions on identification evidence, the mental element for murder, post-offence conduct, and intoxication, as well as evidentiary rulings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant failed to establish a violation of his s. 14 Charter rights, as he had agreed to the interpreter arrangement and never complained of any lack of understanding during the trial.

The Court also found no reversible errors in the jury instructions or evidentiary rulings.

The appellants appealed their assault convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in his jury charge regarding eyewitness identification, including the failure to give Chartier and Vetrovec warnings, and the handling of in-dock identification and photo lineups.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding the trial judge gave a well-crafted and balanced charge that adequately highlighted the frailties of the identification evidence.

One appellant's sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the three-year sentence was within the appropriate range given his significant criminal record.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and his sentence of three years' imprisonment.

He argued that his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter was violated due to institutional delay following a mistrial.

He also challenged the admission of his prior guilty plea for assaulting the complainant's mother and the admission of the complainant's videotaped statement under s. 715.1 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no unreasonable delay and no error in the evidentiary rulings.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the three-year penitentiary sentence was fit given the repeated sexual assaults on a child in a position of trust.