Daniel Guttman

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in finding he was not detained during police questioning, which he claimed resulted in a Charter violation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest at the time of questioning, and that the questioning was general and non-coercive.

The court also dismissed an application to admit fresh evidence.

On the sentence appeal, the court found the trial judge's credit for stringent bail conditions was reasonable given the serious nature of the crimes and the appellant's prior record.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conviction entered by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's two-year delay in rendering a decision, followed by an additional five-month delay to release brief reasons, constituted an unreasonable delay.

The appeal was allowed, the finding of guilt was set aside, and the proceedings were stayed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding self-defence, specifically by only charging under s. 34(2) of the Criminal Code and overemphasizing its objective component.

The appellant also challenged the instructions on defence of property and the application of the Scopelliti principles regarding the complainant's criminal record.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly focused the jury on the most relevant self-defence provision, correctly balanced the subjective and objective components, and caused no prejudice with the limiting instruction on the complainant's record.

The appellant was convicted of assault causing bodily harm and his summary conviction appeal was dismissed.

He appealed to the Court of Appeal, arguing that the trial judge erred in dismissing his section 11(b) Charter motion for unreasonable delay and in assessing eyewitness identification evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the 11 to 12 months of institutional delay did not violate section 11(b), noting that the Morin guideline is not a strict statute of limitations.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's reliance on eyewitness identification, finding the verdict was not unreasonable.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his murder conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in his jury charge regarding the requisite intent for murder by reason of mental disorder falling short of insanity, and by leaving the defence of insanity to the jury over the objections of both counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's charge was fair and balanced, and that there was an air of reality to the insanity defence given the appellant's own doctor raised the issue.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of robbery and related offences for acting as the getaway driver in an armed jewellery store robbery.

At trial, the Crown introduced hearsay evidence from the deceased store owner, who had previously testified at a co-accused's sentencing hearing and identified the appellant as having visited the store the day before the robbery.

The appellant appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting this hearsay evidence and failing to properly instruct the jury on its frailties.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the evidence met the principled exception tests of necessity and reliability, and the jury instructions were adequate.

The applicant submitted a freedom of information request for records concerning an Ontario Provincial Police review of alleged police and Crown misconduct.

The Ministry refused disclosure, claiming exemptions for law enforcement and solicitor-client privilege under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Assistant Commissioner upheld the exemptions and found the public interest override in s. 23 of the Act did not apply to them.

The Court of Appeal held that the exclusion of these exemptions from the public interest override infringed the applicant's freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter and could not be justified under s. 1.

The Court remedied the breach by reading the exemptions into s. 23.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for assault and sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversal of the burden of proof, and upheld the SOIRA registration and the non-application of the Kienapple principle.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal, reducing the sentence from four years to three years due to the appellant's youth, lack of criminal record, low risk of re-offending, and positive personal circumstances.

The appellants, who were 16 years old at the time of the offences, pleaded guilty to six violent convenience store robberies.

The Crown successfully applied to have them sentenced as adults under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The sentencing judge imposed five-year sentences in addition to three years' credit for pre-sentence custody, and ordered both to serve their sentences in adult penitentiaries.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the adult sentences and the quantum of the sentences, finding no error in the judge's approach to accountability, rehabilitation, or pre-sentence custody credit.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part regarding the placement of one appellant, finding the sentencing judge failed to properly evaluate expert evidence recommending he remain in a youth facility, and ordered a new placement hearing for that appellant.

Following the dismissal of an inmate's application for judicial review of a disciplinary decision, the respondents sought $7,000 in costs.

The inmate argued that no costs should be awarded on public interest grounds.

The Divisional Court agreed, finding that the inmate raised bona fide issues of procedural fairness that were of potential importance to all inmates.

Recognizing the inmate's vulnerable position and the chilling effect a costs award would have on future inmates seeking to protect their rights, the court ordered that the parties bear their own costs.

The applicant, an inmate at Maplehurst Correctional Complex, sought judicial review of a decision finding him guilty of assaulting another inmate and imposing a penalty of 10 days in segregation.

He argued the process was procedurally unfair and that the disciplinary system violated section 7 of the Charter due to institutional bias.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant was treated fairly, as he was informed of the charge, offered counsel, and given the opportunity to question his accuser and call witnesses, which he declined.

The Court also declined to decide the Charter issue, noting the lack of an evidentiary record to support the claim of institutional bias.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder and his life sentence with 14 years of parole ineligibility.

He raised several grounds of appeal, including the adequacy of the jury instructions on reasonable doubt and after-the-fact conduct, the reasonableness of the verdict, the trial judge's review of the evidence, and the handling of a jury question.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's instructions or handling of the trial.

The court also granted leave to appeal the sentence but dismissed the appeal, upholding the 14-year parole ineligibility period.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that evidence of a handgun and cocaine discovered during a search incident to arrest should have been excluded.

The appellant claimed he was unlawfully detained when police questioned him after observing him riding a bicycle on the sidewalk and fleeing.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that there was no psychological detention.

Furthermore, the Court held that even if the arrest lacked objective reasonable and probable grounds, the evidence was admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter because the officers acted in good faith, the search was minimally intrusive, and the offences were serious.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentences for assault and breach of probation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's refusal to sever the breach of probation charge, admission of prior relationship evidence, or the jury's verdicts.

On the sentence appeal, the Court upheld the eight-month sentence for assault but reduced the consecutive sentence for breach of probation from six months to two months, finding the original total sentence too high as the breach was inextricably linked to the assault.

The appellant appealed his convictions on four counts of fraud under $5,000 arising from his computer business, where he accepted cash from customers for computer systems that were never delivered.

He argued the findings of guilt were unreasonable because there was no evidence of the requisite mens rea for fraud.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding there was evidence capable of supporting the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant took the money knowing he could not or would not produce the goods.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting his wife while she was heavily medicated.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing his defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent under s. 273.2(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal found no error in law, holding that the trial judge correctly examined the circumstances from the appellant's perspective and that the complainant's credibility was not central to whether the appellant took reasonable steps to ascertain consent.

Leave to appeal was granted but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant property owner erected a large commercial sign on his land adjacent to Highway 401 without a permit.

The Minister of Transportation obtained a warrant to remove the sign pursuant to s. 38(2)(e) of the Public Transportation and Highway Improvement Act.

The appellant appealed, arguing the provision infringed his freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the provision limited freedom of expression, the limit was prescribed by law and demonstrably justified under s. 1 of the Charter to prevent visual pollution and enhance traffic safety.

In supplementary reasons, the Divisional Court amended its previous ruling on costs at the request of the respondents.

The court deleted the original paragraph regarding costs and substituted a new paragraph directing all counsel to address the court in writing on whether costs should be assessed or fixed, and if fixed, the quantum of such costs.

The applicants had filed a bill of costs seeking partial indemnity costs of $308,926.84.

The applicants, who were social assistance recipients, brought a Charter challenge against a 'lifetime ban' on benefits imposed after convictions related to their benefits.

Before the hearing, a newly elected government repealed the regulations, and the parties settled all issues except costs.

The applicants sought their costs on a public interest basis.

The Divisional Court (majority) awarded the applicants partial indemnity costs of $308,926.84, finding that the litigation was meritorious, the issues were of public importance, and the applicants could not have proceeded without pro bono counsel.

A dissenting judge would have made no order as to costs.

Following the dismissal of the self-represented plaintiff's motion for leave to appeal, the court determined the costs to be awarded to the successful defendants.

The court reviewed the principles for fixing costs under the new costs grid and the Courts of Justice Act.

Finding no compelling reasons for substantial indemnity, the court awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis to the various defendants, totalling $16,158.08.