Daniel Guttman

Following the dismissal of an inmate's application for judicial review of a disciplinary decision, the respondents sought $7,000 in costs.

The inmate argued that no costs should be awarded on public interest grounds.

The Divisional Court agreed, finding that the inmate raised bona fide issues of procedural fairness that were of potential importance to all inmates.

Recognizing the inmate's vulnerable position and the chilling effect a costs award would have on future inmates seeking to protect their rights, the court ordered that the parties bear their own costs.

The applicant, an inmate at Maplehurst Correctional Complex, sought judicial review of a decision finding him guilty of assaulting another inmate and imposing a penalty of 10 days in segregation.

He argued the process was procedurally unfair and that the disciplinary system violated section 7 of the Charter due to institutional bias.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant was treated fairly, as he was informed of the charge, offered counsel, and given the opportunity to question his accuser and call witnesses, which he declined.

The Court also declined to decide the Charter issue, noting the lack of an evidentiary record to support the claim of institutional bias.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder and his life sentence with 14 years of parole ineligibility.

He raised several grounds of appeal, including the adequacy of the jury instructions on reasonable doubt and after-the-fact conduct, the reasonableness of the verdict, the trial judge's review of the evidence, and the handling of a jury question.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's instructions or handling of the trial.

The court also granted leave to appeal the sentence but dismissed the appeal, upholding the 14-year parole ineligibility period.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that evidence of a handgun and cocaine discovered during a search incident to arrest should have been excluded.

The appellant claimed he was unlawfully detained when police questioned him after observing him riding a bicycle on the sidewalk and fleeing.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that there was no psychological detention.

Furthermore, the Court held that even if the arrest lacked objective reasonable and probable grounds, the evidence was admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter because the officers acted in good faith, the search was minimally intrusive, and the offences were serious.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentences for assault and breach of probation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's refusal to sever the breach of probation charge, admission of prior relationship evidence, or the jury's verdicts.

On the sentence appeal, the Court upheld the eight-month sentence for assault but reduced the consecutive sentence for breach of probation from six months to two months, finding the original total sentence too high as the breach was inextricably linked to the assault.

The appellant appealed his convictions on four counts of fraud under $5,000 arising from his computer business, where he accepted cash from customers for computer systems that were never delivered.

He argued the findings of guilt were unreasonable because there was no evidence of the requisite mens rea for fraud.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding there was evidence capable of supporting the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant took the money knowing he could not or would not produce the goods.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting his wife while she was heavily medicated.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing his defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent under s. 273.2(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal found no error in law, holding that the trial judge correctly examined the circumstances from the appellant's perspective and that the complainant's credibility was not central to whether the appellant took reasonable steps to ascertain consent.

Leave to appeal was granted but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant property owner erected a large commercial sign on his land adjacent to Highway 401 without a permit.

The Minister of Transportation obtained a warrant to remove the sign pursuant to s. 38(2)(e) of the Public Transportation and Highway Improvement Act.

The appellant appealed, arguing the provision infringed his freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the provision limited freedom of expression, the limit was prescribed by law and demonstrably justified under s. 1 of the Charter to prevent visual pollution and enhance traffic safety.

In supplementary reasons, the Divisional Court amended its previous ruling on costs at the request of the respondents.

The court deleted the original paragraph regarding costs and substituted a new paragraph directing all counsel to address the court in writing on whether costs should be assessed or fixed, and if fixed, the quantum of such costs.

The applicants had filed a bill of costs seeking partial indemnity costs of $308,926.84.

The applicants, who were social assistance recipients, brought a Charter challenge against a 'lifetime ban' on benefits imposed after convictions related to their benefits.

Before the hearing, a newly elected government repealed the regulations, and the parties settled all issues except costs.

The applicants sought their costs on a public interest basis.

The Divisional Court (majority) awarded the applicants partial indemnity costs of $308,926.84, finding that the litigation was meritorious, the issues were of public importance, and the applicants could not have proceeded without pro bono counsel.

A dissenting judge would have made no order as to costs.

Following the dismissal of the self-represented plaintiff's motion for leave to appeal, the court determined the costs to be awarded to the successful defendants.

The court reviewed the principles for fixing costs under the new costs grid and the Courts of Justice Act.

Finding no compelling reasons for substantial indemnity, the court awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis to the various defendants, totalling $16,158.08.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister's decision to revoke his appointment to an industry advisory committee.

The Minister revoked the appointment after learning the applicant was a member of the Hell's Angels.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Minister's exercise of discretion was not unreasonable and that the revocation did not violate the applicant's freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter.

A dissenting judge would have quashed the decision, finding the revocation unreasonable given the applicant's good character, qualifications, and the fixed term of the appointment.

The Attorney General of Ontario requested costs for a motion for a stay, despite no costs being requested in relation to the appeal.

The Court of Appeal awarded costs of the motion for a stay to the Attorney General, fixed at $5,000 all inclusive.

The Ontario Public Service Employees Union (OPSEU) brought a motion for a stay of an order restraining its members from picketing at courthouses during a lawful strike, pending an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

OPSEU argued that peaceful informational picketing is a protected form of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter and that a total ban was unnecessary.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test for granting a stay.

While tentatively accepting jurisdiction as a single judge to hear the motion, the court dismissed the motion on the balance of convenience branch.

The court held that the public interest in ensuring unimpeded access to the courts, as established in BCGEU, outweighed the harm flowing from the infringement of the picketers' constitutional rights.

During a lawful strike by court workers, a Superior Court judge issued an ex parte injunction on his own motion restraining picketing outside courthouses in the Regional Municipality of Waterloo.

The union appealed, arguing the injunction infringed its members' freedom of expression.

The Court of Appeal held that while the order infringed freedom of expression, it was justified under section 1 of the Charter to ensure unimpeded public access to the courts.

However, the court deleted a paragraph of the order prohibiting 'any activities whatsoever' as there was no evidence of non-picketing interference.