Cydney Gaye Israel

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, sought disclosure of the contents of cell phones seized from the victims' vehicle.

The Crown had categorized the contents and withheld certain materials as clearly irrelevant.

The trial judge declined to personally review the voluminous digital materials, holding that where the defence articulates an issue to which a category of materials might be relevant, the Crown fails to discharge its burden of proving clear irrelevance.

The court ordered the disclosure of most disputed categories, limited to the four-week period authorized by the search warrants.

Saieed Hagi pled guilty to possession of a loaded firearm in breach of a firearm prohibition order while on parole for a manslaughter conviction involving a firearm.

The Crown sought a 5-year sentence emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, while the Defence argued for 4 years with credit for harsh pre-sentence incarceration conditions and social context mitigating factors.

The court balanced aggravating factors including possession of two firearms while intoxicated and on parole, against mitigating factors such as a guilty plea, significant lockdown conditions, social disadvantage, and demonstrated rehabilitation efforts.

The sentence imposed was a global 4 years minus pre-sentence custody, with ancillary orders including a lifetime firearm prohibition and DNA sample.

The Crown sought to admit statements made by three defendants charged in relation to a first degree murder.

The defendants argued the statements were involuntary and obtained in breach of their Charter rights.

The court found all three statements were voluntary.

Mr. Kerr's statement was admitted despite a minor s. 10(b) breach.

Mr. Samuel's statement was admitted as no Charter breaches were established.

Ms. Owen's statement was excluded under s. 24(2) because she was arbitrarily detained and denied her right to counsel during the execution of a search warrant, and the court rejected the Crown's argument that the 'actus reus exception' precluded exclusion.

This criminal trial concerned the charge of reckless discharge of a firearm against the accused, who had already pleaded guilty to possession of a loaded firearm and possession of a firearm contrary to a prohibition order.

The incident occurred in a busy mall where the accused returned fire after another individual (Shooter 1) discharged a handgun in his direction.

The central issue was whether the accused's actions constituted lawful self-defence under Section 34 of the Criminal Code.

The court found that while the accused reasonably believed force was being used against him and acted with the purpose of self-defence, his response was not reasonable in the circumstances.

The judge emphasized that the accused had other options, such as seeking cover, and that his act of firing into a crowded mall recklessly escalated the risk to numerous innocent bystanders, which does not align with community norms.

Consequently, the Crown successfully disproved self-defence, and the accused was found guilty of reckless discharge of a firearm.

This is a sentencing decision for Gioacchino Jack Ricchio, who was convicted of sexual assault.

The 16-year-old victim was intoxicated and drugged with flubromazolam, rendering her incapable of consent.

The assault involved intimate touching and possibly digital penetration.

Aggravating factors included the victim's vulnerability, the accused's knowledge of her incapacitation, his prior youth criminal record (including a violent offence), and his callous abandonment of the victim while she was incapacitated.

Mitigating factors included the accused's youth (20 years old), intellectual deficits, and family support.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence, finding the assault highly intrusive and harmful despite the absence of proven penile penetration, citing R. v. Friesen.

Considering the principle of parity with a co-accused who received 26 months, the court imposed a sentence of two years less a day imprisonment, followed by two years of probation, along with various ancillary orders.

The accused was charged with sexual assault after he and a co-accused provided alcohol and drugs to two underage girls and took them to a hotel.

The complainant was highly intoxicated and incapacitated.

The court rejected the accused's testimony that the complainant was fine and consented.

Applying the test for capacity to consent, the court found the complainant was incapable of consenting due to intoxication.

The court also found no air of reality to the defence of honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent, as the accused took no reasonable steps to ascertain consent.

The accused was found guilty.

Following a judge-alone criminal trial, the court convicted the defendant of sexual assault with another person, choking to enable sexual assault, forcible confinement, uttering death threats, and assault arising from multiple assaults in the complainant's apartment over several hours.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court rejected the defendant's evidence of consensual intercourse and accepted the complainant's evidence despite some sequencing errors and omissions in her police statement.

The court relied on corroborative circumstantial evidence including the state of the bedroom, surveillance footage of an attempted escape and locked apartment door, injuries, prayer-related clothing, and DNA evidence linking both men to genital and anal swabs.

The publication ban protecting the complainant's identity remains in force.

The accused applied for a bail review following a detention order based on the tertiary ground.

The accused proposed a release plan involving house arrest with his parents as sureties and electronic monitoring.

The court found that the combination of the electronic monitoring proposal and the COVID-19 pandemic constituted a material change in circumstances.

The court concluded that a reasonably informed member of the public would not lose confidence in the justice system if the accused were released under strict conditions during a global health crisis, and granted the application for release.

Ayub Ali was found guilty of manslaughter as a party to the first-degree murder of Kadir Abdulkhadir.

The co-accused, Mohamud Dirie, was found guilty of first-degree murder.

The court was tasked with sentencing Mr. Ali, who was 19 at the time of the offence and a youthful first offender.

The jury's verdict implied Mr. Ali knew Mr. Dirie was armed and intended to recklessly discharge a firearm, and Mr. Ali aided in tracking the victim and positioning Mr. Dirie for the ambush.

The Crown sought 12-13 years imprisonment, while the defence sought 6 years.

The court considered the aggravated nature of the manslaughter, the use of a firearm (triggering a 4-year minimum), and the principles of denunciation, general deterrence, and rehabilitation for a youthful first offender.

The court imposed a sentence of 9 years imprisonment, reduced to an effective term of 3 years and 11 months after enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody.

The Crown brought an application during a first-degree murder trial to admit the preliminary inquiry evidence of two unavailable witnesses under s. 715(1) of the Criminal Code.

One witness was too ill to testify, which the defence conceded.

The other witness had left Canada and was evading his subpoena.

The court found that the witness was absent from Canada and that it was not feasible to take his evidence via video link.

Balancing the probative value of the evidence against potential trial unfairness, the court admitted the preliminary inquiry evidence, noting the defence could lead evidence regarding the witness's credibility.

During a trial for first degree murder, the Crown brought an application to admit several ante-mortem hearsay statements made by the deceased to his mother and cousin.

The statements detailed a history of animosity and fear of the accused.

The court applied the principled exception to the hearsay rule, assessing the threshold reliability of each statement.

The court admitted several statements that possessed sufficient circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, such as those made shortly after traumatic events or expressing present fear.

However, the court excluded other statements that were made under circumstances of suspicion or were inextricably intertwined with double hearsay.

The court also declined the defence's request to cross-examine the deceased's mother on the voir dire, finding that her preliminary inquiry transcripts were sufficient to assess threshold reliability and that her credibility was not so deficient as to rob the statements of all probative value.

The applicant, charged with accessory after the fact to murder, applied for judicial interim release.

The charges arose from an execution-style shooting in downtown Toronto where the applicant allegedly acted as the getaway driver.

The Crown was seeking certiorari to reinstate a first-degree murder charge.

The court denied bail, finding that while the primary and secondary grounds might be manageable with a strict supervision plan, detention was necessary under the tertiary ground to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice given the gravity and circumstances of the offence.

The accused applied for a bail review after being denied bail on nine firearm-related charges.

The accused argued there was a material change in circumstances based on a firearm property report indicating blank bullets were used, and a new proposed plan of supervision involving his common law spouse as a surety.

The court found that the report did not materially change the Crown's case and that the new supervision plan was deficient.

The court concluded there was a substantial likelihood the accused would re-offend and that his detention was necessary to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The application was dismissed.

The defendants were charged with multiple offences relating to an alleged armed home invasion and robbery.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence, including security video footage, to place the defendants at the scene.

The defence argued that no home invasion occurred and that the occupants of the apartment staged the scene to cover up an accidental discharge of their own firearm.

The court found both the Crown's and the defence's theories equally plausible based on the physical evidence and witness testimony.

As the Crown failed to prove its version of events beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendants were found not guilty of all charges.

On a Garofoli review motion, the applicants sought leave to cross-examine the affiant on three Part VI authorizations arising from a robbery and homicide investigation.

The court reviewed the governing principles from Garofoli and Pires and held that there is no automatic right to cross-examine a wiretap affiant, but leave should be granted where there is a reasonable likelihood the questioning will assist the court on a material issue bearing on the authorization's validity.

Given the proposed areas of inquiry concerning the state agent, other suspects, and investigative omissions, the court found an evidentiary foundation sufficient to meet the threshold.

Leave was granted, limited to the questions identified in the applicants' factum.

The applicants sought to quash Part VI authorizations arising from a homicide and robbery investigation, alleging the affiant failed to make full, fair, and frank disclosure regarding a state agent, a related firearms investigation, and inquiries into another suspect.

Applying the Garofoli line of authority, the court held the informations to obtain had to be assessed holistically and not by piecemeal dissection, and that the alleged omissions and inaccuracies did not undermine the existence of sufficient grounds for the authorizations.

One category of bad character intercept material concerning unrelated firearms was held to be excisable, but the remaining record still supported issuance.

In the alternative, applying Grant, the court held any breach would not justify exclusion because the police acted in good faith, the privacy impact did not warrant exclusion on these facts, and society’s interest in adjudication on the merits was high.

The applicant, charged with drug offences following the execution of a telewarrant at his residence, sought leave to cross-examine the affiant and sub-affiant of the Information to Obtain (ITO).

The applicant argued that cross-examination was necessary to challenge the reasonable and probable grounds for the warrant, specifically regarding the urgency of the telewarrant, the need for a night-time search, and the reliability of confidential informants.

The court applied the Garofoli test and granted leave to cross-examine the affiant, but restricted the scope to specific areas including when the affiant learned the applicant's name, the basis for describing the applicant as having a violent record and multiple firearms, and the failure to disclose a linked vehicle.

Accused persons charged following a large police investigation sought disclosure of source materials underlying wiretap authorizations to support anticipated Garofoli and Dawson applications.

The defence argued that all investigative materials, including pre‑Part VI materials referenced or relied upon by the affiant, were presumptively relevant and disclosable under Stinchcombe principles.

The Attorney General of Ontario argued that disclosure should be limited to materials relevant to the accused’s ability to make full answer and defence at trial unless the defence first demonstrated a reasonable possibility that additional materials would assist in challenging the authorization.

The court acknowledged conceptual difficulties with the Crown’s narrower approach but held that existing authorities required an accused to meet a minimal relevance threshold before obtaining additional disclosure beyond what was before the authorizing judge.

Applying principles of judicial comity and following prior decisions adopting that approach, the court dismissed the disclosure applications.

The applicant brought a Garofoli application under ss. 8 and 24(2) of the Charter to exclude evidence seized during the execution of a telewarrant at his residence.

The court found that the police officer who swore the information to obtain the warrant was negligent and breached his duty to provide full and frank disclosure, including relying on non-existent surveillance and failing to disclose discrepancies in the confidential informant's information.

After excising the erroneous information and amplifying the record, the court concluded the remaining information was insufficient to establish reasonable grounds for the warrant, resulting in a s. 8 breach.

Applying s. 24(2), the court excluded the evidence, finding the officer's conduct reckless and that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused were jointly tried for offences arising from a robbery at a mall cell phone store during which the victim was shot.

The central issue was whether the victim produced a firearm and accidentally shot himself during a struggle, as claimed by the accused, or whether one of the accused produced and discharged the weapon.

The court rejected the accused’s testimony as implausible and inconsistent with surveillance evidence and witness testimony, finding that one accused possessed and fired the handgun to facilitate the robbery while the other knowingly participated.

The principal offender was convicted of robbery while armed, aggravated assault, discharging a firearm with intent, and firearm possession offences.

The co‑accused was convicted of robbery while armed and firearm possession offences but acquitted of the aggravated assault and firearm discharge counts due to reasonable doubt about foreseeability.