Charles T. Hackland

Following a judge-alone trial on a 45-count indictment, the court found that the accused engaged in a sustained pattern of drugging women with GHB or Ketamine and sexually assaulting them while they were unconscious or otherwise incapable of consenting.

The court applied the law of conscious consent, incapacity, and administering a stupefying substance under s. 246(b) of the Criminal Code, and admitted count-to-count similar fact evidence to assess intent, absence of consent, and the lack of any air of reality to mistaken belief in consent.

The court also relied on expert evidence concerning the pharmacological effects of GHB and Ketamine and on disturbing cellphone images and videos created by the accused.

Convictions were entered on most assault, sexual assault, stupefying substance, and drug trafficking counts, with acquittals on a limited number of counts where the evidence left a reasonable doubt.

Because of the publication ban, this summary avoids identifying protected persons.

The applicant, charged with trafficking in heroin, brought a pre-trial motion seeking a declaration that sections 185 and 186 of the Criminal Code are unconstitutional.

The applicant argued that the 'may assist' standard for targeting an individual's private communications for interception violates section 8 of the Charter, which requires a reasonable and probable cause standard.

The court dismissed the application, finding it was bound by Ontario Court of Appeal jurisprudence that upheld the constitutional validity of the Part VI wiretap regime and the 'may assist' criteria.

The appellant appealed two decisions of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming his incapacity to consent to treatment with anti-psychotic medication and upholding a Community Treatment Order.

The appellant, who has a history of schizophrenia, wished to discontinue his medication.

The court applied the reasonableness standard of review and found that the Board's conclusion—that the appellant failed the 'appreciation test' for capacity because he did not accept his mental illness—was fully supported by the clinical evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion for security of costs against the plaintiff, an American actress residing in California with no assets in Ontario, who sued for injuries sustained from a dog bite on a film set.

The plaintiff opposed paying security into court, arguing that her After-The-Event (ATE) legal expenses insurance policy provided adequate protection for the defendants' costs.

The court held that the specific ATE policy, which covered costs up to the date of any cancellation and was supported by counsel's undertaking to advise of any policy suspension, was an adequate substitute for payment into court.

The court exercised its discretion to accept the ATE policy as security for costs.

The accused was convicted of two counts of sexual assault against his daughter, occurring over several years.

The court weighed aggravating factors, including the extreme breach of trust and lack of remorse, against mitigating factors such as the accused's lack of a prior record and the comparatively low-level nature of the sexual conduct.

The court sentenced the accused to 27 months' imprisonment, emphasizing the principles of deterrence and denunciation for sexual offences against minors.

The accused, R.T., was charged with sexual touching, sexual assault, and voyeurism against his daughter.

The court assessed the credibility of both the complainant and the accused, finding the complainant to be a credible witness and the accused's testimony not credible.

The court found the accused guilty of two counts of sexual assault (counts 2 and 4), with the related sexual touching counts (1 and 3) conditionally stayed on the Kienapple principle.

The accused was found not guilty of voyeurism (count 5) because the entry into the bathroom, though a breach of privacy, was not "surreptitious" as required by the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired care and control of a motor vehicle.

He was found passed out in the driver's seat of a running vehicle with a high blood alcohol content.

The trial judge rejected his defence that he intended only to sleep in the vehicle, finding he failed to rebut the presumption of care and control under s. 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge also found a realistic risk of danger even without an intention to drive.

The appeal court upheld the trial judge's factual findings and application of the law, dismissing the appeal.

The appellant, Nabil Benhsaien, sought a funding order under s. 684 of the Criminal Code to pursue an appeal from convictions for mischief and an indecent act.

The Crown moved to strike the appeal for lack of perfection.

The court denied the funding application, finding the appellant capable of self-representation and the appeal lacking merit.

Consequently, the court granted the Crown's motion to strike the appeal.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's medical negligence action on the basis that it was statute-barred.

The plaintiff had a kidney removed in 2000 due to a misdiagnosis of cancer, which she was informed of shortly after the surgery.

She commenced the action in 2015.

The court found that the plaintiff knew the material facts necessary to make a claim by the end of 2001, as she was aware of the misdiagnosis, the unnecessary surgery, and had been encouraged by family to sue.

The court held that the claim was discovered well outside the two-year limitation period and dismissed the action.

The court issued a costs endorsement following a successful motion by the defendants to strike portions of the plaintiff's statement of claim.

The defendants sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis, citing the plaintiff's uncooperative and offensive conduct, and in the case of one defendant, malicious and unsubstantiated allegations.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the Centre for Spanish Speaking Peoples and associated individual defendants, reducing the quantum due to excessive claims and the nature of a pleadings motion.

Legal Aid Ontario received its claimed modest costs.

Carita Wong was awarded substantial indemnity costs, fixed at a reduced amount, due to the plaintiff's outrageous, unjustified, and malicious allegations against her as a professional, serving as a deterrent.

The plaintiff was ordered to pay all awarded costs within 30 days.

The Third Party, Miguel Villeneuve, brought a motion for summary judgment to strike third-party claims by the Laferrière defendants and Calypso Theme Waterpark.

The claims alleged Villeneuve caused the plaintiff's injuries, which directly contradicted findings from a prior criminal conviction of the Laferrière defendants for assaulting the plaintiff.

The court found that these third-party claims constituted a collateral attack on the criminal court's findings and were an abuse of process.

The motion was granted, and the third-party claims were struck.

The Crown sought a pre-trial ruling on the voluntariness and admissibility of a video statement provided by the accused to police.

The accused argued the statement was involuntary due to alleged excessive force during arrest.

The court found that the brief and reasonable force used by police during the arrest, which occurred ten hours prior, did not impact the accused's state of mind when giving the statement to an officer not involved in the arrest.

No threats or inducements were found.

The statement was deemed voluntary and admissible.

Ade Olumide brought an application for mandamus and a constitutional declaration challenging the Crown's stay of his private prosecutions against judges and the Crown for alleged fraud and false statements.

The court found the private prosecutions against judges to be an egregious abuse of process due to judicial immunity.

While acknowledging that vexatious litigant orders under provincial legislation do not bar private prosecutions under the Criminal Code, the court dismissed Olumide's application, deeming it vexatious and an abuse of process, and declined to issue an injunction requiring leave for future private prosecutions, noting existing safeguards in the Criminal Code.

The respondent was successful on her motion for temporary spousal support and the sale of the matrimonial home.

She had previously made a settlement offer to accept a lower amount of support.

The applicant had unwisely withheld support to leverage increased access, which was delayed pending an OCL report.

The court awarded the respondent costs fixed at $5,000 for fees plus HST and $300 for disbursements.

The accused were charged with multiple offences including conspiracy to traffic cocaine, trafficking, and participating in a criminal organization following a lengthy police investigation involving wiretaps and surveillance.

The court found both accused guilty of conspiracy to traffic and trafficking in cocaine, relying on intercepted communications and surveillance evidence establishing their roles in an ongoing drug distribution network.

However, the court acquitted them of the criminal organization charges, finding insufficient evidence of structure or leadership to meet the statutory definition.

The court also dismissed the accused's application under s. 11(b) of the Charter, concluding that the 38-month delay was justified by the case's complexity and the transitional exception under the Jordan framework.

The accused brought an application under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging an infringement of his right to a trial within a reasonable time.

The total delay was 32.5 months, marginally exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in *R. v. Jordan*.

The court deducted one month for defence delay (accused being a fugitive), resulting in a net delay of 31 months.

The Crown invoked the "transitional exceptional circumstances" exception, arguing reasonable reliance on pre-*Jordan* case law (*R. v. Morin* guidelines) and existing scheduling practices in Ottawa.

The court found that counsel and the court had reasonably relied on the previous regime for calculating s. 11(b) delay, and that staying a second-degree murder charge under these circumstances, where the *Jordan* ceiling was only moderately exceeded, would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The application was dismissed.

The defendants brought motions to strike the plaintiff's 80-page statement of claim, which alleged wrongful dismissal and various torts against his former employer, a legal aid clinic, its funder, and various individuals.

The court struck the claims against the employer's outside counsel, the funding agency, and two individual employees without leave to amend, finding no reasonable cause of action was disclosed.

The remainder of the statement of claim against the employer and other individuals was struck for failing to comply with the rules of pleading, with leave granted to deliver a fresh as amended statement of claim.

Following a seven-week personal injury jury trial, the court determined post-trial adjustments to the $2.3 million verdict.

The court ruled that recent Insurance Act amendments increasing statutory deductibles applied retrospectively, but changes to pre-judgment interest did not.

Applying the 'silos of deductibility' approach, the court deducted the plaintiff's $900,000 Statutory Accident Benefits (SABs) settlement from the tort award, but apportioned the deduction 50-50 between the defendant and a non-party driver who had previously settled, matching the jury's liability finding.

The plaintiff's final judgment of $500,827 slightly exceeded the defendant's Rule 49 offer, entitling the plaintiff to costs, which the court fixed at $100,000 plus disbursements.

The plaintiff in a motor vehicle accident case served a Notice of Discontinuance against two defendants.

Despite this, the defendants insisted on proceeding with a previously scheduled summary judgment motion to dismiss the action, seemingly to leverage higher costs.

The plaintiff brought a cross-motion to approve the Notice of Discontinuance nunc pro tunc.

The court granted the plaintiff's cross-motion, finding the defendants' summary judgment motion to be vexatious, unnecessary, and an abuse of process.

The summary judgment motion was permanently stayed, and the defendants were ordered to pay the plaintiff's costs of $15,305.

Following the dismissal of the appellants' motion for leave to appeal an Ontario Municipal Board decision regarding a development on lands with significance to indigenous persons, the successful respondents sought costs.

The court declined to award costs against the appellants, finding they met the criteria for public interest litigants as they raised issues of public importance regarding indigenous religious sites and had no pecuniary interest in the outcome.

Additionally, the court awarded costs to the appellants' counsel personally against one of the respondents for an abandoned claim for personal costs under Rule 57.07(1).