Charles T. Hackland

Sentencing decision following a guilty plea to internet luring arising from a two-and-a-half-month relationship between an adult police officer and a vulnerable 15-year-old girl.

The court found the communications, gifts, rides, and provision of alcohol amounted to grooming and exploitative conduct aimed at achieving a sexual relationship, despite the absence of sexual touching.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence in child exploitation cases, the court treated the offender's status as a police officer and breach of trust as powerful aggravating factors.

A sentence of one year imprisonment followed by three years' probation, together with SOIRA, DNA, and s. 161 orders, was imposed.

Several tenured professors at McMaster University sought judicial review of a university tribunal decision that found them liable for workplace harassment and contributing to a poisoned work environment.

The tribunal had imposed severe penalties, including three-year unpaid suspensions for three professors.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applicants' procedural fairness and jurisdictional arguments, finding they had consented to the tribunal's procedures and failed to raise timely objections.

However, the Court found the lengthy unpaid suspensions were disproportionate and unreasonable, effectively destroying the employment relationship.

The Court reduced the three-year suspensions to one year, reduced a one-year suspension to one academic term, and ordered compensation in lieu of reinstatement for the affected professors.

The appellant appealed his conviction for refusing to comply with a demand to provide a breath sample.

He argued that the police had no lawful basis to ask for a sample, that he was not asked in a way he could understand, and that he had a reasonable excuse due to fear of the police.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's credibility assessments were reasonable, the officer had a reasonable suspicion to make the demand, and the appellant's claimed excuse lacked an air of reality.

This costs endorsement followed a successful motion by the plaintiff's solicitors, Victor Ages Vallance LLP (VAV), to assert a solicitor's lien and obtain a charging order over a $48,000 costs award owed to their client.

The Conservative Party of Canada (CPC), a judgment creditor, opposed this relief and sought to garnish the funds, and subsequently requested to set off the costs awarded to VAV against an earlier costs award owed by the plaintiff to CPC.

The court awarded VAV partial indemnity costs for their successful motion, albeit reduced from their requested amount due to some over-lawyering.

The court denied CPC's request for set-off, reasoning that it would unfairly penalize the solicitors for asserting a valid right.

The applicant, Municipal Property Assessment Corporation (MPAC), sought leave to appeal a decision of the Assessment Review Board that cancelled the administrative reinstatement of the respondent taxpayer's property assessment appeal.

The Board member had exercised discretion to not relieve against MPAC's irregular service by email of a Special Notice requesting a higher assessment, effectively confirming the taxpayer's withdrawal of its appeal.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding that the Board member's reasons for exercising her discretion were based on an erroneous view of the Assessment Act and assumed facts not argued before her, raising questions of law of broad importance to the assessment system.

The applicant, Julie Green, brought a motion seeking interim custody, child support, a restraining order, and supervised access for the respondent, Andrew Green, following their separation.

The respondent had a history of inappropriate communication and mental health concerns, and had minimal contact with their two young children.

The court granted the applicant sole interim custody, ordered the respondent to pay child support retroactively and ongoing, imposed a communication restraining order, and mandated supervised access for the respondent for six months.

The applicant was also awarded costs of the motion.

The parties sought directions concerning the form of the order following the disposition of an appeal in a defamation action.

The parties disagreed on the scope of issues to be sent back for re-trial.

The Divisional Court agreed with the appellant that the new trial judge should not be bound by the previous trial judge's findings on fair comment, malice, and damages, as the previous judge had been dismissive of the claims.

The court directed that the appellant's draft order be issued, remitting these issues for a full retrial without factual constraints.

The plaintiff's solicitors, Victor Ages Vallance LLP (VAV), sought a declaration of a valid solicitor's lien and a charging order under section 34(1) of the Solicitors Act over $47,886 in costs awarded to the plaintiff.

These funds were held in trust by counsel for Arthur Hamilton and Cassels Brock & Blackwell LLP.

The Conservative Party of Canada (CPC), a creditor of the plaintiff, opposed the relief, asserting a garnishment notice and arguing for an equitable set-off.

The court found that the fund came into existence due to VAV's efforts, establishing a solicitor's lien with priority over garnishment.

The court rejected the equitable set-off argument due to a lack of mutuality of debts.

The charging order was granted, directing the funds to be paid to VAV.

The court fixed the "costs thrown away" for the plaintiffs in the sum of $30,000, inclusive of disbursements and H.S.T., payable by the defendants jointly and severally.

These costs were incurred by the plaintiffs due to the defendants' prolonged denial of successor corporation status, which necessitated the plaintiffs' efforts to establish CSL's responsibility for CPSL's liabilities.

The court had previously granted the defendants' motion to set aside pleadings against CPSL on the condition that the plaintiffs be paid these costs.

The appellant, Michelle Anne David, was successful in her appeal of a motion to vary child and spousal support.

She sought costs of $15,000 for the appeal and $16,000 for the motion to vary.

The respondent, Franco Ruffolo, argued that each party should bear their own costs or that costs should be limited to $5,000.

The Divisional Court awarded the appellant $15,000 for the appeal, finding the amount reasonable and within the norm.

For the motion to vary, the court awarded $12,000, taking into account an offer to settle made by the appellant.

Total costs were fixed at $27,000 payable forthwith.

The appellants sought leave to appeal two Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) decisions that dismissed their appeals against a City of Ottawa official plan amendment and zoning by-law facilitating the redevelopment of Chaudiere and Albert Islands.

The appellants argued the OMB erred in quashing their Notice of Constitutional Question and in finding that the City and developer adequately consulted with the Algonquin First Nation.

The Divisional Court denied leave to appeal, holding that the OMB correctly determined it lacked jurisdiction to grant declarations of Aboriginal title and that the OMB's findings regarding the adequacy of the consultation process were reasonable and did not raise a question of law.

Following the settlement of an action to recover a loan used to purchase property, the plaintiff sought partial indemnity costs.

The action settled on the eve of trial for $125,000 plus costs.

The court found the plaintiff's counsel's hourly rates and time spent were reasonable, noting the defendant's lack of cooperation and the need for various procedural steps.

The court fixed the plaintiff's partial indemnity costs at $30,000 for fees plus $8,646 for disbursements.

The applicants sought guardianship of their adult niece, H.A., and a declaration of incapacity.

The respondent father initially opposed but later did not oppose these orders.

The court found the respondent's opposition to the guardianship and incapacity declaration to be tactical and without merit, warranting substantial indemnity costs for that aspect.

However, the applicants had conflated guardianship issues with unresolved family law support issues, which generated unnecessary costs.

The court awarded the applicants one-third of their claimed substantial indemnity costs, specifically $14,000 plus HST, attributable to the incapacity/guardianship issues, with other costs to be determined in ongoing family law proceedings.

The plaintiffs sought partial indemnity costs following a six-week jury trial for personal injuries and Family Law Act claims, where a jury awarded damages of $141,500.

The defendant had made a nominal settlement offer of $7.

The court awarded partial indemnity fees of $159,249.90 plus HST and disbursements, rejecting the defendant's argument that costs should be proportionate to the amount recovered, particularly given the nominal settlement offer and the need to encourage genuine settlement efforts.

The plaintiff, Beate Nkunda-Batware, was awarded $418,330 by a jury in a motor vehicle personal injury action.

The defendants brought a threshold motion, arguing that the plaintiff's injuries did not meet the statutory exceptions under subsections 267.5(3) and (5) of the Insurance Act, requiring a "permanent, serious impairment of an important, physical, mental or psychological function." The court found that the plaintiff, a "thin skull" individual with a pre-existing predisposition to depression, suffered whiplash injuries that evolved into a chronic pain syndrome directly caused by the accident.

The court preferred the plaintiff's medical experts and concluded that the plaintiff's impairments were permanent and serious, substantially interfering with her employment and daily functioning.

The defendants' threshold motion was dismissed.

The applicant insurer sought an order compelling seven respondents to attend examinations under oath regarding their statutory accident benefits claims, specifically attendant care benefits, due to concerns about validity.

The respondents refused, citing insufficient notice of the reasons for examination and their medical conditions.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that the insurer's generic notice ("determining whether State Farm is liable to pay benefits") was inadequate under s. 33(4)3 of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The court emphasized that specific reasons for the examination are a condition precedent to the obligation to attend, allowing insureds to prepare adequately.

The Abdollahpours brought a motion to vacate a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) on one property (300A Ferndale) and sought leave to register a CPL on another (300B Ferndale).

They were unsuccessful in vacating the CPL on 300A but successful in registering one on 300B.

The responding party, Banifatemi, sought costs based on a pre-motion offer to settle that mirrored the court's ultimate order.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs of $10,000 to Banifatemi, payable by the Abdollahpours, finding that Banifatemi's offer reflected the "common sense, inevitable outcome" and that he was successful on the principal issue of maintaining the CPL on 300A.

The applicant, a tobacco manufacturer, challenged the Minister of Finance's demand for security under the Tobacco Tax Act.

The applicant argued that because its products were sold exclusively to on-reserve First Nations retailers and for export, they were not subject to Ontario tax, and thus no security could be demanded.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the plain language of s. 12(2)(f.1) of the Act requires the Minister to demand security for unmarked fine cut tobacco as if it were destined for taxable sale, to protect against the risk of product diversion.

The court also found the Minister's decision to reduce the required security amount was reasonable.

Following a jury trial for a motor vehicle accident, the court ruled on post-verdict issues including the statutory threshold and deductibles.

The court found the plaintiff met the threshold for permanent serious impairment due to a somatic symptom disorder.

However, the court held that the increased statutory deductibles enacted in August 2015 applied retrospectively, which reduced the jury's non-pecuniary and Family Law Act damage awards to zero.

After applying set-offs for statutory accident benefits, judgment was issued for the plaintiffs in the amount of $56,294.98.

The appellants, heating and air conditioning businesses, sued the Better Business Bureau (BBB) for defamation after the BBB assigned them a 'D-' rating on its website.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the rating was not defamatory and was protected by fair comment and qualified privilege.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that the trial judge erred in law by failing to determine the plain and ordinary meaning of the rating, which was clearly defamatory.

The court also found that the BBB did not enjoy qualified privilege for general ratings published to the public.

The appeal was allowed, the trial judgment set aside, and the matter remitted for a new trial on the issues of fair comment, malice, and damages.