Thomas V. Ozere

This decision concerns the approval of a contingency fee retainer agreement, the reasonableness of solicitor-client accounts, and the management of settlement funds for plaintiffs under disability in a personal injury action.

The court reviews the proposed legal fees for both Stephen and Adriana Duffy, the structure of the settlement payments, and the adequacy of the arrangements for the management of funds, ultimately approving the proposals as reasonable and in the best interests of the parties.

This is an interim ruling on a motion for court approval of a tentative settlement reached in a personal injury action involving parties under disability.

The plaintiffs sought approval for the settlement of Stephen Duffy's and Adriana Duffy's claims, approval of contingency fee retainer agreements, approval of a proposed structured settlement for Stephen, and an order dispensing with service of the motion record on the defendants.

The court approved the settlement amounts for both Stephen and Adriana, and the disbursement accounts.

However, the court adjourned the approval of the proposed solicitor-client fee accounts for both Stephen and Adriana, and the proposed structured settlement for Stephen, due to insufficient supporting evidence.

The request to dispense with service of the motion record on the defendants was also denied, requiring the plaintiffs to provide specific details on claimed privileges.

The court issued a costs endorsement following post-trial motions concerning the assignment of Long Term Disability (LTD) benefits, pre-judgment interest (PJI) rates, and tax treatment of LTD benefits.

The defendant sought partial indemnity costs for these motions, while the plaintiff argued for each party to bear their own costs, citing legal developments and novelty of arguments.

The court awarded the defendant $8,000 in partial indemnity costs for the PJI portion of Motion 1, finding the plaintiff's argument on PJI not novel.

For the assignment and tax treatment issues (Motion 1 and Motion 2), the court found both parties responsible for the lack of agreement and ordered them to bear their own costs.

The court also addressed costs for preserving the plaintiff's LTD rights, which were to be paid by Aviva on a full indemnity scale, with quantum to be resolved by the parties or fixed by the court.

Following a jury trial in a personal injury action where the plaintiff was awarded $698,112.58 in damages, the court determined the plaintiff's entitlement to costs.

The parties agreed on most rates and disbursements but disputed the senior counsel's hourly rate for 2017 and 2018, and whether the costs should reflect the net recovery after an assignment of collateral benefits.

The court fixed senior counsel's rate at $375 per hour, declined to reduce costs based on the uncertain future of collateral benefits, and awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs totaling $466,185.76.

In a post-trial ruling following a motor vehicle accident trial, the court determined the terms of an assignment of the plaintiff's long-term disability (LTD) benefits to the defendant's insurer.

The court held that the defendant is entitled to a credit for the gross amount of the LTD benefits, regardless of the tax deducted at source by the LTD insurer.

The court also ruled that the effective date of the assignment is the date of the jury's verdict, not the date the judgment is paid, and ordered the defendant to reimburse the plaintiff for reasonable costs incurred in preserving her right to the LTD benefits.

The plaintiff was injured in a car accident and awarded damages by a jury, including $125,000 for non-pecuniary damages and $600,000 for future income loss, subject to a 10% reduction for contributory negligence.

In this post-trial ruling, the court determined the applicable prejudgment interest rate for non-pecuniary damages and whether the defendant was entitled to an assignment of the plaintiff's long-term disability (LTD) benefits.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to depart from the default 1.3% prejudgment interest rate.

The court also granted the defendant's request for an assignment of the plaintiff's LTD benefits until age 65 or until the future income loss award is exhausted, to prevent double recovery.

Following a jury verdict, the plaintiff brought a motion for judgment to determine the pre-judgment interest (PJI) rate applicable to general non-pecuniary damages.

The plaintiff argued for a 5% PJI rate, asserting that amendments to the Insurance Act effective January 1, 2015, were not retroactive as PJI is a matter of substantive law, relying on the Divisional Court's decision in Carr v. Modi.

The defendant conceded the court was bound by Carr, despite believing the case law was wrongly decided, given a pending Court of Appeal decision in El-Khodr v. Lackie.

The parties agreed to issue judgment with a 5% PJI rate, with a mechanism to revisit the calculation if the El-Khodr appeal decision impacted it.

The court ordered judgment for the plaintiff in the agreed amount.

The defendant brought a threshold motion under section 267.5 of the Insurance Act, seeking a declaration that the plaintiff had not suffered a permanent and serious impairment of an important physical, mental, or psychological function as a result of a motor vehicle collision.

The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that her injuries, including PTSD and major depression, met the threshold criteria.

The court dismissed the defendant's motion, finding that the plaintiff had, on a balance of probabilities, suffered a permanent, serious impairment of an important physical, mental, or psychological function caused by the collision.

The court also made findings on the credibility and reliability of the defence medical expert.

The plaintiff in a motor vehicle collision action brought a motion to include the names of the parties' respective motor vehicle insurers (Belair Direct and Aviva) in the jury pre-screening process.

The plaintiff argued that public awareness of mandatory insurance mitigated prejudice and that broader "connections" beyond employment should be screened.

The defendant opposed, citing potential prejudice and increased complexity.

The court dismissed the motion, affirming that civil jury selection in Ontario does not permit challenges for cause based on unspecified partiality and that the presumption of juror impartiality is strong.

The court held that identifying insurers at the outset could mischaracterize the dispute as one between insurers rather than individuals and potentially mislead the jury regarding a defendant's personal exposure.

The plaintiff brought a motion to strike the defendant's jury notice and proceed before a judge alone, arguing that a 19.5-day delay between the conclusion of evidence and closing arguments would prejudice the jury's ability to recall and understand complex medical evidence regarding post-traumatic stress disorder.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the evidence was not overly complex, the actual delay was shorter than claimed, and the jury was capable of comprehending and weighing the evidence.

The court concluded that justice would be better served by retaining the jury.

The plaintiff sought a specific instruction to the jury regarding the defendant's in-court admissions concerning fault for a collision.

During cross-examination, the defendant stated she did not believe the plaintiff was responsible and that her decision to enter a lane ultimately caused the accident.

The court had previously given a general instruction that the jury are the triers of fact and the defendant's views on fault are merely her views.

The plaintiff argued these were in-court admissions warranting a specific instruction that the jury should rely on them unless contradicted.

The court ruled that the defendant's answers were her views, not admissions of fact based on all relevant evidence, and therefore did not warrant specific mention in the jury charge.

The defendant in a personal injury action sought to rely on approximately 20 posts from the plaintiff’s Facebook page for cross-examination, which had been retrieved through an agreement but not formally disclosed.

The plaintiff objected, citing prejudice due to the late disclosure of a significant volume of materials, which prevented proper trial preparation, expert review, and settlement negotiations.

The court dismissed the defendant's request, emphasizing the importance of full and rigorous compliance with disclosure obligations under the Rules of Civil Procedure and the agreement between counsel.

The defendant sought to admit surveillance video of the plaintiff as substantive evidence in a personal injury action.

The court applied a three-part test for admissibility (accuracy, fairness/absence of intention to mislead, and verification on oath) and found that the surveillance evidence did not meet these criteria due to issues with inconsistent time-stamping, selective editing, subjective descriptions by the investigator, and significant gaps in footage.

The court also determined that the evidence had minimal probative value and that its potential prejudice to the plaintiff, particularly given the claim of post-traumatic stress disorder and the lack of expert review of the surveillance, outweighed any probative value.

Additionally, the defendant's late disclosure of 2016 surveillance evidence, two weeks before trial, was deemed non-compliant with disclosure obligations, and leave to rely on it was denied.

The motion to admit the surveillance evidence was dismissed in its entirety.

The plaintiff, Beate Nkunda-Batware, was awarded $418,330 by a jury in a motor vehicle personal injury action.

The defendants brought a threshold motion, arguing that the plaintiff's injuries did not meet the statutory exceptions under subsections 267.5(3) and (5) of the Insurance Act, requiring a "permanent, serious impairment of an important, physical, mental or psychological function." The court found that the plaintiff, a "thin skull" individual with a pre-existing predisposition to depression, suffered whiplash injuries that evolved into a chronic pain syndrome directly caused by the accident.

The court preferred the plaintiff's medical experts and concluded that the plaintiff's impairments were permanent and serious, substantially interfering with her employment and daily functioning.

The defendants' threshold motion was dismissed.

Following a settlement conference in a civil action, the court addressed the readiness of the matter for trial and concerns about the refusal of a non-party insurer to participate in settlement negotiations.

The court observed that the insurer’s absence from negotiations created a significant impediment to resolution and left the plaintiffs facing trial risks and costs.

The judge strongly urged the insurer to participate in negotiations and warned that cost sanctions might apply if it failed to do so.

The matter was confirmed as ready for trial with two weeks of trial time required.

The appellant tenant sued the landlord and its independent contractor for water damage caused by a leaking roof.

The Master granted summary judgment dismissing the claim against the contractor, finding that a waiver of subrogation clause in the lease protected the landlord and those for whom it was 'in law responsible'.

The Divisional Court dismissed the tenant's appeal, holding that the Master had jurisdiction to interpret the lease and correctly concluded that the landlord could not delegate its contractual duty to repair the roof, making it responsible in law for the contractor's work.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and received income replacement benefits until the insurer terminated them, alleging his ongoing disability was due to a pre-existing congenital neck condition, degenerative changes, or self-limitation.

The arbitrator found that while the congenital condition was not caused by the accident, the accident injuries combined with the fear generated by the discovery of the condition led to a chronic pain syndrome.

The arbitrator rejected the insurer's video surveillance evidence as proof of ability to return to work and ordered the reinstatement of income replacement benefits.

The applicant sought weekly income replacement benefits following a motor vehicle accident, claiming he was employed at an auto parts business at the time.

The insurer terminated benefits and sought repayment, alleging misrepresentation.

The arbitrator found the applicant's evidence regarding his employment to be contradictory and not credible, noting that pre-accident medical records contradicted his claims of performing heavy labour.

The arbitrator concluded the applicant was not employed at the time of the accident and had wilfully misrepresented his employment status.

The applicant was ordered to repay $25,050.69 in benefits plus interest, and his claim for hearing expenses was denied as the case lacked merit.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and received weekly income benefits until the insurer terminated them.

The applicant applied for arbitration, claiming ongoing entitlement under section 12(5)(b) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The arbitrator found that the applicant suffered from chronic pain syndrome resulting from the accident, which continuously prevented him from engaging in any employment for which he was reasonably suited by education, training, or experience, including the alternative position of a service advisor.

The arbitrator ordered the insurer to pay weekly income benefits from the date of termination, along with interest and arbitration expenses.