Dr. Evans

The applicant and respondent, former cohabitants of 22 years, sought resolution on spousal support and property division.

The applicant sought indefinite spousal support and equal division of the jointly owned Arnprior property.

The respondent denied spousal support entitlement, sought repayment of previously paid support, and reimbursement for initial contributions to both the Ottawa and Arnprior properties.

The court found the applicant entitled to indefinite non-compensatory spousal support, but at a lower monthly amount than previously ordered, resulting in a significant overpayment by the respondent.

The court also determined that the respondent's initial financial contributions to the properties were intended as gifts, thus ordering an equal division of the Arnprior property's net proceeds.

The overpaid spousal support was ordered to be deducted from the applicant's share of the property proceeds.

The defendant brought an urgent motion to compel the plaintiff to attend two independent medical examinations (physiatry and psychological) shortly before trial.

The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing it was brought too late.

The court granted the request for the physiatry examination, finding that the plaintiff's late service of a physiatry expert report constituted a substantial change in circumstances warranting a responding report.

However, the court dismissed the request for a psychological examination, as the plaintiff had not served a psychological expert report and the defendant had long been aware of the psychological claims.

Costs of $3,000 were awarded to the plaintiff.

The defendant brought a threshold motion under section 267.5 of the Insurance Act, seeking a declaration that the plaintiff had not suffered a permanent and serious impairment of an important physical, mental, or psychological function as a result of a motor vehicle collision.

The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that her injuries, including PTSD and major depression, met the threshold criteria.

The court dismissed the defendant's motion, finding that the plaintiff had, on a balance of probabilities, suffered a permanent, serious impairment of an important physical, mental, or psychological function caused by the collision.

The court also made findings on the credibility and reliability of the defence medical expert.

The appellant, who was 17 at the time of the offences, appealed the imposition of an adult sentence following his conviction for second degree murder and offering an indignity to a dead body.

He argued that the sentencing judge mischaracterized the jury’s implied factual findings and erred in concluding that the presumption of diminished moral culpability under the Youth Criminal Justice Act had been rebutted.

The court held that, on the evidentiary record and jury instructions, the finding that the appellant inflicted at least one stab wound reasonably flowed from the verdict.

The court further held that the sentencing judge undertook a full and balanced analysis under s. 72 of the YCJA and properly concluded that a youth sentence would not be sufficient to hold the appellant accountable.

Fresh evidence concerning rehabilitation, institutional placement, and possible transfer to Germany did not alter that conclusion.