Catherine D. Aitken

The accused, charged with multiple firearms and drug trafficking offences, underwent a 90-day detention review under s. 525 of the Criminal Code.

The accused proposed a release plan involving a surety and GPS monitoring.

The court found the release plan inadequate and ordered the accused's continued detention, concluding it was justified under the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds, despite the risks posed by the COVID-19 pandemic in correctional institutions.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for assault and assault causing bodily harm against the complainant.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing credibility, improperly used corroborative evidence, and applied uneven scrutiny to the defence and Crown evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's credibility assessments, noting that different types of testimony require different critical evaluations.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for breaching an undertaking not to communicate with his former partner.

The breach occurred when the appellant engaged in FaceTime calls with the complainant while exercising access to their children.

The summary conviction appeal court upheld the trial judge's findings that the appellant had the requisite subjective mens rea, as he intentionally called the complainant knowing he was bound by a no-contact condition.

The court also upheld the trial judge's refusal to apply the defence of de minimis non curat lex, noting the public interest in enforcing release conditions in domestic violence cases.

The appeal against the suspended sentence and probation was also dismissed.

The appellants appealed a judgment allowing an oppression application that granted the respondents sole authority to conduct a civil action.

The respondents had sold their shares in a company to the appellants but retained the financial benefit and cost obligations of an ongoing lawsuit.

The relationship deteriorated, and the appellants ceased pursuing the lawsuit and withheld information.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's conclusion that the appellants' conduct violated the respondents' reasonable expectations, nor any error in the remedy granting the respondents control of the litigation.

The appellants, the Chief of the Durham Regional Police Service and the Durham Regional Police Services Board, sought judicial review of an interim order made by the Ontario Civilian Police Commission.

The Commission had appointed an Administrator to oversee disciplinary proceedings, promotions, and secondary employment within the Service, citing an emergency and a crisis of confidence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Commission had the jurisdiction to make the interim order without notice or a hearing under section 24(1) of the Police Services Act.

The Court held that the decision was reasonable, did not breach procedural fairness, and did not raise a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The accused, Gaston Nicholas, was found guilty of two counts of arson.

At sentencing, the Crown sought a 12-month reformatory sentence, while the defence sought a suspended sentence with probation, citing the accused's advanced age, poor physical and mental health (including vascular dementia and depression), and the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.

The court found a causal link between the accused's mental health and the offences, and concluded that incarceration would have a severe negative effect on him due to his vulnerabilities and the pandemic conditions in correctional institutions.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with three years probation and a 10-year weapons prohibition, declining a DNA order.

The applicant sought an order under s. 684 of the Criminal Code assigning counsel to act on her behalf in a summary conviction appeal.

While the court found the appeal raised an arguable issue, it determined the applicant had sufficient financial means to retain counsel.

The court noted that the applicant's high monthly expenses included discretionary choices, such as boarding three horses, and concluded that reorganizing her finances would allow her to pay for legal services.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision that reduced a Master's awards for an extra invoice, prejudgment interest, and costs in a construction lien dispute.

The motion judge had found that the Master made a palpable and overriding error regarding the date of a supplier's invoice, which tainted the Master's overall negative assessment of the respondents' credibility.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that while the Master's factual error was palpable, it was not overriding, as the credibility findings were supported by numerous other significant factors.

The motion judge erred in law by reassessing credibility and substituting his own findings.

The respondents' cross-appeal for a new trial was dismissed.

The applicant, an internationally trained dentist, sought judicial review of two decisions by the National Dental Examining Board of Canada (NDEB) that resulted in her failing the Assessment of Clinical Skills for the third time.

She challenged the denial of both a compassionate appeal and a regular appeal.

The Divisional Court held that the Executive Committee breached its duty of procedural fairness by failing to provide adequate reasons for denying the compassionate appeal, specifically regarding the applicant's mental and emotional state during the exam.

The compassionate appeal decision was set aside and remitted for reconsideration.

However, the court dismissed the judicial review of the regular appeal, finding the Appeals Panel's decision was reasonable, transparent, and intelligible.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Social Benefits Tribunal upholding the denial of her Ontario Works benefits due to having assets in excess of the allowable limit.

The Tribunal found that the appellant owned three vehicles, the value of which exceeded the $5,000 limit for a single person.

On appeal, the appellant argued the Tribunal erred in law by equating legal ownership with the definition of an 'asset' under the Act and failing to consider if the vehicles were exempt.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Tribunal made no error in law as the appellant failed to adduce evidence that the vehicles were inaccessible or exempt under the regulations.

Following a successful appeal by the self-represented appellants, the Divisional Court determined the costs for both the Small Claims Court trial and the appeal.

The court applied the principles from Fong v. Chan, finding that the self-represented appellants were entitled to costs because they demonstrated an opportunity cost by foregoing remunerative activity to prepare for the appeal.

The respondent was ordered to pay a total of $14,512.32 in costs and disbursements to the appellants.

The children's aid society sought extended society care for three young children and a custody order to a grandmother for the oldest child.

The parents opposed the orders, seeking the return of all four children to their care.

The court found the children were in need of protection due to the parents' history of substance abuse, domestic conflict, and inability to meet the children's developmental and medical needs.

The court concluded that returning the children to the parents was not a viable option and that the society's proposed plan was in the children's best interests.

The oldest child was placed in the custody of his grandmother, and the three younger children were placed in extended society care with limited parental access.

The applicant, who had pled guilty to multiple counts of fraud and received a 360-day sentence, appealed his conviction and sentence.

He brought an application under s. 684 of the Criminal Code for the assignment of counsel for his summary conviction appeal, arguing his guilty plea was uninformed regarding the start date of his sentence.

The court dismissed the application, finding no arguable issue as the sentencing judge had clearly explained the sentence and the applicant, a seasoned offender, raised no concerns.

The court also noted the applicant was capable of representing himself.

A Crown motion to summarily dismiss the appeal was dismissed without prejudice due to lack of notice.

The applicant school board sought judicial review of an arbitration award that upheld a union grievance regarding a teacher laid off out of seniority order.

The board argued it retained a junior teacher because she possessed specific skills (ASL and PECS) necessary for a special education course, fulfilling its statutory duty to provide the 'best possible program.' The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the arbitrator's conclusion reasonable that the collective agreement's seniority provisions and the statutory requirements were complementary, and that the junior teacher did not possess recognized qualifications superior to the senior teachers.

The appellants appealed a Small Claims Court decision ordering them to pay $27,208 to the respondent dentist for alleged overpayment of wages and loans.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred by failing to apply issue estoppel to prior factual findings made by the Ontario Labour Relations Board, exceeding the court's monetary jurisdiction, and holding the appellant husband liable without a legal basis.

Furthermore, the court found the trial judge's conduct, including aggressive interventions and disparate treatment of the self-represented appellants compared to the respondent's counsel, created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court substituted its own judgment, dismissing the claim against the husband and reducing the wife's liability to $3,020 for unpaid advances.

At the commencement of a child protection trial, the mother disclosed that her father and paternal grandmother identified with the Algonquin First Nation.

The court adjourned the trial to hear a motion on whether the children were 'First Nations children' under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

Finding uncontroverted evidence of the children's Algonquin heritage, the court determined they were First Nations children.

The court declared a mistrial to ensure the relevant band was served with notice and given the opportunity to participate, emphasizing the importance of reconciliation and First Nations' rights in child welfare proceedings.

The accused, Jorden Larocque-Laplante, was found guilty of second-degree murder.

The court was tasked with determining the period of parole ineligibility, which could range from 10 to 25 years.

The judge considered the accused's character, the brutal nature and circumstances of the offence (including a hate-motivated element), the jury's recommendations, and the devastating impact on the victim's family.

Despite mitigating factors such as youth and remorse, the significant aggravating factors led the court to impose a parole ineligibility period of 13 years.

The Applicant sought substantial indemnity costs of $9,638.47 for an interim motion, while the Respondent sought no costs.

The court found the Applicant was largely successful on the interim motion.

The Respondent's conduct was deemed unreasonable, including non-compliance with disclosure orders, changing positions on property sale, and late filing of materials and an unreasonable settlement offer.

Despite this, the court did not award substantial indemnity costs.

Considering factors under Family Law Rules, r. 24(12), the court fixed costs at $6,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements, to be paid by the Respondent to the Applicant.

The Respondent's impecuniosity was not a reason to deny costs given her unreasonable litigation conduct.

Crown counsel, on behalf of Complainant C.G., applied for an order lifting a mandatory publication ban under s. 486.4 of the Criminal Code, which had been imposed in incest proceedings.

C.G. wished to publicize her story to encourage other victims and aid her healing.

The other complainant, H.B., did not consent to lifting the ban, and the Accused, T.S.H., opposed it due to concerns about youth criminal justice information.

The court acknowledged its jurisdiction to revoke the ban given C.G.'s consent, but ultimately refused the application, prioritizing H.B.'s privacy interests and the criminal justice system's assurance of victim identity protection.

The court suggested alternative ways for C.G. to tell her story without revealing her identity.

Following convictions for historical incest involving non-consensual sexual intercourse with two younger sisters, the court imposed a penitentiary sentence.

The court held that denunciation and general deterrence remained the primary sentencing objectives despite the passage of time, while treating the offender's age, medical frailty, lack of recent offending, and limited record as mitigating factors.

A conditional sentence was rejected as inadequate given the abuse of trust, the victims' vulnerability, the repeated conduct, and the profound long-term harm described in the victim impact material.

A total sentence of three years' incarceration was imposed, together with pre-sentence custody credit and ancillary DNA, weapons prohibition, and no-contact orders.