Catherine D. Aitken

The accused was convicted of human trafficking, assault, uttering death threats, and related offences involving a young woman.

The court considered the accused's lengthy criminal record, particularly concerning violence against women, and his lack of respect for court orders.

Applying the Tang factors, the court noted the accused exerted control through violence and financial dependency, though the operation was small.

The court imposed a global sentence of 5 years, granting 25 months of credit for pre-sentence custody, leaving 35 months to serve.

The applicant sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after being detained on primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds for drug trafficking charges.

The applicant argued that the Justice of the Peace erred in law and that the proposed use of electronic monitoring constituted a material change in circumstances.

The court found that while the Justice of the Peace made some errors of law warranting intervention, the electronic monitoring proposal did not amount to a material change.

Upon conducting a fresh review, the court concluded the applicant failed to meet the reverse onus, finding detention was necessary on all three grounds due to flight risk, likelihood of reoffending, and the need to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The defendants, a church and its lead pastor, sought leave to appeal an order dismissing their motion to strike the plaintiffs' claim against the pastor in his personal capacity.

The plaintiffs had sued the defendants for negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and negligence regarding an unregistered educational program run by the church.

The court granted leave to appeal, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision because the statement of claim did not specifically plead a separate claim against the pastor in his personal capacity, contrary to established case law.

The defendant's motion for leave to appeal an order granting the plaintiffs leave to amend their statement of claim and requiring the defendant to answer discovery refusals was dismissed.

The plaintiffs sought costs of $7,672.26 on a partial indemnity basis for the written motion.

The court found the plaintiffs' docketed hours excessive and noted the reasonable expectations of the unsuccessful party.

Costs were fixed at $3,500 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The defendant lawyer brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action for solicitor negligence.

The plaintiff had retained the defendant to pursue a medical malpractice claim, but the defendant advised her to discontinue the action after an expert concluded there was no case.

The plaintiff sued the defendant for damages, alleging breach of trust and negligence, particularly regarding the administrative dismissal of her underlying action.

The court granted the summary judgment motion, finding the plaintiff failed to provide any evidence of wrongdoing, breach of standard of care, or damages caused by the defendant.

The self-represented plaintiff sued a women's shelter, the city's public health department, and an infectious disease specialist, alleging she contracted active tuberculosis from another shelter resident and was subsequently misdiagnosed and mistreated.

The defendants moved for summary judgment.

The court granted the motions and dismissed the action, finding the plaintiff failed to adduce any expert medical evidence to support her claims of medical malpractice or to prove she was exposed to an infectious person.

Costs were awarded to the defendants on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellant massage therapist appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee Panel finding him guilty of professional misconduct and sexual abuse of a patient.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Panel's decision was unreasonable because its credibility assessment of the complainant and the appellant was fundamentally flawed, incomplete, and lacked transparency.

The matter was remitted for a new hearing before a differently constituted panel.

The applicant builder sought judicial review of Tarion Warranty Corporation's decision finding it unwilling or unable to resolve warranty claims, which allowed Tarion to abridge vendor repair periods.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application without hearing the merits, finding that the issue was moot because the repair periods had long expired and Tarion had already undertaken the repairs.

The court also noted the applicant's unreasonable delay in bringing the application and the availability of an alternative remedy through an existing civil action.

The defendant, W.O. Stinson & Son Limited, sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order that granted the plaintiffs leave to amend their Statement of Claim and required the defendant to answer questions refused at discovery.

The underlying action involved an oil leak from a tank installed by the defendant.

The court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's decision regarding the amendment of pleadings or the discovery refusals.

Furthermore, the court held that the proposed appeal did not raise matters of general importance, as the issues were specific to the facts and pleadings of the case.

The appellant lawyer appealed an order dismissing his motion to enforce a settlement agreement reached with the respondents.

The Divisional Court found the motions judge's one-sentence endorsement lacked adequate reasons, preventing appellate review.

Exercising its jurisdiction under the Courts of Justice Act, the Divisional Court heard the motion on its merits.

The court found that the parties' counsel had reached a binding settlement agreement via email, agreeing on the essential terms of a $15,000 payment and a full and final release.

The respondents' subsequent refusal to sign the documents was an improper attempt to resile from the agreement.

The appeal was allowed and the settlement enforced.

The appellants appealed an order removing their lawyers of record, which was made during a motion to consolidate and extend time.

The Divisional Court found the motions judge clearly erred by proceeding without proper notice, without supporting evidence, without allowing responding evidence, and on a motion brought by a respondent who lacked standing.

The appeal was allowed, the order was set aside, and costs were awarded against the respondent personally.

The Registrar appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision ordering the Registrar not to carry out a proposal to refuse the respondent's registration as a motor vehicle salesperson.

The respondent had a criminal conviction for arson and provided inaccurate details about it during the application process.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the Tribunal erred in law by focusing on whether the respondent deliberately intended to mislead rather than whether he knowingly made false statements.

The Court set aside the Tribunal's decision and directed the Registrar to refuse the registration.

The appellant brought a motion to set aside an order quashing his appeal to the Divisional Court for want of jurisdiction.

The underlying action claimed $15 million in damages, which exceeds the $50,000 monetary limit for appeals to the Divisional Court under the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellant argued the appeal should have been transferred to the Court of Appeal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, noting the appellant had not sought a transfer in his materials and had proceeded in the Divisional Court despite being alerted to the jurisdictional issue.

The accused was charged with multiple offences arising from a relationship with a complainant involved in escorting and exotic dancing, including human trafficking, receiving a material benefit from trafficking, withholding identity documents, assault, uttering threats, and breach of an undertaking.

The court assessed the complainant’s credibility, finding elements of exaggeration but accepting significant portions of her evidence.

The court held that the accused exercised control over the complainant through violence, threats, emotional manipulation, and financial control, compelling her to provide sexual services and surrender her earnings.

This conduct constituted human trafficking and related offences under the Criminal Code.

The accused was convicted on several counts, acquitted on others where the Crown had not met the burden of proof.

The Crown brought an application to admit similar act evidence between two alleged sexual assaults involving different complainants.

The incidents involved sex trade workers who were allegedly lured into a vehicle, threatened with a knife, and sexually assaulted.

The court considered the governing principles from leading authorities on similar fact evidence and assessed whether the probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect.

Given the strong DNA evidence, significant factual similarities between the incidents, and lack of evidence of collusion, the court concluded that the evidence had substantial probative value on issues of identity, consent, and use of a weapon.

The Crown’s application to admit the similar act evidence was granted.

The accused applied under s. 591(3) of the Criminal Code to sever counts relating to two alleged sexual assaults involving different complainants so that each incident would be tried separately.

The accused argued that he intended to testify on one set of counts to advance a consent defence but not on the other, where identity was disputed.

The court considered the factors governing severance, including prejudice to the accused, the factual and legal nexus between the incidents, the potential for similar fact evidence, and the efficiency of a single trial.

Finding extensive similarities between the alleged incidents and a viable similar fact evidence application, the court concluded that the interests of justice favoured a joint trial.

The accused failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that severance was required.

The accused sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code following a detention order on secondary and tertiary grounds.

The accused argued that disclosure constituted a material change in circumstances because witness statements no longer clearly placed a firearm in his possession during the incident.

The court applied the criteria for bail review and new evidence articulated in St. Cloud and Palmer.

The court held that even without firearm evidence, the seriousness of the assault allegations, the accused’s lengthy criminal record, repeated breaches of court orders, and weak bail plan meant detention remained justified on the secondary ground.

The alleged change in the Crown’s evidence was therefore not material to the detention decision.

The accused applied for a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code following a prior detention order based on secondary grounds.

The application relied on new evidence that a responsible adult relative was prepared to act as surety, post a bond, and supervise the accused in another province.

The court considered the criteria for admitting new evidence on review and determined that the proposed supervision plan constituted a material change in circumstances.

Given the credible surety and relocation away from complainants, the court found the risk to public safety could be adequately addressed by release conditions.

The accused was found guilty of multiple counts of sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching against his 15-year-old cousin.

Applying the Kienapple principle, the court conditionally stayed several counts and proceeded to sentence the accused on five counts of sexual interference and one count of invitation to sexual touching.

The court considered the significant breach of trust, the vulnerability of the victim, and the devastating impact on her and her family as aggravating factors.

The accused was sentenced to a global term of 3.5 years in penitentiary, along with DNA, SOIRA, non-communication, and weapons prohibition orders.

Following an application concerning enforcement of a condominium declaration restricting units to single family residence use, the court determined the issue of costs.

The applicants had been largely successful on the underlying application, obtaining findings that the condominium corporation was obligated to enforce its declaration and that certain grandfathering provisions in a proposed rule were unreasonable.

The court held that litigation was necessary to compel compliance with the declaration and that the applicants achieved the substantive relief sought.

Considering the factors under rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, including settlement offers and litigation conduct, the court awarded costs jointly and severally against the corporation and a director who had breached his statutory duties.