Carson M. Coughlin

The Crown sought to admit "recognition evidence" from a hotel customer service representative to identify the accused in surveillance video related to a first-degree murder charge.

The defence opposed, arguing the witness lacked sufficient exposure to the accused.

The court dismissed the Crown's motion, finding that the witness's limited prior interactions with the accused, reliance on a short, obscured video clip, and identification based on clothing and gait (rather than facial features or consistent observation of gait on stairs) did not place her in a better position than the trier of fact to identify the accused.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control of a motor vehicle and refusing to provide a breath sample following a single-vehicle collision on Highway 401.

The Crown established that the accused was the driver of the damaged vehicle through circumstantial evidence, including possession of car keys, proximity to the vehicle, and flight from the scene.

The court found the accused guilty of both charges.

The court rejected Charter arguments regarding sections 8, 9, and 10(b), finding that the 13-minute delay in informing the accused of his right to counsel was a technical breach with no serious impact.

The court also rejected the defence argument that the accused's subsequent offer to provide a breath sample after being charged negated the refusal offence, finding the offer was not genuine and the officer was justified in declining it.

The defendant was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol contrary to section 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, care or control of a motor vehicle over 80 contrary to section 253(1)(b), and driving while disqualified contrary to section 259(4)(a).

The defence conceded impairment and blood alcohol concentration over the legal limit.

The sole issue was whether the Crown proved the defendant was in care or control of the motor vehicle on May 22, 2017.

The defendant testified he placed food in the rear door of his vehicle and was standing in front of the car when arrested.

The Crown relied on police officer testimony that the defendant was observed sitting in the driver's seat.

The court found the defendant's testimony regarding a designated driver arrangement implausible and accepted the officer's evidence despite deficient note-taking.

The defendant was convicted on both the impaired care or control and driving while disqualified counts.

The accused sought to strike his guilty pleas to break and enter and possession of stolen property on the grounds that they were involuntary, allegedly coerced by pressure from his parents who faced related criminal charges.

The court found that while the accused was under considerable pressure, including from his parents and the disclosure of fingerprint evidence on the day of trial, the pleas remained voluntary and conscious volitional decisions.

The court rejected the argument that the charges against his parents were meritless or used as leverage, finding instead that they were rooted in compelling evidence.

The application to strike the guilty pleas was dismissed.

The defendant, Shane Trought, facing firearm and drug charges, brought motions seeking a sealing/non-communication order regarding his submissions on police credibility and extensive disclosure of CPIC audits.

The court dismissed the sealing order, finding no basis to presume Crown misconduct and emphasizing the Crown's duty to prepare witnesses.

Regarding disclosure, the court distinguished between Stinchcombe (first-party) and O'Connor (third-party) disclosure.

It ordered the Crown to produce CPIC information related to specific license plates and Mr. Trought himself, deeming these "fruits of the investigation." However, disclosure requests for other individuals (Mr. Velasquez, Mr. White, Mr. Tryden Reis, and Mr. Royden Reis) were dismissed as speculative "fishing expeditions" and due to the lack of proper service required for third-party disclosure applications.

The defendant was charged with three offences: fail to remain at the scene of an accident, impaired driving, and having an excess blood alcohol concentration while driving.

The Crown's case on the issue of driver identity was entirely circumstantial.

The defendant denied involvement and claimed his vehicle had been stolen and crashed by an unknown third party.

The court found that the circumstantial evidence—including the location of the passenger's cell phone, the defendant's facial injuries consistent with driver-side airbag deployment, the passenger's lack of injuries, and the defendant's implausible explanations—proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the driver.

The defendant was convicted on all three counts.

The accused, Prabhjeet Singh, brought a motion to exclude post-incident statements made by himself and Abhijeet Nagra to a relative of the deceased and their employer.

The statements allegedly minimized their involvement by claiming the air hose was applied to the deceased's legs rather than his anus, following an incident resulting in the deceased's death.

The Crown argued the motion was untimely and, alternatively, that the evidence was probative as it demonstrated the accused's knowledge of danger and attempt to minimize responsibility.

The court declined to dismiss the motion as untimely due to the accused's liberty interests but dismissed it on its merits, finding that the circumstances (video evidence, statements made to employer and next of kin) provided independent evidence of fabrication, making the statements admissible and relevant to the issue of assault.

The accused, charged with unlawful act manslaughter, brought multiple motions during their trial.

These included a motion to exclude the testimony of a lawyer, Mr. Sodhi, on the grounds that his evidence was tainted by a breach of an exclusion of witnesses order and late disclosure by the Crown.

They also sought, in the alternative, a mistrial, a stay of proceedings based on abuse of process, and permission to call Crown counsel and an officer as witnesses.

The court dismissed all motions, finding the breach of the exclusion order to be minor and technical, the evidence not unduly tainted, no Charter breach affecting fair trial rights, no abuse of process warranting a stay, and no basis to call Crown counsel or re-examine the officer.

The court emphasized that alternative remedies, such as cross-examination and limiting instructions to the jury, were sufficient to address any concerns.

The accused, a young person, was charged with robbery and possession of stolen property.

The sole issue was identification.

The complainant and his friends testified that they were robbed of an iPhone in a distinctive white case with a Hindu God image.

They followed the suspect to an apartment building where police arrested the accused.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence, video surveillance, and the identification of the accused as he was escorted from the building in handcuffs.

The court found the complainant and his friends credible but determined that the identification evidence was unreliable due to discrepancies in physical descriptions, the accused wearing different clothing, and the problematic nature of in-dock identification while in police custody.

Critical evidence—the iPhone case, identification of the specific apartment, and the yellow blanket and red purse—was not properly presented.

The accused was acquitted due to reasonable doubt regarding identification.

The accused, charged with invitation to sexual touching, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay from the swearing of the Information to the anticipated trial date was 34.7 months.

The court found that a significant portion of the delay was attributable to the Crown's failure to disclose relevant computer forensic evidence until shortly before the original trial date, necessitating an adjournment.

Finding that the delay exceeded the guidelines and caused actual prejudice to the accused, the court granted the application and stayed the proceedings.

The accused was charged with impaired driving contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

He sought to exclude breath test results, alleging violations of his Charter rights under sections 8 and 10, specifically claiming the screening demand was not made forthwith as required by section 254(2) and that he was denied a reasonable opportunity to consult counsel.

The court found that the police did not breach the accused's constitutional rights.

The screening demand was made promptly once grounds were formed, the overall delay was reasonable given the volatile circumstances requiring officer safety and situation stabilization, and there was no realistic opportunity to provide counsel before the screening test given the brief nine-minute window and unstable conditions.