Carson M. Coughlin

The applicant, charged with first-degree murder alongside a co-accused, applied for severance under s. 591(3)(b) of the Criminal Code.

He argued that a joint trial would violate his s. 11(b) Charter right to a trial within a reasonable time, as the co-accused's counsel was unavailable until six months past the Jordan ceiling.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the strong public interest in joint trials for co-accused alleged to have acted in concert outweighed the anticipated delay, which was partially justified by the complexity of a multi-accused trial and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The accused was charged with manslaughter after killing his father and setting the body on fire in a vehicle.

The accused had a lengthy history of mental illness and was experiencing severe delusions at the time, believing his father was an alien trying to kill him.

Relying on expert psychiatric evidence, the court found that the accused suffered from a schizoaffective disorder that rendered him incapable of knowing his actions were morally wrong.

The accused was found not criminally responsible (NCR) and the matter was referred to the Ontario Review Board.

Judge-alone criminal trial on allegations of sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching involving a child complainant who frequently stayed at a relative's home.

The central issue was credibility and reliability, with the court applying the W. (D.) framework to conflicting testimony from the complainant and the accused.

The court found aspects of the complainant's evidence compelling but identified significant inconsistencies and a possible motive to fabricate arising from being confronted about internet pornography searches.

Because the court was unable to decide whom to believe and was left with a reasonable doubt, the accused was acquitted on all counts.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash his committal for trial on a charge of first-degree murder, arguing the preliminary inquiry justice committed jurisdictional error by relying on insufficient circumstantial evidence of identity.

The reviewing judge found no jurisdictional error, concluding that the preliminary inquiry justice properly engaged in a limited weighing of the evidence, including DNA on a glove, video surveillance, clothing similarities, and association with the co-accused, to determine that a reasonable inference of guilt was available.

The application was dismissed.

The Crown brought a motion to admit "recognition" evidence from the accused's former girlfriend, Dejaunte Blake, to identify the accused in surveillance video related to a first-degree murder charge.

The defence opposed, arguing the relationship was not significant enough and the video quality was poor.

The court, applying the principles from R. v. Leaney, found the witness was in a better position than the jury to identify the accused due to her intimate and regular contact with him.

The court admitted the evidence, ruling that concerns about video quality and prior inconsistent statements went to weight, not admissibility.

In a first-degree murder trial, the court ruled on the admissibility of three wiretap excerpts, balancing their probative value against their prejudicial effect.

Two excerpts were excluded: one lacked sufficient link to the killing and carried significant prejudice by associating the accused with incarcerated individuals, and the other lacked probative value regarding a potential getaway vehicle or the shooting itself.

The third excerpt, which involved the accused discussing a homicide and police inquiries with his girlfriend, was admitted as highly probative of post-incident conduct related to his involvement in the shooting.

The Crown brought an application during a first-degree murder trial to determine the voluntariness of two statements made by the accused to police.

The first statement was made to patrol officers investigating a trespass complaint prior to the murder, and the second was a six-hour interview following the accused's arrest by a tactical unit.

The court applied the Oickle framework and found no evidence of inducements, oppression, lack of an operating mind, or police trickery.

Both statements were ruled voluntary, with the first admissible in the Crown's case in chief and the second admissible for cross-examination.

The Crown sought to admit "recognition evidence" from a hotel customer service representative to identify the accused in surveillance video related to a first-degree murder charge.

The defence opposed, arguing the witness lacked sufficient exposure to the accused.

The court dismissed the Crown's motion, finding that the witness's limited prior interactions with the accused, reliance on a short, obscured video clip, and identification based on clothing and gait (rather than facial features or consistent observation of gait on stairs) did not place her in a better position than the trier of fact to identify the accused.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control of a motor vehicle and refusing to provide a breath sample following a single-vehicle collision on Highway 401.

The Crown established that the accused was the driver of the damaged vehicle through circumstantial evidence, including possession of car keys, proximity to the vehicle, and flight from the scene.

The court found the accused guilty of both charges.

The court rejected Charter arguments regarding sections 8, 9, and 10(b), finding that the 13-minute delay in informing the accused of his right to counsel was a technical breach with no serious impact.

The court also rejected the defence argument that the accused's subsequent offer to provide a breath sample after being charged negated the refusal offence, finding the offer was not genuine and the officer was justified in declining it.

The defendant was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol contrary to section 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, care or control of a motor vehicle over 80 contrary to section 253(1)(b), and driving while disqualified contrary to section 259(4)(a).

The defence conceded impairment and blood alcohol concentration over the legal limit.

The sole issue was whether the Crown proved the defendant was in care or control of the motor vehicle on May 22, 2017.

The defendant testified he placed food in the rear door of his vehicle and was standing in front of the car when arrested.

The Crown relied on police officer testimony that the defendant was observed sitting in the driver's seat.

The court found the defendant's testimony regarding a designated driver arrangement implausible and accepted the officer's evidence despite deficient note-taking.

The defendant was convicted on both the impaired care or control and driving while disqualified counts.

The accused sought to strike his guilty pleas to break and enter and possession of stolen property on the grounds that they were involuntary, allegedly coerced by pressure from his parents who faced related criminal charges.

The court found that while the accused was under considerable pressure, including from his parents and the disclosure of fingerprint evidence on the day of trial, the pleas remained voluntary and conscious volitional decisions.

The court rejected the argument that the charges against his parents were meritless or used as leverage, finding instead that they were rooted in compelling evidence.

The application to strike the guilty pleas was dismissed.

The accused brought pre-trial Charter applications alleging abuse of process, unlawful searches, and multiple right-to-counsel breaches arising from his arrest on an outstanding warrant and ensuing firearm and drug investigation.

The court rejected allegations of police cover-up, fabrication, and perjury, and dismissed most alleged s. 8 and s. 10 breaches, but found specific breaches when an officer went onto the unit balcony without authority, when police asked the accused 'where's the gun' before a proper opportunity to consult counsel, when a canine officer re-entered the unit without lawful authority, and when Unit searches proceeded under invalid Criminal Code and CDSA warrants.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded observations and evidence flowing from those specific breaches, including all observations and items seized under the invalid Unit warrants.

The court held, however, that the firearm and drugs found on the neighbouring balcony were not obtained in a manner that infringed the accused's Charter rights and remained admissible.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The defendant, Shane Trought, facing firearm and drug charges, brought motions seeking a sealing/non-communication order regarding his submissions on police credibility and extensive disclosure of CPIC audits.

The court dismissed the sealing order, finding no basis to presume Crown misconduct and emphasizing the Crown's duty to prepare witnesses.

Regarding disclosure, the court distinguished between Stinchcombe (first-party) and O'Connor (third-party) disclosure.

It ordered the Crown to produce CPIC information related to specific license plates and Mr. Trought himself, deeming these "fruits of the investigation." However, disclosure requests for other individuals (Mr. Velasquez, Mr. White, Mr. Tryden Reis, and Mr. Royden Reis) were dismissed as speculative "fishing expeditions" and due to the lack of proper service required for third-party disclosure applications.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with an excess blood alcohol concentration.

At trial, the accused brought Charter applications alleging violations of his rights under ss. 7, 8, 9, and 10(b).

The accused argued that the police failed to accommodate his limited English comprehension, failed to facilitate his right to counsel by not allowing him to speak to a friend, and arbitrarily detained him for seven hours after breath testing.

The court dismissed the applications, finding that the accused sufficiently understood his rights, the police made reasonable efforts to contact his friend for a lawyer's name before the accused spoke to duty counsel, and the continued detention was justified given the accused's high blood alcohol level and inability to care for himself.

The defendant was charged with three offences: fail to remain at the scene of an accident, impaired driving, and having an excess blood alcohol concentration while driving.

The Crown's case on the issue of driver identity was entirely circumstantial.

The defendant denied involvement and claimed his vehicle had been stolen and crashed by an unknown third party.

The court found that the circumstantial evidence—including the location of the passenger's cell phone, the defendant's facial injuries consistent with driver-side airbag deployment, the passenger's lack of injuries, and the defendant's implausible explanations—proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the driver.

The defendant was convicted on all three counts.

The accused, charged with unlawful act manslaughter, brought multiple motions during their trial.

These included a motion to exclude the testimony of a lawyer, Mr. Sodhi, on the grounds that his evidence was tainted by a breach of an exclusion of witnesses order and late disclosure by the Crown.

They also sought, in the alternative, a mistrial, a stay of proceedings based on abuse of process, and permission to call Crown counsel and an officer as witnesses.

The court dismissed all motions, finding the breach of the exclusion order to be minor and technical, the evidence not unduly tainted, no Charter breach affecting fair trial rights, no abuse of process warranting a stay, and no basis to call Crown counsel or re-examine the officer.

The court emphasized that alternative remedies, such as cross-examination and limiting instructions to the jury, were sufficient to address any concerns.

The accused, Prabhjeet Singh, brought a motion to exclude post-incident statements made by himself and Abhijeet Nagra to a relative of the deceased and their employer.

The statements allegedly minimized their involvement by claiming the air hose was applied to the deceased's legs rather than his anus, following an incident resulting in the deceased's death.

The Crown argued the motion was untimely and, alternatively, that the evidence was probative as it demonstrated the accused's knowledge of danger and attempt to minimize responsibility.

The court declined to dismiss the motion as untimely due to the accused's liberty interests but dismissed it on its merits, finding that the circumstances (video evidence, statements made to employer and next of kin) provided independent evidence of fabrication, making the statements admissible and relevant to the issue of assault.

The offender was convicted of manslaughter by a jury after stabbing a highly intoxicated neighbour who mistakenly arrived at his door late at night.

The offender, who had a history of being harassed by the victim's associates, reasonably but mistakenly believed his home was under attack, though his use of a lethal sword was found disproportionate.

The court assessed his moral culpability at the low end of the scale, sentencing him to 2 years' imprisonment, reduced to 7 months after crediting pre-trial custody and house arrest, followed by 2 years of probation.

The Crown brought a pretrial motion seeking an order for the jury and the court to take a view of the food processing facility where the deceased was fatally injured by a high-pressure air hose during an incident of horseplay.

The Crown sought the view primarily to allow the jury to hear the sound of the air hose.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the facility had undergone significant changes since the incident, the exact conditions could not be recreated, and the jury would have access to high-quality video and audio evidence.

The court concluded that the potential prejudice to the accused outweighed the limited probative value of the view.

In a manslaughter trial involving three Punjabi Sikh accused, the defence brought a pretrial motion to determine the wording of a challenge for cause question to be put to the jury panel.

The court ruled that a general preamble was sufficient, rejecting a more detailed version proposed by the defence.

The court also held that the question should specifically identify the accused as Punjabi Sikhs, recognizing that prejudice may be triggered by outward manifestations of religious beliefs such as wearing a turban.

Finally, the court exercised its discretion to not provide the question to prospective jurors in advance, preferring spontaneous answers.