Carson M. Coughlin

In a joint first‑degree murder prosecution, one accused brought a pretrial motion seeking to exclude the police statements of a co‑accused or, alternatively, to sever the trials.

The applicant argued that the statements implicated him in the killing and would be highly prejudicial because the jury might improperly use them as evidence against him despite limiting instructions.

The court held that the statements were highly probative against the co‑accused and formed an important part of the Crown’s case.

Applying the principles governing severance under s. 591(3) of the Criminal Code and the presumption favouring joint trials, the court concluded that any prejudice could be managed through editing of the recordings and strong jury instructions.

The motion to exclude the statements or order severance was dismissed.

In a pre‑trial evidentiary motion in a homicide prosecution, the accused sought to exclude several items of proposed Crown evidence on the basis that their prejudicial effect outweighed their probative value.

The court applied the common law balancing test governing admissibility and considered whether the evidence would undermine trial fairness or invite improper jury reasoning.

Several graphic autopsy photographs and circumstantial forensic evidence were permitted where they illustrated the nature of the injuries or were relevant to the location and manner of the assault.

Evidence consisting of a written message on a pacifier package was excluded from the Crown’s case due to minimal probative value and risk of prejudice, though it could be used in cross‑examination if the accused testified.

A baseball bat potentially linked to the killing and a partial fingerprint found at the scene were admitted, with concerns about evidentiary weight left for the jury.

In a pretrial ruling in a first degree murder prosecution, the accused sought to challenge prospective jurors for cause on the basis of potential race‑based bias and requested that the court adopt a multiple‑choice formulation of the challenge question derived from prior jurisprudence.

The Crown opposed the request and argued that the traditional Parks question should be used.

The court held that a question permitting prospective jurors to answer in their own words better assists the triers in evaluating sincerity and bias than a structured multiple‑choice response.

The application to conduct a challenge for cause was allowed, but the court declined to adopt the proposed multiple‑choice wording and instead directed that the traditional Parks formulation, or a modified version used in prior authority, be employed.

The court further held that the question would not be provided in writing to jurors in the witness box.

In a pre‑trial voir dire in a first degree murder prosecution, the accused sought to exclude a police interview conducted the day the victim’s body was discovered.

The court considered whether the accused was detained during questioning at the police station and therefore entitled to rights to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Applying the detention factors from R. v. Moran and the objective test for psychological detention articulated in R. v. Grant, the court found the accused was effectively detained when interviewed after being transported in a locked police cruiser and held in an interview room for hours without a caution.

Because the accused was not advised of his right to counsel, his Charter rights were breached.

The statement was excluded under s. 24(2), and the court noted that it would also have had a reasonable doubt regarding voluntariness.

The accused was charged with manslaughter following the death of her common-law spouse, who was cut during an altercation at a house party.

The Crown sought to admit a portion of the accused's statement to police made during a 15.5-hour interrogation.

The court found that the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the accused, rendering her detention unlawful and a breach of section 9 of the Charter.

Furthermore, the police violated the accused's right to silence by using a Commissioner of Oaths to compel a KGB statement under threat of criminal sanction.

The court excluded the statement under both the common law confessions rule and section 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellant, a store manager, was convicted of sexually assaulting a 16-year-old employee.

He appealed the conviction, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were deficient and failed to explain why his evidence was rejected and the complainant's evidence was accepted.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court agreed, finding that the trial judge's reasons were largely conclusory, misapprehended important defence evidence, and failed to address significant inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The accused was charged with impaired driving contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

He sought to exclude breath test results, alleging violations of his Charter rights under sections 8 and 10, specifically claiming the screening demand was not made forthwith as required by section 254(2) and that he was denied a reasonable opportunity to consult counsel.

The court found that the police did not breach the accused's constitutional rights.

The screening demand was made promptly once grounds were formed, the overall delay was reasonable given the volatile circumstances requiring officer safety and situation stabilization, and there was no realistic opportunity to provide counsel before the screening test given the brief nine-minute window and unstable conditions.