Carson M. Coughlin

The accused were charged with unlawful act manslaughter following a workplace incident where a co-worker was fatally injured by a high-pressure air hose.

One of the accused brought a motion to admit expert evidence from an occupational health and safety expert regarding the hazards of compressed air and the need for workplace training.

The court applied the White Burgess framework and dismissed the motion, finding that the proposed evidence regarding domestic law was inadmissible, and the factual evidence lacked probative value and was unnecessary, as the objective standard for manslaughter does not require such specialized knowledge.

During a trial for unlawful act manslaughter arising from a workplace incident involving a compressed air hose, the defence sought to cross-examine the Crown's forensic pathology expert on a statement from a 1942 journal article regarding public perception of the dangers of compressed air.

The Crown objected.

Following a voir dire, the court ruled that the question could not be put to the expert.

The court found that public perception was outside the expert's area of expertise, the 1942 article was of limited reliability for assessing public knowledge in 2015, and the question had no probative value while carrying significant prejudicial effect.

During a jury trial for unlawful act manslaughter arising from a workplace incident involving a compressed air hose, the accused applied for a directed verdict of acquittal.

They argued there was no evidence from which a jury could infer that a reasonable person would have objectively foreseen the risk of bodily harm.

The court dismissed the application, finding that evidence including video footage, the sound and power of the air hose, and the bypassing of a safety mechanism provided a sufficient basis for a properly instructed jury to find objective foreseeability of bodily harm.

The accused, charged with manslaughter, brought an application for the case management judge to recuse himself.

The accused argued that the judge's prior involvement in administrative decisions to transfer cases out of Brampton due to courtroom shortages created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the accused failed to provide cogent evidence to overcome the strong presumption of judicial impartiality.

The court noted that the administrative transfer process and the court's commitment to managing resources efficiently would not lead a reasonable, informed person to conclude the judge had a closed mind.

The accused, charged with manslaughter alongside two co-accused, applied for an adjournment of the trial to find more experienced counsel after his counsel of choice was removed from the record due to medical issues and a change of venue.

He also applied for severance from his co-accused, offering to waive his s. 11(b) Charter rights.

The court dismissed the applications, finding that the accused had retained competent counsel, that an adjournment would jeopardize the co-accused's s. 11(b) rights, and that the interests of justice strongly favoured a joint trial.

The accused brought pre-trial applications challenging the Superior Court's administrative decision to transfer his manslaughter trial from Brampton to Kitchener due to a severe courtroom shortage.

The accused argued the transfer order was subject to judicial review and violated administrative law principles of procedural fairness.

The court dismissed the applications, holding that the Chief Justice and Regional Senior Judges have statutory authority under the Courts of Justice Act to transfer cases within and outside a region.

The court further held that administrative decisions made in the course of criminal proceedings are not subject to judicial review, and that the accused failed to establish grounds for a change of venue under s. 599 of the Criminal Code.

The accused, charged with manslaughter alongside two co-accused, sought to bring several pre-trial applications, including a recusal motion, a jurisdictional challenge against transferring the trial out of Brampton, a section 10(b) Charter application, and an application for removal of counsel.

Due to counsel's medical issues and scheduling conflicts, the court had to set a firm timetable for the filing of materials and the hearing of these applications to ensure the scheduled trial date could be maintained.

The court ordered strict deadlines for the filing of application records and factums, scheduling the recusal application first, followed by the substantive applications.

The case involves three accused charged with manslaughter.

Due to courtroom shortages in Brampton, the trial was scheduled to be held in Kitchener.

Counsel for one of the accused suffered medical issues, leading to an adjournment.

Counsel subsequently indicated an intention to bring motions to transfer the trial back to Brampton or be removed from the record, but later attempted to unilaterally delay bringing these motions.

The case management judge rejected this delay, emphasizing the need for efficiency under the Jordan framework, and ordered strict deadlines for the defence to perfect any such applications.

A jury trial arising from the kidnapping, extortion, assault, and unlawful confinement of the complainant.

The court issued written reasons for numerous pre‑trial and mid‑trial rulings including mistrial motions, evidentiary disputes, cell tower evidence admissibility, video‑link testimony under s. 714.2 of the Criminal Code, interpretation issues under s. 14 of the Charter, and jury charge requests.

The court dismissed several defence mistrial applications, permitted certain Crown evidence including cell tower records as factual evidence, allowed video‑link testimony from a witness abroad, and provided jury instructions concerning fabricated statements and the Browne v. Dunn rule.

The jury ultimately convicted two accused and acquitted one.

In a criminal prosecution for kidnapping, extortion, and assault, the court conducted a blended voir dire regarding the admissibility of statements made by the accused to police following a 911 call and police entry into a residence where a bound complainant was discovered.

The accused argued the statements were involuntary and obtained in breach of Charter rights, particularly the right to counsel under s. 10(b).

The court found that one police officer violated the accused’s right to counsel during investigative detention but declined to exclude certain statements after applying the s. 24(2) framework from Grant.

Spontaneous utterances and statements made after proper cautions and waiver of counsel were admitted, while statements allegedly made to another officer in the police cruiser were excluded because the Crown failed to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt due to unreliable notes and evidentiary inconsistencies.

The accused brought Charter applications seeking exclusion of physical evidence and statements following a police investigation into a reported kidnapping.

Police had entered a residence after a 911 call and later attended a second location linked to a vehicle found at the scene, where the accused was arrested.

The accused argued that seizure and search of pants containing identification and items belonging to the complainant breached s.8 of the Charter, and that statements were obtained in breach of s.10(b).

The court held the seizure of the pants was a lawful search incident to arrest for the purpose of confirming identification and therefore did not violate s.8.

Although one post‑arrest question about identification breached s.10(b), the breach was minor and did not justify exclusion under s.24(2), and all statements were found voluntary.

The accused applied under s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude evidence obtained after police entered a residence without a warrant following a 911 call reporting a gun and possible emergency.

Police arrived, detained an occupant in the backyard, and conducted a sweep of the home where they discovered a complainant tied to a bed in the basement and seized two envelopes during the search.

The applicants argued the entry and subsequent seizure violated s. 8 of the Charter.

The court held the warrantless entry was justified under the police duty to protect life and safety in response to an emergency 911 call.

The seizure of the envelopes was lawful as plain view evidence discovered while officers were lawfully present in the home.

During a jury trial on kidnapping, extortion, and assault charges, one accused brought a Corbett application to restrict use of his criminal record if he testified.

The court applied the balancing analysis governing admissibility of prior convictions, weighing probative value on credibility against the risk of prejudice through impermissible propensity reasoning.

The court held that the prior conviction for failing to comply with a recognizance bore directly on testimonial credibility and was admissible.

The two uttering threats convictions were excluded because their prejudicial effect outweighed their limited credibility value in the context of the Crown theory at trial.

In a criminal jury trial on kidnapping, extortion, and assault charges, the Crown sought to adduce hearsay statements made by an absent alleged participant through a former friend.

The court held the co-conspirators' exception did not apply because there was no direct or circumstantial evidence that a joint criminal enterprise involving the accused already existed when the statements were made.

The court also rejected alternative hearsay routes based on penal interest, present intention, motive, and credibility corroboration, finding the proposed evidence irrelevant to the live issue of the identity and participation of the accused.

The application was dismissed, subject only to a narrow allowance to refer to the Square One meeting to refresh the witness's memory about a phone number.

In a mid-trial motion, the accused sought to exclude a forensic DNA analysis on the basis that police handling of cloth restraints during an earlier trial created a serious risk of contamination.

The court held that, even accepting the factual allegations regarding handling and continuity, the complaint went to the weight of the DNA evidence rather than its admissibility.

Applying the trial judge’s case-management authority, the court found there was no reasonable likelihood that a voir dire would assist in determining admissibility.

The application was summarily dismissed as unmeritorious and brought too late.

The applicants sought a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging their right to trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) had been breached.

The case involved charges of kidnapping, extortion, and assault arising from a violent abduction.

The court conducted a detailed Morin analysis of delay, allocating periods to inherent requirements, defence delay, institutional delay, and Crown delay, including delay caused by a mistrial following disclosure failures.

The court determined that total Crown and institutional delay amounted to approximately 14 months and 27 days, falling within the Morin guidelines.

Although some prejudice was established, it did not reach the level required to justify a constitutional remedy, and the seriousness of the offences weighed strongly in favour of a trial on the merits.

The accused, a young person, was charged with robbery and possession of stolen property.

The sole issue was identification.

The complainant and his friends testified that they were robbed of an iPhone in a distinctive white case with a Hindu God image.

They followed the suspect to an apartment building where police arrested the accused.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence, video surveillance, and the identification of the accused as he was escorted from the building in handcuffs.

The court found the complainant and his friends credible but determined that the identification evidence was unreliable due to discrepancies in physical descriptions, the accused wearing different clothing, and the problematic nature of in-dock identification while in police custody.

Critical evidence—the iPhone case, identification of the specific apartment, and the yellow blanket and red purse—was not properly presented.

The accused was acquitted due to reasonable doubt regarding identification.

The accused, charged with invitation to sexual touching, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay from the swearing of the Information to the anticipated trial date was 34.7 months.

The court found that a significant portion of the delay was attributable to the Crown's failure to disclose relevant computer forensic evidence until shortly before the original trial date, necessitating an adjournment.

Finding that the delay exceeded the guidelines and caused actual prejudice to the accused, the court granted the application and stayed the proceedings.

In a first-degree murder trial, the Crown sought to admit several categories of hearsay statements made by the deceased, including statements to a school friend and her sister, text messages to her mother, personal writings, and contextual evidence regarding discipline within the household.

The defence opposed portions of the evidence, arguing that it constituted inadmissible hearsay or impermissible prior discreditable conduct whose prejudicial effect outweighed probative value.

Applying the analytical framework for hearsay admissibility, including the state of mind exception and the principled exception requiring necessity and threshold reliability, the court held that most of the deceased’s statements were admissible as either non-hearsay evidence of state of mind or under the principled exception.

Evidence concerning family discipline and prior incidents was also admitted as relevant contextual evidence with probative value exceeding potential prejudice.

One diary entry dated more than a year prior to the death was excluded because its limited probative value was outweighed by its potential prejudicial impact.

In a first-degree murder trial, the Crown brought a pretrial application to admit the videotaped police interviews of the eight-year-old brother of the deceased under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The child had returned to Jamaica and his mother refused to permit him to testify.

While the necessity requirement was met, the court found the statements lacked threshold reliability due to material inconsistencies, the child's tendency to guess or make assumptions, and the lack of opportunity for cross-examination.

The Crown's application to admit the hearsay evidence was dismissed.