Bryan Finlay

The applicants sought judicial review of the government's alleged failure to allocate adequate resources to fund treatment for autistic children, raising both administrative and constitutional arguments under ss. 7 and 15 of the Charter.

The Divisional Court declined to hear the constitutional arguments on a piecemeal basis, noting that a fuller record was being developed in related litigation (Wynberg and Deskin).

The court adjourned the constitutional issues pending the outcome of those cases and proceeded to hear only the administrative law issues.

The moving party sought to set aside an order of a single judge refusing leave to appeal a substantial costs award made by the Ontario Municipal Board.

The moving party argued that the costs award penalized them for exercising their right to a hearing de novo.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the single judge did not decline jurisdiction or apply a wrong principle in refusing leave to appeal, but rather considered the argument on its merits and rejected it.

The appellant, executor of the estate of John F. McLennan, appealed a decision ordering the discharge of a collateral mortgage and the payment of approximately $5.7 million in property sale proceeds to the estate of John K. McLennan.

The appellant argued that a 1996 assignment agreement transferred both the collateral mortgage and the deceased's personal guarantee to the father's estate.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower courts' findings that the assignment agreement only transferred the collateral mortgage, which was worthless without the underlying debt and personal guarantee.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondents sought leave under s. 246 of the Business Corporations Act to commence a derivative action.

The appellants, who were the intended defendants in the proposed action, moved to intervene in the leave application.

The motions judge dismissed the motion to intervene.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 246 permits the proceeding to be brought by application rather than motion, and that the motions judge did not err in exercising his discretion to deny intervention, as the intended defendants' rights would be fully protected once the action was commenced.

The appellant law firm, Davies, Ward & Beck LLP, appealed an order disqualifying it from acting for Trilogy Enterprises Ltd. in a hostile takeover bid for Chapters Inc. The law firm had previously acted for Chapters on competition law issues arising from its formation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the previous retainer was sufficiently related to the current matter, thereby raising a presumption that confidential information was imparted.

The law firm failed to discharge the heavy burden of showing that no relevant confidential information was received that could be used to the prejudice of its former client.

The defendants in a libel action appealed a Master's decision dismissing their motion to compel production of documents and examination for discovery of a non-party investigator.

The investigator had been hired by the plaintiff employer to interview employees regarding the same allegations that formed the basis of the libel action.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the interview notes were relevant to the defendants' plea of justification and were not protected by privilege under the Wigmore criteria.

The court concluded it would be unfair to require the defendants to proceed to trial without discovery of the non-party.

The appellant land developer suffered financial losses due to a two-year delay by the respondent transit authority in determining the precise location and acreage required for a new transit station on the appellant's land.

The municipality withheld development approvals during this period.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the damages resulting from the delay were the natural and reasonable consequences of the expropriation and were compensable as disturbance damages under the Expropriations Act.

The Court emphasized that the Act is a remedial statute that must be given a broad and liberal interpretation to adequately compensate those whose lands are taken.

The respondent, a lawyer, was defamed by the appellants who published documents falsely alleging he had misappropriated funds intended for a community organization.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the trial judge's finding that the publications were defamatory and that the appellants were jointly and severally liable as joint tortfeasors.

The Court rejected the defence of qualified privilege, finding that the appellants had exceeded the limits of the occasion and were motivated by express malice.

The Court restored the trial judge's award of $140,000 in compensatory damages and $325,000 in special damages for loss of business, as well as the award of prejudgment interest for 12.5 years.

The appellants appealed a libel judgment arising from a press conference at which counsel publicly read and commented on contempt allegations against a Crown attorney that were later found to be untrue.

The Court held that the private defamation action did not constitute government action under s. 32 of the Charter, but confirmed that the common law must nonetheless develop consistently with Charter values.

The Court declined to adopt the American actual malice rule, holding that Canadian defamation law appropriately balances freedom of expression with the protection of reputation.

It further held that any qualified privilege attached to the occasion was defeated by the excessive, careless, and high‑handed dissemination of serious allegations.

The jury's awards of $300,000 general damages, $500,000 aggravated damages, and $800,000 punitive damages were upheld.

The complainant, a 13-year-old female, was denied the opportunity to play on a boys' competitive hockey team despite successfully trying out and being offered a position.

The respondents argued that the restriction was justified and that the Ontario Women's Hockey Association (OWHA) constituted a special program under section 13(1) of the Human Rights Code.

The Board of Inquiry found that while the OWHA is a valid special program designed to assist disadvantaged females in hockey, this does not justify denying the complainant her right to equal treatment under section 1 of the Code.

The Board concluded that the complainant was unlawfully discriminated against on the basis of sex and upheld the complaint.

The Restrictive Trade Practices Commission ordered several persons to appear before a Hearing Officer to give evidence in an inquiry under the Combines Investigation Act.

The Hearing Officer made rulings limiting the role of counsel, including denying the right to cross-examine witnesses, excluding a potential witness, and ruling that the Director need not disclose his reasons for commencing the inquiry.

The appellants sought to quash these rulings.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the inquiry was purely investigatory and that neither the Act nor the common law doctrine of fairness required the Director to disclose his reasons or permitted counsel to cross-examine witnesses at this preliminary stage.

The appellant company, through the Ontario Securities Commission, commenced an action against its directors and officers for alleged insider trading under the Ontario Securities Act.

The defendants argued that the provincial insider trading provisions were inoperative due to the doctrine of paramountcy, as they duplicated provisions in the federal Canada Corporations Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that both the federal and provincial provisions were intra vires under the double aspect doctrine.

The Court further held that the provincial provisions were not rendered inoperative by paramountcy, as mere duplication without actual conflict or contradiction does not invoke the doctrine.