Civil Litigation - Plaintiff

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their solicitor negligence action, arguing the trial judge failed to consider the solicitor's duty to warn about the consequences of signing a mortgage discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that at trial, the appellants claimed they never met the solicitor, and their counsel conceded the action would fail if the trial judge found they had indeed signed the documents.

Because the trial judge accepted the solicitor's evidence that the meeting occurred, the duty to warn was not a live issue.

The appellant insurer appealed a decision dismissing its application for a preliminary determination of whether the respondent was involved in an 'accident' under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The insurer argued this was a coverage issue that had to be determined by a court before the mandatory dispute resolution scheme under s. 279 of the Insurance Act applied.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the s. 279 scheme is a comprehensive alternative dispute resolution process that governs all disputes concerning entitlement to statutory accident benefits, including whether a claimant qualifies as an insured person involved in an accident.

The appellant landlord appealed an order granting the respondent tenant relief from forfeiture of a commercial sublease.

The appellant had issued notices of termination alleging the tenant permitted stolen hardwood flooring to be stored on the premises, constituting criminal activity.

The application judge found no admissible evidence of criminal activity by the tenant and granted relief from forfeiture for a minor breach regarding storage by a related company.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and a motion to admit fresh evidence, finding no palpable or overriding error in the application judge's assessment of the evidence.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an order of the Divisional Court that dismissed her appeal under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Divisional Court had dismissed the appeal because the amount claimed exceeded $50,000, placing it outside its jurisdiction under section 19(1.2) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the Divisional Court lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the motion for leave to appeal under Rule 2.1 as devoid of merit.

The appellant moved for leave to appeal an order of the Divisional Court that dismissed her Judicial Review Application for want of jurisdiction.

The appellant had sought $1,800,000 in damages in her application.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the Divisional Court had no jurisdiction to grant such relief under section 2 of the Judicial Review Procedure Act.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed as devoid of merit under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following an appeal and motion for leave to appeal under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act.

The court fixed the costs of the appeal and the motion for leave to appeal at $25,000, inclusive of disbursements and taxes, payable by the appellant union to the respondent.

The respondents brought a motion to quash an appeal from a trial judge's order declaring a mistrial and discharging the jury.

The appellant argued the order was final because it went to the jurisdiction of the court.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial court did not lose jurisdiction but expressly retained it, making the mistrial declaration an interlocutory order.

The motion to quash the appeal was granted.

The moving parties brought a motion to quash the responding parties' appeal of an order requiring interim payments pending a phase two trial.

The moving parties argued the order was interlocutory, or alternatively, made under the Ontario Business Corporations Act, meaning jurisdiction lay with the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding the order was final as it determined minimum payment amounts and rejected certain deductions.

The Court also held the underlying relief was rooted in common law and equity, not the OBCA, giving the Court of Appeal jurisdiction.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment enforcing a Consulting Agreement and a Letter of Credit Agreement, and the dismissal of their motion to consolidate two related actions.

The appellants argued the agreements were unenforceable as illegal loans under the Criminal Code and were procured in breach of fiduciary duty.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's findings that the case was document-driven, appropriate for summary judgment, the agreements were not loans, and no fiduciary duty existed.

The appellant appealed from two orders: one striking his statement of claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action, and another declaring him a vexatious litigant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding that the statement of claim lacked factual underpinnings and that the appellant's history of numerous lawsuits supported the vexatious litigant declaration.

Costs of $7,000 were awarded to the respondents.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order staying its action for wrongful termination and tortious misconduct based on a forum selection clause in an Exclusive Sales Agreement.

The clause required disputes to be settled by binding arbitration in Germany.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the broad language of the clause captured both the contract and tort claims against the contracting party.

The majority also upheld the stay against the non-contracting respondents, finding their claims were factually intertwined with those against the contracting party.

A dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal in part, finding no jurisdiction to force arbitration on non-parties.

The City of Hamilton appealed a decision declaring its equipment installation by-law inoperative against Canada Post's installation of community mailboxes.

The by-law imposed a moratorium and permit fees on Canada Post.

The Court of Appeal found that while the by-law's pith and substance—regulating municipal rights of way—was within provincial jurisdiction, it conflicted with the federal purpose of the Canada Post Corporation Act and its regulations, which grant Canada Post sole decision-making power over the location of mail receptacles.

The appeal was dismissed under the doctrine of federal paramountcy.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment that dismissed their action in negligence and breach of contract against the respondent regarding a slip and fall on restaurant stairs.

The motion judge had dismissed the claim regarding hazards on the stairs but allowed the appellants to amend their claim to plead a breach of the Consumer Protection Act for failing to advise of a main floor washroom.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge correctly dismissed the first branch of the claim due to a lack of evidence of stair hazards, and properly preserved the second branch regarding the failure to advise.

The appellant appealed an order striking his claim against the lawyers who represented his former spouse in family law proceedings.

The appellant alleged the lawyers caused delays, distress, and hardship, and misled the court.

The motion judge struck the claim, finding no duty of care owed by the lawyers to the opposing party and concluding the action was an abuse of process and a collateral attack on previous family court and Law Society decisions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusions that the statement of claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action and constituted an abuse of process.

The moving party brought a motion to quash the appellants' appeal from a judgment implementing a consent to judgment.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion to quash, noting that under section 133(a) of the Courts of Justice Act, an appeal from a consent order requires leave.

The appellants had improperly sought leave within their Notice of Appeal rather than bringing a motion in writing as required by Rule 61.03.1.

The appeal was quashed without prejudice to the appellants bringing a proper motion for leave to appeal.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing her action against her insurer for terminating her Income Replacement Benefits.

The motion judge found the action was barred by the two-year limitation period under the Insurance Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the termination notice was clear and unequivocal, and affirming that the limitation period is triggered by a single event—the refusal to pay the benefits claimed—rather than operating as a rolling limitation period.

The moving party brought a motion to review a single judge's decision dismissing his motion for an extension of time to file a Notice of Appeal.

The moving party argued the judge placed undue emphasis on his troubling explanation for the delay and erred in finding no merit in the proposed appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no palpable and overriding error of fact and agreeing that the correct legal test was applied.

The respondents transferred their home to the appellant at below market value as part of a scheme to defraud creditors, with an oral agreement for re-conveyance.

When the appellant refused to re-convey the property, the respondents sued for unjust enrichment and a constructive trust.

The trial judge found the agreement of purchase and sale was a sham and ordered a re-conveyance based on unjust enrichment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of unjust enrichment or the 'clean hands' doctrine.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his action under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as frivolous and vexatious.

The appellant had sued the Divisional Court, the Province, and the Public Guardian and Trustee regarding prior settlements approved by the court.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the claim was devoid of merit and dismissed the appeal.

Following a successful appeal regarding the apportionment of damages, the court determined the costs of the appeal and cross-appeal.

The third parties were ordered to pay partial indemnity costs of $50,000 to the appellants and $75,000 to the respondents.

The appellants were ordered to pay $30,000 in partial indemnity costs to the respondents, as the respondents were required to address all issues initially raised by the appellants.