Amanda Rubaszek

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference involving his step-daughter.

The trial judge had convicted the appellant based primarily on the complainant's credibility.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge committed several errors in assessing credibility, including failing to adequately address the complainant's motive to fabricate, failing to resolve material inconsistencies in the evidence, improperly using a prior consistent statement to bolster the complainant's credibility, and failing to apply the W.(D.) principles to determine if the defence evidence raised a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was found not criminally responsible for minor assaults and detained at a minimum forensic unit.

Despite his ongoing marijuana use, he had no history of aggression while detained.

The Ontario Review Board ordered his transfer to a medium security unit to restrict his access to drugs and help him develop insight.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the transfer unreasonable because it was more restrictive of his liberty and there was no evidence linking his marijuana use to a risk to public safety while detained.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on charges of counselling to commit murder.

At trial, the judge excluded an out-of-court statement made by the accused's common law spouse, relying on the spousal incompetency rule.

The trial judge also set aside wiretap authorizations and excluded intercepted communications under s. 24(2) of the Charter after finding the police affiant failed to disclose material facts about an informant's credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while the trial judge erred in applying the spousal incompetency rule to a common law spouse, the error did not affect the verdict because the statement was inadmissible hearsay.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's decision to excise the informant's information from the wiretap application and exclude the resulting evidence due to serious police misconduct.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the verdict was unreasonable due to the complainant's lack of credibility and that the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge meaningfully addressed the frailties in the complainant's evidence, including her criminal record and drug use, and properly found confirmation in other evidence such as her immediate reporting and physical injuries.

The verdict was held to be reasonable.

The Crown sought leave to appeal a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision regarding whether breath tests were administered 'as soon as practicable'.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding that the lower courts properly applied the established legal test to the specific facts of the case, which involved delay associated with allowing the detainee to contact a parent.

The court concluded the appeal did not raise a question of law alone of significance beyond the immediate case.

The appellant was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder and appealed a hybrid detention disposition made by the Ontario Review Board.

The appellant argued that the Board erred in finding he posed a significant risk to public safety and in failing to grant an absolute or conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board's finding of significant risk was supported by the evidence, including the unanimous opinion of the treatment team.

The Court also rejected the appellant's procedural fairness arguments regarding the late delivery of a hospital report and alleged bias.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's risk assessment and disposition were reasonable and supported by reasons that bear a somewhat probing examination.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference involving a young child, arguing that the trial judge gave inadequate reasons, reached an unreasonable verdict, misapprehended evidence concerning opportunity and post-incident circumstances, and misapplied the W.(D.) framework.

The court held that, although brief, the reasons were sufficient when read in the context of the evidence and submissions, and adequately disclosed why the trial judge accepted the complainant's evidence and rejected the denial evidence.

The court further held that the verdict was supported by the record, no material misapprehension of evidence was shown, and the trial judge properly applied the criminal burden of proof and the W.(D.) principles.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board transferring him from Ontario Shores to Waypoint.

The appellant conceded he represented a significant threat to public safety and required a custodial order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision to transfer the appellant was reasonable, based on the correct legal test, and entitled to deference.

The applicant sought to review a single judge's decision dismissing her request for a stay of a driving prohibition pending an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding it lacked jurisdiction because the applicant had not obtained leave under section 680 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown appealed from a jury verdict acquitting the accused of sexual assault.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred by excluding evidence of the accused's sexual fantasies about the complainant, allowing cross-examination of the complainant regarding prior sexual activity under section 276(2) of the Criminal Code, and inadequately charging the jury on the requirement to take reasonable steps to ascertain consent under section 273.2.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's evidentiary rulings were reasonable and legally sound, and noting the jury charge used the exact, legally correct language suggested by the Crown at trial.

The appellant was convicted of abducting his son in contravention of a custody order.

The indictment specifically charged him with 'taking away' his son.

At trial, the judge instructed the jury that they could convict the appellant either if he took the child away or if he failed to return the child once the custody order was made.

The Court of Appeal held that this instruction was an error because the Crown must prove the offence exactly as particularized in the indictment, which did not include detaining or harbouring the child.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that excluded breath test results due to an alleged breach of the informational component of section 10(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the appeal judge erred by failing to conduct a meaningful analysis under the Grant framework.

The Court held that any breach was minor, especially since the accused subsequently contacted duty counsel, and that a proper balancing mandated the admission of the evidence.

The trial conviction and sentence were reinstated.

The appellant pleaded guilty to charges arising from a violent home invasion where he and an accomplice forced their way into a residence, bound the victim, stole property, and discharged a firearm while fleeing.

He was sentenced to nine years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant introduced fresh evidence of severe medical issues suffered while in custody, including a stabbing and an allergic reaction requiring a permanent tracheotomy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the nine-year sentence was at the low end of the range and that the paramount considerations of denunciation and general deterrence for such a serious offence overshadowed the appellant's medical condition, which should be managed by the Parole Board and penitentiary authorities.

The three accused, former senior executives of Nortel Networks Corporation, were charged with two counts of fraud over $5,000.

The Crown alleged that they deliberately misrepresented Nortel's financial results by manipulating accrued liability balances to meet earnings targets and trigger bonus payments.

The court conducted a detailed review of Nortel's accounting practices, the use of accrued liabilities, and the restatements of its financial results.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused deliberately misrepresented the financial results or that the financial statements were materially misstated.

The accused were found not guilty on both counts.

During a criminal fraud trial involving former corporate executives, the Crown sought disclosure of lawyers’ interview notes created while representing two accused during internal corporate investigations.

The defence asserted litigation privilege over handwritten and typed notes taken by counsel and assisting lawyers during interviews conducted by investigators retained by the corporation’s audit committee.

The court held that the notes were created for the dominant purpose of anticipated litigation, including regulatory proceedings and civil actions, and therefore attracted litigation privilege.

None of the recognized exceptions to litigation privilege were established.

The court ruled that the privileged notes were not producible, though counsel-witnesses could review their own notes to refresh memory without waiving privilege.

The accused brought a pre‑trial motion seeking particulars requiring the Crown to specify the alleged misrepresentations, fraudulent conduct, and false accounting entries underlying charges relating to financial reporting of a public corporation.

The motion relied on s. 587 of the Criminal Code, arguing that the indictment lacked sufficient detail for the preparation of a defence.

The court reviewed the extensive investigations, disclosure, and related regulatory proceedings already known to the accused and concluded that they were aware of the case they had to meet.

The court held that the areas of dispute were sufficiently delineated and that further particulars were unnecessary for trial fairness or evidentiary rulings.

The application for particulars was dismissed.

The appellants, former executives of Livent, appealed their convictions and sentences for large-scale commercial frauds involving the falsification of financial statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding that the trial judge's reasons were adequate, the verdicts were reasonable, and the trial judge properly assessed the credibility of unsavoury accomplice witnesses.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeals, reducing the penitentiary terms because the Crown failed to prove the actual amount of financial loss or that the company's bankruptcy was caused solely by the fraud.

The appellant appealed from two dispositions of the Ontario Review Board that ordered his detention at a minimum security unit.

The appellant argued that the Board erred in failing to grant him an absolute or conditional discharge, asserting he no longer posed a significant threat to public safety.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board did not improperly shift the burden of proof and that its conclusion regarding the appellant's threat to public safety was reasonable based on the expert evidence.

The Court also held that a conditional discharge was not realistic given the appellant's failure to comply with hospital conditions.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

Prior to the appeal being heard, the Board held another hearing resulting in a new disposition that increased the restrictions on the appellant's liberty.

Due to delays in bringing the initial appeal and the intention to appeal the new disposition, the Court of Appeal adjourned the current appeal to be heard together with the proposed appeal of the new disposition, and appointed amicus curiae to assist the self-represented appellant.