Amanda Rubaszek

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder and detained in a mental health facility, sought an absolute discharge and treatment orders as remedies under s. 24(1) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada established a new approach for determining whether an administrative tribunal is a court of competent jurisdiction under s. 24(1).

The Court held that the Ontario Review Board has the jurisdiction to grant Charter remedies because it has the authority to decide questions of law.

However, the Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the specific remedies sought by the appellant—an absolute discharge for a dangerous patient and a treatment order—were expressly precluded by the Board's statutory scheme under the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, arguing the Board misunderstood the terms of a joint recommendation regarding his community and grounds supervision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the record did not support the appellant's contention and that the Board gave careful reasons for adding restrictions to his privileges.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence imposed on the respondent for an offence involving a mentally and physically challenged complainant.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge failed to place adequate weight on the gravity of the offence and the complainant's vulnerability.

The conditional sentence was held to be demonstrably unfit.

The Court allowed the appeal, substituting a sentence of three years, reduced to 22 months to account for the 14 months already served under the conditional sentence.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

The Crown had proceeded at trial on the basis that the appellant's ex-wife was entitled to an interest in the former matrimonial home, which was erroneous in law.

Because no calculation of equalization of property was performed, the Crown failed to establish that the complainant was entitled to any equalization payment, thereby failing to prove the essential element of deprivation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and entered an acquittal.

The appellant was acquitted at trial of failing to comply with a breath demand.

The Crown successfully appealed to the Summary Conviction Appeal Court, which ordered a new trial on the basis that the trial judge found the appellant had feigned compliance, which is tantamount to a refusal.

The appellant sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the trial judge's findings amounted to a feigned attempt to blow and denied leave to appeal.

The Crown appealed the dismissal of a certiorari application regarding a preliminary inquiry judge's decision to discharge the accused on charges of aggravated assault and failing to provide the necessaries of life.

The charges related to injuries suffered by the accused's infant children.

The Crown argued the preliminary inquiry judge failed to consider the totality of the evidence and impermissibly weighed competing inferences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the certiorari judge's conclusion that the preliminary inquiry judge properly considered the evidence and engaged only in the limited weighing permissible for circumstantial evidence at a preliminary inquiry.

The appellant appealed his convictions for kidnapping, sexual assault, and criminal harassment of his former partner, as well as his 54-month sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred by refusing to admit evidence of prior sexual activity with the complainant, by allowing evidence of his prior discreditable conduct to show motive, and by failing to leave the defence of mistaken belief in consent to the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the procedural requirements for admitting prior sexual history, properly instructed the jury on the highly probative discreditable conduct evidence, and correctly concluded there was no air of reality to the mistaken belief defence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed the quantum of a restitution order imposed at sentencing.

The parties agreed the original order exceeded the complainant's actual loss, contrary to s. 738(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, and should be reduced to at least $59,496.99.

The appellant argued for a further reduction to $43,240, asserting the disputed $16,256.99 related to transactions where goods were actually delivered.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the Crown failed to meet its burden of demonstrating the additional amount related to the offences for which the appellant was convicted.

The appeal was allowed and the restitution order was reduced to $43,240.

The appellant appealed his convictions for conspiracy to break and enter dwelling houses and assault with intent to steal, as well as his 14-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's Vetrovec warning regarding unsavoury witnesses was adequate and the review of the defence position was sufficient.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed because the trial judge erred by treating the appellant's trial testimony as an aggravating factor and failing to consider his first-offender status.

The sentence was reduced to 10 years' imprisonment, and the order delaying parole eligibility was set aside.

The appellant appealed his indeterminate sentence following a dangerous offender declaration for convictions of sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching.

The sentencing judge had not considered whether the appellant met the criteria for a long-term offender designation, as the sentencing pre-dated the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new sentencing hearing, finding that it was not one of the rare cases where there was no reasonable possibility of a different sentence had the long-term offender provisions been considered.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that the trial judge failed to appreciate the unsavoury witnesses' motives to fabricate, provided insufficient reasons for judgment, and erred in rejecting a witness's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge appropriately cautioned himself regarding the unsavoury witnesses, provided reasons adequate for appellate review, and sufficiently explained his rejection of the witness's evidence.

The appellant appealed a sexual assault conviction involving a child complainant, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate because they did not expressly explain the rejection of his denial.

The court held that the adequacy of reasons must be assessed functionally and contextually by asking whether they permit meaningful appellate review.

Reviewing the whole record, including the complainant's evidence, the diary evidence, and the trial judge's express application of the reasonable doubt standard and the W.(D.) framework, the court found the route to conviction was clear.

The reasons were sufficient to show that the denial did not raise a reasonable doubt when weighed against the accepted evidence.

Appeal dismissed.

The Crown appealed a decision of a Summary Conviction Appeal Judge who had ordered a new trial for the accused.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the conviction.

The Court found that the trial judge's section 16 competence inquiry of the child complainant was adequate, as it established her ability to observe, recollect, communicate, and understand the difference between truth and a lie.

Furthermore, the Court held that the trial judge properly understood the complainant's evidence regarding penetration and that there was no inconsistency with the medical evidence.

Finally, the Court concluded that the trial judge provided adequate reasons for accepting the complainant's evidence and rejecting the accused's testimony.

The young person appealed the custodial sentence imposed for a violent offence.

The Court of Appeal found that while a period of custody was justified, the trial judge erred in principle by failing to credit the young person for 8 days of pre-trial custody and time spent in pre-sentence house arrest.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was reduced to 3 months of open custody and 1.5 months of supervision.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for robbery, arguing that the trial judge erred in his jury instructions on identification evidence and improperly admitted evidence of his failure to attend work.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the jury instructions and holding that the work attendance evidence was relevant to opportunity.

The sentence was also upheld as fit given the appellant's lengthy criminal record and the seriousness of the offences.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Summary Conviction Appeal Court.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the lower court's disposition.

The Court held that the trial judge's inferences from a conversation with the victim's mother were reasonably open and that the proposed fresh evidence regarding a Human Rights Commission claim was properly rejected.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed for lack of merit.

The appellant appealed his conviction.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge erred in convicting the appellant.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, declined to order a new trial, and entered an acquittal.

The appellant appealed convictions arising from sexual offences against a child, arguing the trial judge improperly treated the case as a credibility contest, misused the child's complaint to her mother, gave unreasonable reasons for rejecting the defence evidence, and applied different credibility standards to the parties.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge properly instructed himself under the W.(D.) framework, did not merely choose between competing versions, and gave adequate reasons grounded in the evidence.

The court further held that the complaint to the mother was admissible under the narrative exception and was used only for a limited, permissible purpose in assessing truthfulness.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was charged with aggravated assault by wounding after striking a co-worker with a knife.

At trial, the judge left the included offence of assault causing bodily harm with the jury, despite the undisputed evidence that the injury amounted to a wounding.

The jury acquitted the appellant of aggravated assault but convicted him of the included offence.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the included offence should not have been left with the jury, as there was no reasonable view of the evidence that could yield an acquittal on the main charge and a conviction on the included offence.

The conviction was quashed and an acquittal entered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample, arguing there was no unequivocal refusal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge and summary conviction appeal judge's inference of an unequivocal refusal was available on the facts, and thus no error of law was demonstrated.