Alexandra Hoy

The appellant, Leslie J. O’Connor, appealed a trial judge's decision to discharge a jury and render judgment in favour of the respondent, Peter St. Marthe, following a motor vehicle accident.

The appeal centered on whether the trial judge erred in ruling that counsel improperly elicited inadmissible opinion evidence from a non-party expert (Dr. Mussett) regarding the respondent's ability to work, and whether the judge erred in discharging the jury.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding Dr. Mussett's opinion on employability was inadmissible as it went beyond the scope of his original assessment and was highly prejudicial.

The court also found no error in discharging the jury, given the significant impact of the inadmissible evidence and the trial judge's assessment of trial fairness.

This is an appeal and cross-appeal arising from a trial judgment concerning oppression and conspiracy claims related to a condominium corporation.

The appellants (original defendants) challenged the trial judge's findings that claims against one defendant were not statute-barred, the award of punitive damages, and substantial indemnity costs.

The respondents (original plaintiffs) cross-appealed the prejudgment interest rate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and the cross-appeal, upholding the trial judge's decisions on all contested issues, including the application of limitation periods, the appropriateness of punitive damages for egregious conduct, and the discretion in awarding substantial indemnity costs and prejudgment interest.

The appellants, an Indian law firm and its senior partner, appealed the dismissal of their motion to stay or dismiss an action brought by Kyko Global Inc., an Ontario corporation.

The action alleged negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of contract related to a legal opinion provided by the appellants.

The appellants argued that Ontario lacked jurisdiction and was not the convenient forum.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that Ontario had jurisdiction simpliciter based on presumptive connecting factors (tort occurring in Ontario, contract made in Ontario) and that the appellants failed to demonstrate that Mumbai, India, was a clearly more appropriate forum.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants, April Vuong and Hao Quach, appealed their convictions for large-scale fraud and their 6-year sentences.

They argued that their s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time was infringed, that the trial judge erred in permitting a forensic accountant to testify as a non-expert witness, and that their sentences were unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all appeals, finding that the delay was justified under the Jordan transitional exceptional circumstance, that any error regarding the witness testimony was cured by the Criminal Code's proviso, and that the sentences were fit and within the appropriate range for a sophisticated Ponzi scheme.

The appellant, Shawn Poitras, appealed a trial decision that awarded the respondent, Natalie Burke, child and spousal support, arrears, an equalization payment, and exclusive possession of the matrimonial home, following an uncontested trial where the appellant's answer was struck due to repeated non-disclosure.

The appellant raised four grounds of appeal: denial of participation rights, insufficient scrutiny of the respondent's evidence, indefinite spousal support, and excessive costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, denying leave to file fresh evidence (failing the Palmer test), finding no unfairness regarding participation rights given the appellant's conduct, upholding the trial judge's scrutiny of evidence and spousal support award (applying Moge and SSAGs), and affirming the costs award.

This appeal arose from a family law dispute concerning spousal support and costs.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's refusal to impute a higher income to the respondent, the quantum of spousal support awarded at the high-end of the guidelines, and the award of full recovery costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings regarding income imputation or her legal conclusions on spousal support and costs.

The court affirmed the trial judge's discretion and the high threshold for appellate intervention on factual matters.

The appellant appealed convictions for aggravated assault and assault with a weapon stemming from two separate incidents.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's assessment of unsavoury witnesses under Vetrovec principles and the use of "prefer" language in evaluating witness credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly applied Vetrovec by seeking corroboration and that the use of "prefer" was a linguistic slip, not a misapprehension of the burden of proof, given the overall context of the reasons and the trial judge's self-direction on the standard of proof.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a 6-year sentence for aggravated assault, which included credit for pre-sentence custody and harsh conditions of confinement.

The conviction stemmed from a violent knife attack on his former partner's husband.

The sentencing judge emphasized general deterrence and denunciation, noting the victim's severe injuries, the appellant's use of two knives, his related criminal record, and the attack occurring partly in front of his daughter.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the sentencing judge's assessment of the appellant's limited insight into the gravity of the offence, which restricted the weight given to his rehabilitative potential.

The application for leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal itself was dismissed, upholding the original sentence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, his designation as a dangerous offender, and the imposition of an indeterminate sentence.

The trial judge's finding that the complainant's passivity was due to fear and not consent was upheld, with the Court of Appeal affirming that silence or passivity does not constitute communicated consent.

The court also upheld the dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence, citing the appellant's history of sexual assaults and the intractability of his behavioural challenges, supported by expert psychiatric evidence.

Both the conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

This appeal was dismissed as abandoned due to the appellant's failure to appear for the hearing, despite being notified multiple times.

The court was also informed that the appellant had previously failed to attend his criminal trial, which led to the underlying application for habeas corpus, and that there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest.

The appellant, Roger Guppy, brought an appeal from convictions.

Despite being offered assistance by duty counsel, the appellant declined and remained silent when asked for submissions.

The Crown requested the appeal be dismissed as abandoned.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal as abandoned due to the appellant's continued silence and failure to make submissions.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following its decision on an appeal concerning leave to proceed under the Ontario Securities Act.

The appellants had challenged the motion judge's denial of leave for certain alleged financial misrepresentations.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred in principle on this central issue, remitting it for redetermination.

As the appellants were substantially successful on the appeal, they were awarded $60,000 in all-inclusive costs for the appeal.

The costs of the original motion for leave were deferred to the judge determining the remitted issue.

The appellant, 2161907 Alberta Ltd., appealed a lower court decision that found it had wrongfully terminated agreements with the respondent, 11180673 Canada Inc., and acted in bad faith, ordering payment of a $2 million branding fee.

The dispute arose when 216 refused to fund 111's rent, leading 111 to threaten not to open its cannabis store. 216 terminated the license agreement, citing a "threat to cease carrying on business." The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's finding that 216's termination was invalid, interpreting the "threat" clause objectively in context.

However, the Court of Appeal set aside the finding of bad faith, clarifying that an incorrect belief in a valid termination right, even if motivated by a desire to end the relationship, does not automatically constitute bad faith when there is no knowing misrepresentation or deliberate creation of the breach.

The appeal regarding the sublease termination was dismissed as practically resolved.

The appellant was convicted of sexual contact and inciting sexual contact with a person under 14.

He appealed his convictions and sought leave to appeal his 30-month sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against conviction, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility, particularly regarding inconsistent statements about childhood events.

The court also granted leave to appeal the sentence but dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's consideration of the appellant's age and health, and finding no exceptional circumstances due to the COVID-19 pandemic to warrant a reduced sentence.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of a 1988 agreement between a school board and a municipality for snow and garbage removal services provided in exchange for the sale of a school property for $1.

The municipality unilaterally terminated the services in 2017, arguing the contract was terminable on reasonable notice.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge erred in characterizing the agreement as a personal services contract and in his analysis of surrounding circumstances.

The Court concluded that the agreement was perpetual in nature, given the upfront transfer of an enduring capital asset by the school board and the public nature of the parties' mutually beneficial arrangement, which was not primarily commercial.

The Society of United Professionals appealed a Divisional Court decision affirming the Ontario Labour Relations Board's (OLRB) rulings regarding New Horizon System Solutions' refusal to disclose a Master Services Agreement (MSA).

The Society alleged violations of ss. 17 (duty to bargain in good faith) and 70 (interference with union representation) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Divisional Court's finding that the OLRB's decisions were reasonable, concluding that the MSA was not necessary for the Society to carry out its representational duties under s. 70 and that the s. 17 application was premature when initially brought.

The court also found the OLRB's partial disclosure order under s. 17 and its reliance on counsel's representation regarding a specific MSA article to be reasonable.

Thorneloe University sought leave to appeal a CCAA judge's decision that allowed Laurentian University to disclaim federation agreements and approved a debtor-in-possession (DIP) loan amendment.

Thorneloe argued the disclaimer would cause its insolvency, provided minimal financial benefit to Laurentian, and was motivated by anti-competition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the leave motion, finding the proposed appeal was not prima facie meritorious, not of significance to the practice, and would unduly hinder the progress of the CCAA restructuring.

The court upheld the CCAA judge's balancing of interests under s. 32(4) of the CCAA, emphasizing the high deference owed to supervising judges in CCAA proceedings.

The appellant, Phyllis Johnson, appealed a motion judge's order granting summary judgment and dismissing her dental malpractice action.

The appellant sought to adduce fresh expert evidence on appeal.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding that it satisfied the Palmer test.

The court concluded that with this new evidence, the motion judge would have adjourned the summary judgment motion to allow the appellant to cure deficiencies in the expert report.

The appeal was allowed, and the dismissal of the action was set aside.

The appellant, E.M.M., appealed his conviction for sexual assault and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The trial judge had convicted him after finding the sexual activity was not consensual, despite the complainant and a witness having consumed drugs.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to consider innocent collusion and misapplied the W.(D.) principles.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds of appeal, finding the trial judge properly assessed reliability and applied W.(D.).

The court also dismissed the application to adduce fresh evidence regarding sentence, stating it did not meet the Palmer criteria and that reducing the sentence would not reflect the gravity of the offence, especially given the victim's age and vulnerability.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) for attempted murder, appealed the Ontario Review Board's (ORB) decision to continue his conditional discharge, seeking an absolute discharge.

He argued the ORB's finding of a significant threat to public safety was unreasonable and presented fresh evidence of improved stability and a developed therapeutic relationship with his community psychiatrist.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the ORB's original decision reasonable at the time it was made.

While admitting the fresh evidence, the majority declined to grant an absolute discharge, preferring that the ORB, as the expert body, make that determination at an already scheduled early review hearing.

A dissenting judge would have granted the absolute discharge based on the fresh evidence.