Alexandra Hoy

The appellant sought to appeal interlocutory orders from the Superior Court of Justice, which had dismissed her appeals of two Master's orders concerning security for costs and costs.

The respondents moved to quash the appeal for want of jurisdiction, arguing that the orders were interlocutory and thus appealable to the Divisional Court with leave, not the Court of Appeal.

The appellant also brought a cross-motion seeking leave to appeal two other costs orders.

The Court of Appeal agreed that all orders were interlocutory, quashed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and dismissed the appellant's cross-motion.

The appellants, beneficiaries of an estate, appealed a Superior Court order that declared they had no interest in a property, ordered them to vacate, and required them to pay occupation rent.

Their appeal primarily argued that the motion judge erred by failing to grant them an adjournment and by providing insufficient reasons for the denial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the motion judge's discretionary decision.

The court noted that it was not the appellants' first adjournment request, they had received legal advice, and the ongoing delay prejudiced other beneficiaries of the estate.

Costs were awarded against one appellant.

The appellants sought to enforce an alleged oral agreement to purchase a family home from the respondent.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding no enforceable agreement due to a lack of agreement on the fundamental term of price.

The appellants argued this finding was a palpable and overriding error, asserting the price was $850,000 and the dispute was merely over a $100,000 gift/discount.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding, agreeing that an objective, reasonable bystander would conclude the parties had not agreed on the purchase price, as the $100,000 difference was material.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, O’Dean McFarlane, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board (ORB) that transferred him from St. Joseph’s Healthcare Hamilton to a higher security forensic facility at Waypoint Centre for Mental Health Care.

The appeal was based on two grounds: the Board's refusal to grant an adjournment of an early review hearing, which the appellant argued denied him a fair hearing, and the Board's alleged failure to discharge its inquisitorial duty to investigate concerns of unconscious racial bias influencing hospital staff's perception of him.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Board's discretionary decision regarding the adjournment, as the issues were intertwined and no prejudice was demonstrated.

The court also held that the Board's inquisitorial duty was not triggered regarding racial bias, as there was no realistic possibility that further inquiry would have altered the decision, which was firmly rooted in objective evidence of the appellant's conduct.

The appellant, L.T., appealed a sentence, specifically challenging the imposition of a s. 161 order under the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, affirming the sentencing judge's discretionary decision.

The court emphasized that s. 161 orders are entitled to substantial deference on appeal and do not require the underlying offence to have been committed in prescribed circumstances.

The absence of an objection to the order at the time of sentencing was also noted as relevant to its fitness.

The respondent, Teresa Di Nunzio, brought a motion before the Court of Appeal for Ontario seeking an order for security for costs against the appellant, Lucia Di Nunzio, for both the appeal and the underlying application.

Teresa relied on Rule 61.06(1)(a) and (c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing the appeal was frivolous and vexatious and Lucia had insufficient assets, or alternatively, that a novel "lack of mutuality of remedy" constituted "other good reason." The court found that while Lucia lacked sufficient assets, the appeal was not frivolous or vexatious.

The court also rejected the novel "lack of mutuality" argument, stating it was essentially a disparity in financial resources and accepting it would unduly broaden the scope of the rule.

The motion was dismissed.

The appellants, Alton Grant and Shaqwan Kawano, appealed their first-degree murder convictions.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on how to assess exculpatory eyewitness identification evidence, specifically regarding a key witness whose testimony arguably contradicted the Crown's theory of identity.

This error was deemed serious and not curable.

The court dismissed Grant's Charter s. 11(b) application for unreasonable delay and found the verdict against him was not unreasonable.

However, due to the misdirection on eyewitness identification, the appeals were allowed, and new trials were ordered for both appellants.

The appellant appealed his convictions for gross indecency and sexual assault, arguing ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The Crown conceded several areas of counsel's incompetence, including failures to thoroughly investigate collusion among complainants, explore opportunity, challenge inconsistencies in testimony, and adequately prepare the appellant for trial.

The Court of Appeal found that the cumulative impact of these failures undermined the reliability of the verdict, particularly concerning the credibility of a key complainant and the application of similar fact evidence.

The court concluded that there was a reasonable probability that the trial outcome would have been different with effective counsel.

The appellant, Dylan Hird, appealed his conviction for various offences related to the trafficking and sexual assault of a 15-year-old complainant.

The appeal focused on two grounds: the trial judge's charge to the jury regarding identification evidence and the handling of the police's failure to conduct a photo line-up.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's instructions on identification, which adequately cautioned the jury on eyewitness testimony frailties and the need to prove the appellant's identity beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's management of the photo line-up issue, concluding that the approach taken was fair to both the Crown and the defence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed an appeal challenging the quantum of damages awarded for trespass involving the removal of trees.

The trial judge had granted summary judgment for trespass and subsequently awarded damages for tree replacement, irrigation, fencing, and "loss of amenities" based on the cost of reasonable restoration.

The appellants argued errors in applying foreseeability, assessing the plaintiff's intent to build, and drainage-related findings.

The appellate court found no reviewable error, affirming the trial judge's holistic approach to damages, the application of the Kates v. Hall restoration principle, and the rejection of arguments that the damages were unforeseeable or that the trees would have been removed anyway.

The appellant appealed convictions for human trafficking, procuring, and receiving a material benefit from a person under 18, arguing errors in the trial judge's jury charge.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding the jury charge was fair and legally sound.

Specifically, the court held that the trial judge correctly instructed the jury on the "purpose" element of human trafficking, the two modes of committing the procuring offence (despite the indictment only specifying one mode, the charge as a whole adequately covered the mens rea for both), and the application of circumstantial evidence for the material benefit charge, consistent with *R. v. Villaroman*.

The appellant, Tesean Alvarez, appealed his convictions for aggravated assault and possession of a weapon dangerous to the public peace, arguing the trial judge erred in jury instructions regarding eyewitness identification reliability, Vetrovec warnings, exculpatory evidence, and cross-racial identification, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's instructions on eyewitness identification were inadequate, particularly concerning flaws in the police identification process and the distinction between inculpatory and exculpatory evidence.

While other grounds of appeal were dismissed, the court concluded that the jury was not properly equipped to assess the identification evidence, which was central to the Crown's case.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible due to mental disorder, appealed the Ontario Review Board's conditional discharge, seeking an absolute discharge.

He argued the Board's finding of significant public safety risk was unreasonable, citing his non-violent history and good behaviour.

Amicus curiae argued the Board failed to fully exercise its inquisitorial powers regarding the appellant's reintegration and treatment.

The Court of Appeal found the Board's risk assessment reasonable, supported by the treatment team's assessment of potential harm without supervision.

The court also found no basis to interfere with the Board's inquisitorial powers, noting the appellant's improved situation and the Board's continued attentiveness to treatment and community supports.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Ali Elenezi, sought leave to appeal a three-year consecutive sentence for contempt of court.

This sentence was imposed after he refused to testify at a murder trial, despite having previously pleaded guilty to manslaughter in the same incident and affirmed an agreed statement of facts.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle by the sentencing judge regarding the consideration of the appellant's youth, rehabilitative prospects, or the totality principle.

The court affirmed that denunciation is the primary principle for contempt of court, especially refusal to testify, and that significant jail terms are required to deter such behaviour.

The appellant appealed her conviction for dangerous driving.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge relied on inadmissible hearsay to find that the appellant was the driver of the tractor trailer involved in the collision.

As there was no other admissible evidence tying the appellant to the accident, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and entered an acquittal.

The appellant, Latoya Ceballo, appealed her conviction for importing cocaine, arguing that the trial judge erred in denying her Charter application to exclude evidence.

Ceballo contended she was detained during a secondary customs inspection without being promptly advised of her Charter rights (ss. 10(a), 10(b)).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's finding that Ceballo was not detained prior to admitting possession of cocaine.

The court reiterated that routine border inspections, including ion scans and questioning about travel, do not constitute detention.

It found no error in the trial judge's assessment that the Border Services Officer's actions were not intrusive enough, nor was there a sufficiently strong particularized suspicion or subjective decision to engage in an intrusive investigation to trigger detention.

The court also found no material misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge.

The appellant, Leslie J. O’Connor, appealed a trial judge's decision to discharge a jury and render judgment in favour of the respondent, Peter St. Marthe, following a motor vehicle accident.

The appeal centered on whether the trial judge erred in ruling that counsel improperly elicited inadmissible opinion evidence from a non-party expert (Dr. Mussett) regarding the respondent's ability to work, and whether the judge erred in discharging the jury.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding Dr. Mussett's opinion on employability was inadmissible as it went beyond the scope of his original assessment and was highly prejudicial.

The court also found no error in discharging the jury, given the significant impact of the inadmissible evidence and the trial judge's assessment of trial fairness.

This is an appeal and cross-appeal arising from a trial judgment concerning oppression and conspiracy claims related to a condominium corporation.

The appellants (original defendants) challenged the trial judge's findings that claims against one defendant were not statute-barred, the award of punitive damages, and substantial indemnity costs.

The respondents (original plaintiffs) cross-appealed the prejudgment interest rate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and the cross-appeal, upholding the trial judge's decisions on all contested issues, including the application of limitation periods, the appropriateness of punitive damages for egregious conduct, and the discretion in awarding substantial indemnity costs and prejudgment interest.

The appellants, an Indian law firm and its senior partner, appealed the dismissal of their motion to stay or dismiss an action brought by Kyko Global Inc., an Ontario corporation.

The action alleged negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of contract related to a legal opinion provided by the appellants.

The appellants argued that Ontario lacked jurisdiction and was not the convenient forum.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that Ontario had jurisdiction simpliciter based on presumptive connecting factors (tort occurring in Ontario, contract made in Ontario) and that the appellants failed to demonstrate that Mumbai, India, was a clearly more appropriate forum.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants, April Vuong and Hao Quach, appealed their convictions for large-scale fraud and their 6-year sentences.

They argued that their s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time was infringed, that the trial judge erred in permitting a forensic accountant to testify as a non-expert witness, and that their sentences were unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all appeals, finding that the delay was justified under the Jordan transitional exceptional circumstance, that any error regarding the witness testimony was cured by the Criminal Code's proviso, and that the sentences were fit and within the appropriate range for a sophisticated Ponzi scheme.