Zachary Kerbel

The Crown alleged Christian Collins breached his Conditional Sentence Order (CSO) by committing an armed robbery shortly after the CSO was finalized.

The court found overwhelming circumstantial evidence, including DNA and the purchase of walkie-talkies used in the robbery, connecting Collins to the crime.

The court determined that Collins's previously established "complete and successful reformation," which was a premise for the CSO, was erroneous.

Given the serious nature of the breach (armed robbery) and the underlying offences (drug trafficking, firearm possession) which endangered public safety, the court concluded that the CSO was no longer appropriate.

The CSO was terminated, and Collins was committed to custody for the remainder of his sentence.

The accused pleaded guilty to drug trafficking and firearms offences, including possession of a loaded prohibited firearm.

Prior to sentencing, the court found two Charter violations regarding a wiretap intercept of a solicitor-client call and a breach of the right to counsel upon arrest, but dismissed a challenge to a strip search.

At sentencing, the court weighed the serious aggravating factors of the offences against exceptional mitigating factors, including the accused's complete reformation while on bail, his successful music career, his community service mentoring at-risk youth, and the Charter breaches.

The court concluded that a conditional sentence of two years less a day was appropriate to address denunciation and deterrence while supporting the accused's rehabilitation.

This criminal trial addressed charges of possession of a restricted handgun.

The court first heard a blended Charter application, alleging violations of sections 9 (unlawful arrest due to lack of reasonable and probable grounds) and 8 (unreasonable search incident to arrest).

The court found no Charter violations, determining that police had subjective and objective reasonable and probable grounds for arrest based on extensive wiretap evidence and that the search incident to arrest was lawful.

Subsequently, the court proceeded to the trial on the merits, finding the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed a restricted firearm with knowledge, largely relying on circumstantial evidence, including the interpretation of intercepted communications.

The defendant was found guilty as charged.

The applicants, Vito Bailey-Ricketts and Victoria Dittmer, brought a pre-trial motion alleging violations of their ss. 8 and 9 Charter rights and seeking the exclusion of evidence obtained from warrantless searches incident to their arrest.

The central issue was whether police had reasonable and probable grounds to lawfully arrest the applicants for possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking.

The court found that the totality of circumstantial evidence, including wiretaps, surveillance, and location data gathered during "Project Sunder," provided objectively reasonable and probable grounds for the arrests.

Consequently, the arrests did not violate s. 9 of the Charter, and the subsequent searches did not violate s. 8.

The motion was dismissed.

The applicant brought a pre-trial Charter application alleging that police unlawfully intercepted calls between him and his lawyers during a wiretap investigation, violating section 8 of the Charter.

The court found that while two of the three impugned calls did not violate the authorization's minimization terms, one call to the applicant's lawyer was unlawfully intercepted.

However, the court declined to stay the proceedings or exclude the wiretap evidence under sections 24(1) or 24(2) of the Charter, finding the breach was isolated and did not impact trial fairness.

Instead, the court ordered a mandatory injunction requiring the police to implement new protocols for blocking lawyers' phone numbers upon a target's arrest.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, arising from a home invasion robbery, on two grounds: alleged errors in jury instructions regarding the mens rea for murder as a party to the killing and the requirements for a party to be found guilty of first-degree murder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's instructions on party liability for murder and first-degree murder were proper, adequately related to the evidence, and did not require hypothetical scenarios not supported by evidence, distinguishing the case from R. v. Ferrari.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possessing and accessing child pornography, arguing that evidence obtained during the execution of a search warrant should have been excluded due to breaches of his Charter rights, specifically the right to counsel under s. 10(b).

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in concluding that the appellant was not detained prior to his formal arrest, applying the R. v. Grant factors.

The court determined that the appellant was psychologically detained from the moment police entered his home, and his s. 10(b) rights were violated.

Applying the s. 24(2) Grant factors, the court found the Charter breach serious, the impact on the appellant significant, and society's interest in the administration of justice favoured exclusion.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, and acquittals entered.

The appellant, Boris Panovski, appealed his convictions for first-degree murder and aggravated assault.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in the jury charge, specifically regarding the application of the W.(D.) rule to exculpatory eyewitness testimony, the overall inadequacy and imbalance of the charge, and the admission of certain non-recognition evidence.

The court determined that these errors were not curable by the proviso.

The appeal was allowed, convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The applicant, charged with second degree murder, applied under s. 680(1) of the Criminal Code for a review of a decision denying him bail pending trial.

He argued that a new release plan and the COVID-19 pandemic constituted material changes in circumstances.

The motion judge dismissed the application, finding no material error in the second bail judge's conclusion that the new release plan did not address the primary and secondary grounds for detention, and that the evidence regarding the pandemic's impact on the applicant was insufficient to constitute a material change.

During a retrial for first-degree murder, the Crown sought to introduce evidence of two unidentified cell phone calls made to the victim moments before he stepped outside and was shot.

The Crown argued the calls supported the theory that the victim was lured to an ambush.

The Superior Court of Justice ruled the evidence inadmissible, finding no direct or indirect evidence connecting the calls to the accused.

The court held that inferring the calls lured the victim outside, contrary to family testimony that he went to buy juice, would be based on impermissible speculation and conjecture.

The applicants, jointly charged with first degree murder, applied for directed verdicts of acquittal on first and second degree murder at the close of the Crown's case.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence, including gunshot residue and the applicants' presence near the scene, to prove identity and intent.

The court found sufficient evidence for a properly instructed jury to infer that both applicants were involved in an intentional killing as either principal or aider/abettor.

However, the court concluded there was no evidence upon which a jury could reasonably infer that the killing was planned and deliberate.

The applications were allowed in part, with the court directing verdicts of acquittal on first degree murder and ordering the trial to proceed on second degree murder.

The offender was found guilty of manslaughter by a jury after shooting the victim three times following an altercation.

The court determined the factual basis for sentencing, finding that provocation played a significant role but rejecting self-defence.

Considering the offender's prior youth record for firearms offences, the use of a firearm, and the profound impact on the victim's family, the court sentenced the offender to 15 years' imprisonment, less credit for pre-trial custody.

The appellant appealed his conviction on three grounds: (1) the trial judge erred in excluding defence expert evidence on recovered memory; (2) the trial judge erred in relying on British Columbia jurisprudence regarding recovered memory; and (3) the trial judge erred in dismissing inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence, rendering the verdict unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly excluded the expert evidence as it would impermissibly comment on credibility, that the trial judge's analysis of the complainant's evidence was thorough and contextually appropriate, and that the identified inconsistencies did not raise a reasonable doubt regarding the core allegations.

Patrick Walsh was found guilty by a jury of sexual assault involving forced oral sex and forced vaginal intercourse.

The Crown sought a three-year custodial sentence, while the defence sought 12 months.

The court, making its own factual findings under section 724 of the Criminal Code, confirmed both acts of sexual violence and found the defendant's post-offence conduct (FaceTiming friends and laughing about the victim) to be a serious aggravating factor.

Mitigating factors included the defendant's youth (22 years old, 20 at the time of offence) and lack of prior criminal record, along with strong family support.

The court dismissed the argument that media coverage constituted a mitigating factor due to insufficient evidence of exceptional public shaming.

Balancing denunciation, deterrence, and rehabilitation, the court imposed a sentence of two years in a penitentiary, along with several ancillary orders.

The appellant sought to appeal his conviction and sentence from the Superior Court of Justice.

The appellant abandoned the appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The court also vacated any victim fine surcharge that may have been part of the appellant's sentence.

The appellant Crown appealed the acquittal of a high school teacher charged with voyeurism under s. 162(1)(c) of the Criminal Code after he used a concealed pen-camera to surreptitiously record female students engaged in ordinary school activities in common areas of the school.

The majority of the Court of Appeal had upheld the acquittal on the basis that the students were not in circumstances giving rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy.

The Supreme Court unanimously allowed the appeal and entered a conviction, holding that circumstances giving rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy under s. 162(1) are circumstances in which a person would reasonably expect not to be the subject of the type of observation or recording that in fact occurred, taking into account the entire context.

The majority (Wagner C.J.) adopted a multi-factor contextual test informed by s. 8 Charter jurisprudence, while a concurring minority (Rowe J.) proposed a conjunctive test requiring both loss of control over one's image and infringement of sexual integrity.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault following an alleged non-consensual sexual encounter outside a dance.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty based primarily on the complainant's post-occurrence emotional state and an assumption that young women would not consensually engage in sexual activity in the conditions described.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by relying on a behavioural assumption about young women, failing to consider that the complainant was upset before the alleged assault, and failing to resolve material inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence or grapple with exculpatory evidence supporting the appellant's version of events.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellants sought leave to appeal their first-degree murder convictions and sought to introduce fresh evidence in the form of a recantation by key Crown witness Ronnie Khananisho.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to admit the fresh evidence and confirmed the prior panel's dismissal of the appellants' appeals from conviction.

The court found that while the recantation was admissible and the due diligence requirement was satisfied, the evidence failed the cogency test.

The recantation suffered from serious credibility issues, including implausible origins involving contact with the incarcerated appellant's former girlfriend, and could not reasonably be expected to have affected the trial verdict given that the central witnesses were Jorge Restrepo and Jorge Acosta, whose testimony was corroborated by powerful independent evidence including cellphone records and medical evidence.

The appellants were convicted of first degree murder in the shooting death of Joel Waldron.

The Crown could not prove which appellant was the shooter but argued both were guilty as one was the shooter and the other aided or abetted the killing.

The appellants appealed on grounds that the trial judge's charge to the jury was deficient in relating evidence to the elements of aiding and abetting and planning and deliberation.

The Court of Appeal found the jury charge was factually unbalanced and failed to properly relate evidence to the necessary legal elements, particularly regarding aiding and abetting.

While the court did not find the verdict unreasonable, it quashed the convictions and ordered a new trial due to the deficiencies in the charge.

The appellant appealed a conviction entered by Justice Chapin of the Ontario Court of Justice on July 15, 2014.

The appeal was allowed on consent.

The conviction was quashed and an acquittal was entered.