Wendy M. Matheson

The applicant dentist sought judicial review of a Health Professions Appeal and Review Board (HPARB) decision confirming an Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee (ICRC) order requiring him to complete a specified continuing education or remediation program (SCERP) on informed consent.

The order arose from a patient complaint regarding the administration of conscious sedation during a wisdom tooth extraction.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the ICRC's concerns about the lack of one-on-one communication and the applicant's reliance on staff for informed consent were supported by the record, making the HPARB's confirmation of the decision reasonable.

The appellant appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision dismissing his application for income replacement benefits as an abuse of process.

The Tribunal had dismissed the application after the appellant repeatedly failed to cooperate with an ordered independent psychological examination, including raising consent issues and threatening the psychologist.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law in the Tribunal's conclusion that the appellant's conduct constituted an abuse of process under its rules and the Statutory Powers Procedure Act.

The moving party filed multiple versions of a notice of motion seeking leave to appeal a single judge's decision to the Divisional Court, which lacks jurisdiction for such an appeal.

The court issued a notice under Rule 2.1.01 indicating it was considering dismissing the motion as an abuse of process.

The moving party failed to provide sufficient medical evidence to support an adjournment request or substantive submissions in response to the notice.

The court dismissed the motion as an abuse of process but granted the moving party leave to commence a new motion seeking a review under section 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated January 27, 2022.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $5,000 to the responding party.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an order and requested a stay.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal on the question of whether the motions judge erred in principle by relying on the responding party's evidence from an adjourned cross-motion without allowing the moving party an opportunity to respond.

The request for a stay was refused, and costs were reserved to the panel hearing the appeal.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the order as issued and entered was not a final order.

Costs of $2,500 were awarded to the responding party.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an earlier order of Di Luca J. The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $10,000 to the responding party.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated February 28, 2022.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal, with costs of $5,000 payable in the discretion of the appeal panel, and directed the parties to agree upon a schedule for the exchange of appeal materials.

The defendants brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of MacNeil J. dated January 19, 2022.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving parties to pay costs fixed at $3,613.74.

The moving parties' motion for leave to appeal and for a stay of various orders was dismissed as abandoned.

The court ordered the moving party to pay costs of $5,000 to the Receiver.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for leave to appeal Paragraph 22 of the order of Perell J. dated February 11, 2022.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal and directed the parties to arrange a case conference regarding the conduct of the appeal.

The moving parties (defendants) brought a motion to stay a production order issued by Perell J. pending the disposition of their appeal.

The Divisional Court granted the motion and ordered the stay.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Health Services Appeal and Review Board affirming a public health order to produce patient contact information following an infection control lapse at a dental clinic.

The sole ground of appeal was that the Board breached procedural fairness by failing to exclude the appellant's husband, who acted as her agent, on its own initiative due to his alleged incompetence and prior inappropriate conduct.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no obligation on the tribunal to inquire into the competence of a chosen agent or to exclude him absent an objection or clear prejudice.

The self-represented applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Office of the Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD) regarding her complaints of police misconduct.

The applicant had filed an initial complaint about an officer's conduct, and later added a second complaint alleging unlawful arrest.

The OIPRD investigated and dismissed the first complaint but inadvertently failed to screen or investigate the second complaint.

The Divisional Court held that the failure to investigate the second complaint was unreasonable and ordered it remitted to the OIPRD for investigation by a different investigator.

However, the court found the OIPRD's decision dismissing the initial complaint was reasonable and upheld that portion of the decision.

The applicant, a Nurse Manager, sought judicial review of a decision by the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board (HPARB) upholding an order by the Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee (ICRC) of the College of Nurses.

The ICRC ordered the applicant to complete a remediation program after a resident signed a 'Do Not Resuscitate' (DNR) form without a proper capacity assessment, despite the applicant having found the resident lacked capacity days earlier.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the decisions reasonable as the core issue was the failure to properly assess capacity, not whether the resident actually had capacity at the time.

The moving party defendants sought leave to appeal an order dismissing their motion for summary judgment based on a limitation period defence.

The Divisional Court noted that although the motion judge made findings about the limitation period defence, there was no order in that regard, making the order interlocutory.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellant, a statutory third party, appealed a motions judge's order refusing leave to serve and file a jury notice on behalf of the defendants, despite the plaintiff's consent.

The motions judge had cited pandemic-related court backlogs as the reason for refusal.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the motions judge erred in law by failing to articulate the applicable test, failing to consider the overall context including companion actions with existing jury notices, and failing to consider whether the jury notice would actually cause delay.

Leave was granted to file the jury notice.

The tenants appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision terminating their tenancy to allow the landlord's mother to move into the property.

The tenants challenged the Board's finding that the landlords required the unit in good faith for the mother's residential occupation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the finding of good faith and intended full-time occupancy were findings of fact, and the appeal raised no extricable question of law as required by s. 210 of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006.

The appellants appealed an order striking out their statement of defence without leave to amend.

The underlying action sought to enforce costs awards against the appellants.

The Associate Justice struck the defence after finding the appellants had flouted multiple peremptory court orders and a 'last chance' order regarding discovery and case management steps.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle or palpable and overriding error in the Associate Justice's exercise of discretion to strike the pleading due to contumelious disregard for court orders.

York University and York University Development Corporation (YUDC) sought judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC) decision denying their request for reconsideration of an order requiring the production of certain records.

The applicants argued the Adjudicator erred in finding the records were under the control of York University pursuant to s. 10(1) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, and in her approach to the reconsideration threshold.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications, finding the Adjudicator reasonably applied the two-part control test from National Defence and reasonably placed the onus on the applicants to establish grounds for reconsideration.