Timothy D. Ray

Following a summary judgment in a wrongful dismissal action under the simplified rules, the plaintiff sought costs of over $20,000.

The plaintiff recovered $13,076.92, which was less than half of the damages sought, and had abandoned a $50,000 punitive damages claim at trial.

The defendant argued no costs should be awarded as the recovery fell within Small Claims Court jurisdiction.

The court declined to order no costs but, applying the principle of proportionality and noting the defendant's mixed success, fixed the plaintiff's costs at $5,000 all-inclusive.

The accused stood trial on multiple historical sexual offence counts involving his granddaughter, including sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual assault.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court rejected most of the accused's evidence as evasive, contradictory, and unreliable, while assessing the complainant's childhood recollections with allowance for age-related imprecision regarding dates and locations.

The court held that one group of counts raised a reasonable doubt because the complainant's account placed the incident at an apartment address during a period when the accused's uncontradicted evidence indicated he did not yet live there.

The remaining counts were proved beyond a reasonable doubt based on the complainant's evidence, corroborative evidence from the father concerning a later incident, and the absence of a reasonable doubt on the whole of the evidence.

The applicant tenant brought an application under Rule 14 for a determination of rights under a commercial lease agreement.

The court held that the tenant was not entitled to a refund of a $24,000 ex gratia payment made to the landlord.

However, the court found the landlord had no grounds to take over management of the building and charge a 15% fee.

The court also determined that under the terms of the lease, the tenant was responsible for paying the depreciation of the HVAC units and the costs of installing roof drains, as these were operating costs and not inherent structural defects.

Claims regarding a breach of the duty of good faith were dismissed.

The offender pleaded guilty to second degree murder, attempted murder, and aggravated assault following a horrific, drug-fueled home invasion.

The court accepted a joint submission for a life sentence with parole ineligibility set at 18 years for the murder, along with concurrent sentences of 14 years for attempted murder and 6 years for aggravated assault.

The court weighed the extreme violence and premeditation against the offender's early guilty pleas, deep remorse, and lack of prior criminal record.

The Crown appealed a sentencing decision in which the trial judge rejected a joint submission to include the Partner Assault Response (PAR) program as a condition of the respondent's probation for domestic violence offences.

The trial judge provided no reasons for rejecting the joint submission and did not invite submissions from counsel.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge failed to explain how the joint submission was contrary to the public interest or would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The PAR program was added as a condition of probation.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment seeking recovery on a promissory note allegedly assigned to him.

The defendants argued that no valid assignment existed, that a later written assignment could not retroactively confer standing, and that the claim was barred by the Limitations Act.

The court held that although the statutory requirements for a legal assignment were not satisfied, an equitable assignment arose through conduct including a written demand and commencement of the action.

The equitable assignment was effective before the limitation period expired.

The court exercised its discretion to add the assignor as a party plaintiff nunc pro tunc and granted judgment.

The appellant lawyer appealed findings of professional misconduct and a six-month suspension imposed by the Law Society of Upper Canada.

The misconduct arose from his representation of a severely injured client and the client's spouse amidst family conflicts over care and property.

The lawyer was found to have acted in a conflict of interest, breached court orders, commissioned a misleading affidavit, and delayed a settlement to prevent a Law Society complaint.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Law Society Appeal Panel's decision reasonable and the penalty well within the appropriate range for the serious departure from professional standards.

The parties filed costs submissions following an interim spousal support motion.

The party seeking support sought $15,000 in costs, claiming 68 hours of work at $350 per hour, while the opposing party argued each side should bear their own costs due to divided success.

The court found the party seeking support was the successful party but noted the issues were not complex and the time claimed was disproportionate to the amounts in issue and the parties' financial means.

Applying Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules and the principle of proportionality, the court fixed the costs award at $4,500 inclusive of disbursements.

Following a judge-alone trial, the court convicted the accused on eight counts arising from prolonged physical and sexual abuse within a family setting.

The allegations involved repeated sexual assaults and grooming of a child complainant, administration of drugs to facilitate abuse, repeated physical assaults on another child with implements including a belt and stick, and an assault on the children's mother.

Applying the W.(D.) credibility framework, the court rejected the accused's evidence as unreliable and found the complainants' evidence credible and sufficiently reliable despite delayed disclosure and some imprecision about frequency.

The court held that the delayed reporting was reasonably explained by threats, shame, fear, and distrust of child protection and police authorities.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision.

The Board found that the respondent employer breached the collective agreement by subcontracting work to a non-unionized contractor, but denied an award of damages because the union suffered no loss, as only a non-union contractor was capable of performing the specialized work.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the Board's decision on remedy was owed deference and was not outside the range of reasonable outcomes.

The appellant appealed an eviction and rent arrears order made by the Landlord and Tenant Board, as well as a subsequent order upholding it on review.

The appellant argued she was a member of the housing co-operative, not a tenant, and that she had obtained money orders for the rent which were never cashed.

The Divisional Court found that the respondent's agent engaged in sharp practice at the review hearing by misrepresenting the appellant's position and the resolution of the jurisdictional issue.

The Court set aside both orders due to breaches of procedural fairness and natural justice.

The accused applied for bail review while facing robbery and manslaughter charges.

He argued that material changes in circumstances justified reconsideration of prior detention orders, including restricted access to disclosure in custody, new DNA evidence concerning a co‑accused, and an enhanced release plan involving substantial cash deposits, sureties, and potential electronic monitoring.

The court held that the proposed release plan was largely unchanged and that the new DNA evidence relating to the co‑accused was not materially relevant to the accused’s circumstances.

However, the court found the evidence concerning the accused’s limited access to disclosure in detention troubling and potentially relevant to the balancing of interests on the tertiary ground.

The bail review was adjourned to permit correctional authorities to address disclosure access issues before a final determination.

The plaintiff moved for summary judgment on a $70,000 promissory note assigned to him by his wholly-owned corporation.

The defendants opposed, arguing the assignment was invalid and raising a limitation period defence.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a full trial but adjourned the motion for further submissions on specific legal issues, including whether the action was statute-barred and the effect of a subsequent assignment executed after the action commenced.

On an interim motion for spousal support following a 26‑year marriage, the responding spouse sought support at the mid‑range of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines, retroactive payments, and life insurance security.

The court accepted entitlement to spousal support but addressed quantum by considering the payor’s income, mandatory pension deductions, and financial assistance provided to an adult child.

The court also imputed modest income to the recipient spouse due to a lack of efforts to seek employment following separation.

Applying the SSAG as a guide, the court fixed interim spousal support below the requested mid‑range amount and required life insurance security at a reduced level.

Retroactive support was declined on the interim motion and broader financial disclosure requests were limited as disproportionate.

The applicant brought a motion to strike several paragraphs from the respondent’s Answer in a family law proceeding on the basis that they were irrelevant, prejudicial, scandalous, and contrary to the rules of pleading.

The respondent sought leave to file an Amended Answer deleting some impugned paragraphs.

The court emphasized that family law pleadings must still comply with relevance principles despite the emotional nature of such disputes.

Several allegations, including references to pre‑marriage medical events and generalized abuse claims unrelated to relief sought, were struck as irrelevant.

Portions of one paragraph relating to the respondent’s diminished capacity to obtain employment were permitted with amendment because they related to the spousal support issues.

During a negligence jury trial arising from a boating accident causing severe injuries to a swimmer, the court was asked to determine the admissibility of statements allegedly made by homeowners acknowledging the danger of swimming behind their dock.

The defendants argued that the statements formed part of an apology and were therefore inadmissible under the Apology Act, 2009.

The court conducted a contextual analysis of the statements and held that expressions of regret must be excluded but that independent factual statements could remain admissible.

Portions containing apologies were ordered redacted while separate statements acknowledging prior warnings about the danger of swimming behind the dock were permitted as evidence.

The moving defendants brought a summary judgment motion seeking dismissal of the plaintiff’s reliance on the Negligence Act and a declaration that their liability was several rather than joint, following a partial settlement (Mary Carter) agreement between the plaintiff and a co-defendant boat operator.

The agreement capped the settling defendant’s liability and required the plaintiff to indemnify and hold that defendant harmless.

The moving defendants argued that the agreement altered the legal relationships among the parties and eliminated joint liability.

The court held that the agreement did not change the substantive liability framework and did not convert potential joint liability into several liability for the non-settling defendants.

The motion was dismissed.

The accused applied for bail while facing charges including first degree murder of a newborn child, concealing the body of a child, failing to obtain assistance in childbirth with intent to conceal birth, and failing to provide the necessaries of life.

The Crown opposed release relying primarily on the accused’s statement that she had suffocated the infant.

The court reviewed psychiatric evidence suggesting serious mental health concerns and the possible applicability of the infanticide provisions, as well as the absence of a determined cause of death and uncertainty whether the child was born alive.

Considering the tertiary ground under s. 515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code and the factors set out in R v St-Cloud, the court found the Crown’s case not strong and accepted a detailed release plan with family sureties and medical supervision.

Bail was granted subject to strict conditions including house arrest, psychiatric treatment, and supervision by sureties.

The applicant sought declarations regarding the interpretation of a limited partnership agreement governing a large residential land development project.

The dispute concerned whether partnership decisions required consensus between the two limited partners or could be determined by weighted voting based on ownership interests, and whether a subsequent agreement requiring equal allocation of residential building lots was enforceable.

The court held that the partnership agreement clearly permitted ordinary resolutions to be decided by a majority of votes weighted by ownership shares, giving the majority partner decision‑making authority.

However, the court also found that the later agreement requiring a 50‑50 division of residential building lots between the partners was valid and binding.

The court concluded that both agreements could operate together: decision‑making authority followed the ownership weighting while lot allocation remained equal under the later agreement.

The defendant sought leave to appeal a decision that set aside the administrative dismissal of the plaintiff's action.

The court applied the two-part test for leave to appeal under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found no conflicting decisions and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's application of the Reid principles.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed.