Thomas R. Lederer

On a summary judgment motion in a wrongful dismissal action, the court held that a series of annual teacher contracts and letters of appointment at a private school did not create fixed-term employment.

Reading the contracts as a whole, and construing ambiguity against the employer, the court found the arrangements contemplated ongoing employment and were contracts of indefinite duration.

The teachers were therefore entitled to common law reasonable notice.

Applying the Bardal factors in light of the school's financial instability, recurring enrolment uncertainty, and the teachers' awareness of that context, the court fixed notice at six months and rejected both mitigation-based reductions and claims for bad faith damages.

The tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision terminating his tenancy so the landlords' son could move into the unit.

The tenant argued the Board erred in law regarding the good faith requirement, maintenance breaches, human rights accommodation, and the landlords' corporate status.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's determinations on good faith and maintenance were unappealable questions of fact, the eviction was unrelated to the tenant's disabilities, and the individual landlords met the statutory definition of a landlord.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board finding him incapable of consenting to treatment with antipsychotic medication under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996.

The court considered whether the Board lacked jurisdiction due to panel composition, the proper legal test for capacity under s. 4(1) of the Act, the applicable standard of review, and whether the Board’s application of the test was reasonable.

The court held that tribunal expertise justified deference regardless of the individual qualifications of panel members and that the standard of review for the Board’s application of law to facts was reasonableness.

The Board reasonably concluded that although the appellant could understand relevant information, symptoms described as perseveration and grandiosity prevented him from appreciating the reasonably foreseeable consequences of refusing treatment.

The Board’s decision fell within a range of defensible outcomes and was upheld.

Following a trial where the Toronto Transit Commission (TTC) was found not liable for a streetcar accident involving a four-year-old child, the TTC sought its costs of the proceeding.

The court declined to award costs to the TTC, noting that the child could not be at fault and that the TTC, as a public service, should bear the costs of defending such claims where the injured party is not at fault.

The court also declined to award costs for the TTC's counterclaim against the child's parents, resulting in no order as to costs for any party.

The appellant was successful on an appeal of a Master's refusal to allow amendments to a Statement of Claim and sought costs.

The court awarded costs to the appellant for both the motion before the Master and the appeal, totaling $15,405.75.

However, the respondent successfully argued that the costs order should be stayed because the appellant had two outstanding costs orders against him in other proceedings totaling over $330,000.

The court stayed the costs order until the appellant paid the outstanding costs orders, noting that a party cannot seek the court's assistance while refusing to respect its previous orders.

The plaintiff appealed a Master's refusal ruling made during examinations for discovery in a wrongful dismissal action involving a senior trading employee.

The appeal challenged the Master's refusal to compel answers to certain discovery questions and requests for document production, including historical trading records, settlement negotiation materials, metadata, bonus pool information, and board approval materials for a deferred payment plan.

Applying the proportionality principles under the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court held that the requested production would be disproportionate or irrelevant and that the Master made no palpable or overriding error.

The court emphasized deference to Masters on discovery matters and reaffirmed that proportionality governs the scope of discovery.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendants sought leave to appeal an order continuing a Mareva injunction against them.

The injunction was largely based on information obtained by the plaintiff's counsel from the RCMP, which had received it from FINTRAC and US law enforcement.

The defendants argued this disclosure breached privacy laws.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of the lower court's conclusion that the RCMP's disclosure of personal information to a private lawyer for a civil fraud action was authorized under the Privacy Act and the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act.

The court also found the tension between privacy and access to information to be a matter of public importance.

An insurer appealed an arbitrator’s decision concerning a statutory loss transfer claim under the Insurance Act following payment of statutory accident benefits after a motor vehicle accident.

The appellant insurer argued the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002 began with the first request for indemnification and barred the claim because arbitration commenced more than two years later.

The court upheld the arbitrator’s conclusion that each request for indemnification creates a separate “rolling” limitation period that begins when the second‑party insurer fails to satisfy that request.

While the first request for indemnification was statute‑barred, later requests were within the limitation period and remained enforceable.

The court emphasized that loss transfer claims arise from statute rather than tort principles and are analogous to recurring contractual obligations.

The appellant appealed a Master's decision refusing leave to amend a Statement of Claim in a defamation action.

The proposed amendments sought to add specific defamatory words allegedly spoken by the respondent to the police.

The Master had ruled that adding the specific words constituted a new, statute-barred cause of action.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, applying a broader, factually-oriented approach to the definition of a 'cause of action'.

The Court found that the amendments were a continuation of the existing claim arising from the same factual matrix, and the respondent was not taken by surprise.

The moving party, Windlectric Inc., proposed a wind energy project on Amherst Island.

The Ministry of the Environment deemed the application complete, initiating the technical review phase.

The responding party, an association opposing the project, sought judicial review to quash the completeness determination, arguing the application lacked an adequate emergency response plan.

Windlectric brought a motion to quash the application for judicial review.

The Divisional Court granted the motion, finding that a completeness check is an administrative step, not a statutory power of decision or a matter subject to public law remedies.

The court also held that the application for judicial review was premature, as the administrative process and available appeals had not been exhausted.

Limited partners in a real estate partnership commenced an action alleging misconduct by accountants, a lawyer, and others in relation to unauthorized corporate changes and mortgages affecting partnership property.

After the action had been set down for trial, certain defendants indicated they would bring motions for summary judgment arguing the plaintiffs lacked standing because the alleged losses were those of the partnership.

The plaintiffs sought leave under Rule 48.04(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to bring a cross‑motion for summary judgment in response.

The court considered modern principles favouring broad access to summary judgment following Hryniak v. Mauldin and whether permitting the motion would promote a proportionate and efficient resolution.

Given that the defendants’ proposed motions could require extensive evidentiary responses and potentially raise broader issues, the court concluded that allowing the plaintiffs to bring their own motion could streamline the litigation.

Leave was therefore granted.

A four-year-old boy ran across a street mid-block and was struck by a TTC streetcar.

The plaintiffs sued the TTC and the streetcar operator for negligence.

Under s. 193(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, the defendants bore the onus of proving they were not negligent.

After hearing extensive expert evidence on accident reconstruction, perception-reaction times, and streetcar braking mechanics, the court concluded that the child ran into the streetcar's path too late for the operator to avoid the collision.

The defendants successfully rebutted the presumption of negligence, and the action was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by a professional association to withdraw him from its professional studies program for possessing unauthorized study notes during an examination.

The applicant argued he was denied procedural fairness because he was not given notice of the investigation or an opportunity to appear in person to show cause why the maximum penalty should not be imposed.

The Divisional Court granted the application, finding serious breaches of procedural fairness by both the initial decision-maker and the appeals committee, and held that the decisions were unreasonable.

The matter was remitted for a rehearing to allow the applicant to make submissions in person regarding the appropriate penalty.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) decision that approved ten minor variances for the responding parties' proposed home construction.

The moving party, a neighbour who had 'participant' status at the OMB hearing, argued the OMB's reasons were insufficient and failed to demonstrate it grappled with the issues.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding the OMB's reasons were sufficient given the brief, uncontested expert evidence presented at the hearing.

In obiter, the court noted that a 'participant' at an OMB hearing likely lacks standing to seek leave to appeal.

The appellants obtained a default judgment against the respondent, an undischarged bankrupt, after successfully moving to lift a bankruptcy stay and striking his pleadings without providing him notice.

The respondent successfully moved to set aside the default judgment.

The appellants appealed, arguing the bankrupt lacked standing under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to bring the motion to set aside and that he was not entitled to notice.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the bankrupt had standing to defend an action involving claims of fraud that would survive bankruptcy, and that he was entitled to notice of the motion to strike under the Rules of Civil Procedure once the stay was lifted.

Following a successful motion for leave to appeal an order refusing to strike conspiracy claims alleged to merge with fraud claims, the moving defendants sought $20,052.74 in costs.

The court considered the reasonableness of the time spent on research, drafting materials, and waiting time for the motion to be heard.

The judge held that the requested amount was excessive, particularly given that much of the work had already been completed for the initial motion and that waiting time in court should not generally be borne by the losing party.

Balancing the complexity of the legal issue with proportionality considerations, the court awarded a reduced amount.

Costs were fixed at $9,500 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) decision that awarded her $5,000 for discrimination.

The applicant argued the award was unreasonable because it did not compensate her for lost wages akin to a wrongful dismissal claim.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the HRTO's award was based on a procedural failing in the duty to accommodate and was distinct from common law wrongful dismissal damages.

Applying the reasonableness standard of review, the court found the HRTO's decision fell within the range of possible, acceptable, and defensible outcomes.

Following a trial in which the plaintiff bank succeeded in obtaining judgment against one defendant for fraud and under a personal guarantee, the court addressed competing claims for costs.

The bank sought substantial indemnity costs exceeding $600,000, while certain defendants who successfully defended fraud allegations sought substantial indemnity costs for both trial and a prior Mareva injunction motion.

The court found that the bank had overstated and pursued broad allegations of fraud despite prior judicial warnings, unnecessarily lengthening the litigation.

Costs were therefore limited to partial indemnity and further reduced under Rule 57 for litigation conduct.

After applying equitable set‑off against costs awarded to two defendants, the court ordered one defendant to pay net costs to the bank.

The applicant, a Justice of the Peace, sought judicial review of a decision by the Justices of the Peace Review Council regarding his inappropriate conduct.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application primarily due to an unexplained 18-month delay in bringing the proceeding.

The court also considered the merits, finding no procedural unfairness in the complaint or investigation process, and rejecting the applicant's claim of ineffective counsel, noting there is no right to effective counsel in civil proceedings.

The defendants sought leave to appeal an order refusing to strike a conspiracy claim pleaded alongside fraud in an action by an insurer alleging fraudulent statutory accident benefit claims.

The defendants argued that the conspiracy claim merged with the underlying fraud and was redundant.

The court reviewed conflicting authorities regarding the doctrine of merger at the pleadings stage, including cases distinguishing between conspiracy based on a predominant intent to injure and conspiracy based on unlawful means.

The motion judge had declined to strike the claim and left the issue of merger to trial.

The court found reason to doubt the correctness of that decision and held that the broader question of whether merger can ever be applied at the pleadings stage was an issue of general importance.

Leave to appeal was therefore granted.