Massa v. Sualim, 2014 ONSC 5171

CITATION: Massa v. Sualim, 2014 ONSC 5171

DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NOS.: 214/14 & 223/14

DATE: 20140912

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO

DIVISIONAL COURT

RE: LEON MASSA Plaintiff/Respondent

AND:

ALEX SUALIM, SANDRA SUALIM, SANDRA OLUWOLFE-AINA, 2078749 ONTARIO LTD., BAUHAUS HOME BUILDER LTD. AND OZILI INC. Defendants/Applicants

BEFORE: Mr. Justice Lederer

COUNSEL: Ruth Promislow, for the Plaintiff/Respondent Claudio R. Aiello, for Sandra Sualim, Sandra Oluwiole-Aina, Defendant/Applicant Nicholas C. Tibollo, for Alex Sualim, 2078749 Ontario Ltd., Bauhaus Home Builder Ltd. and Ozili Inc., Defendants/Applicants

HEARD: June 19, 2014

ENDORSEMENT

INTRODUCTION

[1] This is a motion for leave to appeal an order granting the motion of the plaintiff to continue a Mareva injunction which had initially been granted ex parte; that is, without notice to, or participation of, the defendants. The injunction was granted by an order of Mr. Justice Stinson on December 5, 2013. It was continued and re-stated by him on December 12, 2013. On December 20, 2013, as a result of a motion brought by the defendant, Sandra Sualim, an order was made by Mr. Justice Morgan capping the value of the injunction at $1.6 million. On January 24, 2014, the parties (all of them) appeared before Madam Justice Stewart to determine if the injunction should be continued on its merits. This was joined by a motion to strike parts of the material filed in support of the injunction. The motion to strike was dismissed and the injunction continued. It is that order which the defendants seek leave to appeal.

[2] At the same time, the moving parties, the defendants in the action, seek to produce fresh evidence in response to an adverse inference they say the judge drew from the absence of any evidence to challenge the merits of the claim.

BACKGROUND

[3] In the underlying action, the plaintiff, Leon Massa, says he was the victim of a fraud. He believes the fraud was perpetrated by the defendant, Alex Sualim. Leon Massa has never met or spoken to Alex Sualim. There is no correspondence or other communication between them through which Alex Sualim was identified to Leon Massa. Leon Massa took part in what he understood was a venture to distribute silicon germanium, a semi-conductor product used in computer chips. In furtherance of his participation, Leon Massa wired funds pursuant to instructions received by e-mail. Leon Massa says he advanced and lost $840,000.

[4] In granting the injunction, Mr. Justice Stinson noted that Leon Massa had never met Alex Sualim. Despite this, he found that there was strong circumstantial evidence to support the conclusion that Alex Sualim was the fraudster or otherwise complicit in the fraudulent activity of which Leon Massa was a victim. On this basis, he concluded that there was a strong prima facie case that Leon Massa had been defrauded by Alex Sualim. In coming to this conclusion, Mr. Justice Stinson relied on “… extensive materials furnished by American law enforcement authorities”[^1]. It would appear that the means by which this information became available to Leon Massa or his counsel was not discussed with the judge. There is a duty on a party seeking an ex parte injunction to bring forward all relevant information. I do not say that the duty was breached. I only observe that, in the circumstances, it would have been better if the means by which the information relied on had been raised with Mr. Justice Stinson and the legislation directed to the protection of privacy reviewed.

[5] Sandra Sualim is the wife of Alex Sualim. At the hearing before Mr. Justice Morgan, heard on December 20, 2013, her counsel sought an order to cross-examine Jim Patterson, senior counsel acting on behalf of Leon Massa.[^2] A memorandum of the FBI, produced in the record, indicated that, on November 5, 2013, Jim Patterson had called an investigator with the FBI indicating that he had obtained a copy of the indictment against Alex Sualim and that he intended to pursue a Mareva injunction on behalf of Leon Massa and “other victims of Sualim’s fraudulent scheme”. According to the memorandum, Jim Patterson told the investigator that “…any information he would uncover during the course of his civil investigation could be turned over to law enforcement agencies.” Apparently, Jim Patterson also told the investigator that he had worked with the RCMP on fraud cases.[^3]

[6] In making the submission to cross-examine Jim Patterson, counsel for Sandra Sualim was concerned that information about Alex Sualim had been disclosed illegally and, if it was, should be expunged from the record.[^4] The request to cross-examine was refused. An affidavit from a litigation assistant identified documents that had been received from the RCMP. He was to be cross-examined and was “… more likely to be able to relay the mechanics of how [the information] was obtained and is less likely to offer any glimpse of the legal advice or legal theory behind obtaining that report”.[^5] The material produced on the motion before me provides some parts of the transcript and the refusals on the cross-examination. On a number of occasions, the litigation assistant refused to answer questions on the basis of “litigation privilege”. Some of these questions reflect on how the information was obtained.[^6] I shall return to this shortly.

[7] The Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Center of Canada (“FINTRAC”) was established by the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act.[^7] It “acts at arm’s length from law enforcement agencies and other agencies to which it is authorized to disclose information”. It “collects, analyzes, assesses and discloses information in order to assist in the detection, prevention and deterrence of money laundering and of the financing of terrorist activities”.[^8] If FINTRAC, based on its analysis and assessment, has reasonable grounds to suspect that designated information would be relevant to investigating or prosecuting a money laundering offence or a terrorist activity financing offence, it is directed to disclose the information to, among others, the “appropriate police force”.[^9]

[8] The affidavit of the litigation assistant was sworn on December 3, 2013. It exhibits some, if not all, of the “extensive material furnished by American law enforcement authorities” relied on by Mr. Justice Stinson in finding that there was a strong prima facie case that it was Alex Sualim who had defrauded Leon Massa. Included in the material, on letterhead of FINTRAC, is a “Disclosure Summary”, which indicates that the disclosure was being made in accordance with the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act. The Disclosure Summary is not dated. The affidavit indicates that the law firm received the documents from the RCMP. Among the documents delivered were an Arrest Warrant and Criminal Complaint sworn on October 24, 2013 and an indictment against Alex Sulamin. The indictment asserts that Alex Sualmin and others defrauded some U.S. residents under U.S. law. None of the charges pertain to Leon Massa and he is not named in the Complaint or, apparently, in the supporting affidavit sworn by a Special Agent, Uriah Compton.[^10]

[9] Following his cross-examination, the litigation assistant, in answering a question that had been taken “Under Advisement”, advised that, on November 1, 2013, the RCMP provided the law firm with the documents attached as exhibits to the affidavit of the litigation assistant.[^11] In response to an undertaking given at his cross-examination, the litigation assistant advised that the Criminal Complaint was received by the RCMP from the FBI on November 6, 2013 and was sent on the same day by the RCMP to Jim Patterson.[^12] There appears to be some inconsistency in this since the Criminal Complaint was included as part of Exhibit A to the affidavit of the litigation assistant and, on that basis, would have already been delivered on November 1, 2013. Be that as it may, it seems that FINTRAC, having received the material from authorities in the United States and relying on the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act, delivered it to the RCMP who, in turn, passed it on to Jim Patterson. The defendants do not question the delivery of the material to the RCMP; it was an “appropriate police force”.[^13] The issue is whether the RCMP was authorized to send this material on to the law firm acting on behalf of Leon Massa or whether it breached Alex Sualim’s right to privacy when it did so. This question was put to Madam Justice Stewart. She was asked to expunge the Motion Record of the FINTRAC documents, as well as the affidavit of the Special Agent, Uriah Compton. She refused the request. She concluded:

In my opinion, there is nothing improper in the disclosure by the RCMP of personal information regarding an accused fraudster to assist the Crown with the criminal prosecution of a fraud or to assist a victim of that crime in seeking recovery. There is no evidence before the court to suggest that disclosure was not consistent with that purpose.[^14]

[10] It is this finding that is the foundation of the appeal the defendants seek leave to bring.

THE TEST FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL

[11] As is well-known, and as all three facta filed repeat, the test on a motion for leave to appeal is set by r. 62.02(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule sets two alternative, independent grounds:

Leave to appeal shall not be granted unless,

(a) there is a conflicting decision by another judge or court in Ontario or elsewhere on the matter involved in the proposed appeal and it is, in the opinion of the judge hearing the motion, desirable that leave to appeal be granted; or

(b) there appears to the judge hearing the motion good reason to doubt the correctness of the order in question and the proposed appeal involves matters of such importance that, in his or her opinion, leave to appeal should be granted.

[12] For the purpose of these reasons, it is enough that I consider the second basis for leave to appeal (r. 62.02(4)(b)). To demonstrate that there is good reason to doubt the correctness of the order does not require a moving party to show that the order is wrong. One need only show that that the correctness of the decision is open to very serious debate.[^15] To show that the issues have the requisite importance, it is not enough that they be important to the litigants. They should engage matters of public importance and matters relevant to the development of the law and the administration of justice.

ANALYSIS

(a) Privacy

[13] I begin by observing that the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act does not limit the duty it imposes on FINTRAC to disclose the information it collects to the agencies it identifies.[^16] However, among its objects is the direction to ensure “…that personal information under its control is protected from unauthorized disclosure”.[^17] This augments the more general protection found in the Privacy Act:[^18]

8. (1) Personal information under the control of a government institution shall not, without the consent of the individual to whom it relates, be disclosed by the institution except in accordance with this section.[^19]

[14] “Personal information” is defined at s. 3 of the Privacy Act and includes, among other things:

...information about an identifiable individual that is recorded in any form including, without restricting the generality of the foregoing,

(b) information relating to the education or the medical, criminal or employment history of the individual or information relating to financial transactions in which the individual has been involved,

[Emphasis added]

[15] The principal exceptions to the protection against disclosure are found in subsection 8(2) of the Privacy Act. Of particular relevance to this case is the following:

(2) Subject to any other Act of Parliament, personal information under the control of a government institution may be disclosed

(a) for the purpose for which the information was obtained or compiled by the institution or for a use consistent with that purpose…[^20]

[16] The Privacy Act, s. 3 includes a definition of “government institution”. Both FINTRAC and the RCMP are “government institutions” and are identified as such in a schedule attached to the legislation.

[17] In summary, insofar as it applies to this case, the Privacy Act prohibits government institutions like FINTRAC and the RCMP from disclosing personal information which would include the criminal history and financial transactions unless the individual involved consents or the disclosure was for the purpose for which the information was obtained or for a use consistent with that purpose. This assists in understanding the parameters of “unauthorized disclosure” as referred to in the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act.[^21]

[18] In this case, the issue is whether or not the RCMP was authorized to disclose the information concerning Alex Sualim to the lawyer. On this understanding, there is serious reason to question whether the release of the information to which objection is taken can be justified as being “for the purpose for which the information was obtained,”[^22] expressed by Madam Justice Stewart as “to assist the crown with a criminal prosecution of a fraud.”[^23] It may be that FINTRAC disclosed the information to the RCMP in accordance with the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act, s. 55(3).[^24] That does not necessarily mean that its release by the RCMP was consistent with that purpose. Leon Massa is alleged to have been the victim of a fraud. The lawyer is interested in recovering what was apparently lost as part of that fraud. Fraud does not necessarily entail money laundering or terrorist activity. To my mind, there is little, if anything, in the stated objective of the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act that responds to the concerns that are the basis of the action brought by Leon Massa:

3. The object of this Act is

(a) to implement specific measures to detect and deter money laundering and the financing of terrorist activities and to facilitate the investigation and prosecution of money laundering offences and terrorist activity financing offences, including

(i) establishing record keeping and client identification requirements for financial services providers and other persons or entities that engage in businesses, professions or activities that are susceptible to being used for money laundering or the financing of terrorist activities,

(ii) requiring the reporting of suspicious financial transactions and of cross-border movements of currency and monetary instruments, and

(iii) establishing an agency that is responsible for ensuring compliance with Parts 1 and 1.1 and for dealing with reported and other information;

(b) to respond to the threat posed by organized crime by providing law enforcement officials with the information they need to deprive criminals of the proceeds of their criminal activities, while ensuring that appropriate safeguards are put in place to protect the privacy of persons with respect to personal information about themselves;

(c) to assist in fulfilling Canada’s international commitments to participate in the fight against transnational crime, particularly money laundering, and the fight against terrorist activity; and

(d) to enhance Canada’s capacity to take targeted measures to protect its financial system and to facilitate Canada’s efforts to mitigate the risk that its financial system could be used as a vehicle for money laundering and the financing of terrorist activities.

[19] It may also be that the lawyer advised the FBI that “as a representative of the victims, any information he would uncover during the course of his civil investigation could be turned over to law enforcement agencies”[^25]. This does not make him an “appropriate police force”[^26] or an adjunct to one.

[20] The question that remains is whether the disclosure was “for a use consistent with that purpose,”[^27] expressed by Madam Justice Stewart as “to assist a victim of that crime in seeking recovery”.[^28] What crime? In the United States, Alex Sualim has not been found guilty of anything. He has only been charged. Apparently, Leon Massa is not named in the U.S. Complaint or in the supporting affidavit sworn by the Special Agent, Uriah Compton.[^29] The factum filed in the name of Sandra Sualim indicates that the lawyer prosecuting the criminal case in the United States has indicated, in open court, that he has no proof connecting any assets in the possession of Alex Sualim to any money obtained by fraud.[^30] In the factum, it is said that the judge has suggested that, based on what she has been told by the prosecutor, it does not seem that the case against Alex Sualim is a strong one.[^31] Unhappily, no authority for these assertions is provided. I have not found any document or transcript that confirms these observations. I do not rely on them as established facts. I only point out that the suggestion or allegation that these statements were made underscores the importance of noting that the fact of a charge does not establish the presence of a crime.

[21] In this case, having reviewed the material with which he was provided, Mr. Justice Stinson concluded there was a strong prima facie case that Leon Massa was defrauded by Alex Sualim. On that basis, he granted the Mareva injunction.[^32] To my mind, there is a serious question as whether the justification for the release of the documents by the RCMP to a lawyer to be used in a civil matter is properly established by a subsequent finding of a prima facie case in the civil proceeding. For one thing, the burden of proof is different. The reasons of Madam Justice Stewart depend on the presence of a crime, but there is a serious question as to whether this can be taken as having been established by a finding that is based on the civil standard (balance of probabilities) as opposed to the criminal standard (beyond a reasonable doubt). Under the legislation relied on, in the absence of a crime, there can be no justification for the release of the material to a lawyer for the purpose of pursuing a civil fraud. In such circumstance, its release is not for a purpose consistent with the use for which it was obtained.

[22] Finally, the judge relied on the fact that there was no evidence in the record suggesting that disclosure was not consistent with the purpose for which it was obtained. I say only that, to me, it would be surprising if, once material was released, it fell to a party questioning the decision that it be disclosed to prove that the release was not consistent with the purpose for which it was obtained. The fundamental question is whether the release is demonstrated to be for such a purpose. This requires a positive demonstration by those who made or rely on the disclosure. To me, there is a serious question as to whether, in this case, the conditions for disclosure were present.

(b) Access to Information

[23] There is another side to the issue. It is one thing to recognize that personal information should not be generally available. There is a competing concern. Government institutions should not be able to arbitrarily withhold information from the individuals it touches, implicates or comments on. It is equally troubling if government institutions withhold, for their own purposes, information which otherwise could be and should be made available to the public. The Privacy Act begins the response to this second side of the issue of the treatment of information held by government institutions. The Privacy Act does not stand by itself. It works in conjunction with the Access to Information Act.[^33]

[24] Under both the Privacy Act and the Access to Information Act, Canadian citizens have a right to access to information held by a government institution. Under the former, they have a right to access to personal information:

12. (1) Subject to this Act, every individual who is a Canadian citizen or a permanent resident within the meaning of subsection 2(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act has a right to and shall, on request, be given access to

(a) any personal information about the individual contained in a personal information bank; and

(b) any other personal information about the individual under the control of a government institution with respect to which the individual is able to provide sufficiently specific information on the location of the information as to render it reasonably retrievable by the government institution.

[25] Under the latter, the right to access is broader:

4. (1) Subject to this Act, but notwithstanding any other Act of Parliament, every person who is

(a) a Canadian citizen, or

(b) a permanent resident within the meaning of subsection 2(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act,

has a right to and shall, on request, be given access to any record under the control of a government institution.

[26] This right includes, but is not restricted to, “personal information”.

[27] Both statutes provide that access may be given following a request that is to be “…made in writing to the government institution that has control of”, in one case, the “the personal information”[^34] and, in the other, “the record…”[^35] In this case, no such request was made.

[28] Under the Access to Information Act, the head of the government institution that receives such a request, in certain circumstances, is required to refuse to disclose the record being sought:

13. (1) Subject to subsection (2), the head of a government institution[^36] shall refuse to disclose any record requested under this Act that contains information that was obtained in confidence from

(a) the government of a foreign state or an institution thereof;

(b) an international organization of states or an institution thereof;

(c) the government of a province or an institution thereof;

(d) a municipal or regional government established by or pursuant to an Act of the legislature of a province or an institution of such a government; or

(e) an aboriginal government.

[Emphasis added]

[29] Under the Access to Information Act, the head of the government institution that receives such a request, in certain circumstances, has discretion whether or not to refuse to disclose the record being sought:

16. (1) The head of a government institution may refuse to disclose any record requested under this Act that contains

(a) information obtained or prepared by any government institution, or part of any government institution, that is an investigative body[^37] specified in the regulations in the course of lawful investigations pertaining to

(i) the detection, prevention or suppression of crime,

(ii) the enforcement of any law of Canada or a province, or

(iii) activities suspected of constituting threats to the security of Canada within the meaning of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act,

if the record came into existence less than twenty years prior to the request;

(b) information relating to investigative techniques or plans for specific lawful investigations;

(c) information the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to be injurious to the enforcement of any law of Canada or a province or the conduct of lawful investigations, including, without restricting the generality of the foregoing, any such information

(i) relating to the existence or nature of a particular investigation,

(ii) that would reveal the identity of a confidential source of information, or

(iii) that was obtained or prepared in the course of an investigation; or

(d) information the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to be injurious to the security of penal institutions.[^38]

[Emphasis added]

[30] Under the Access to Information Act, the head of the government institution that receives a request to disclose a record that contains personal information is required to refuse the request except for certain circumstances where the head has discretion whether or not to refuse to disclose the record being sought:

19. (1) Subject to subsection (2), the head of a government institution shall refuse to disclose any record requested under this Act that contains personal information as defined in section 3 of the Privacy Act.

(2) The head of a government institution may disclose any record requested under this Act that contains personal information if

(a) the individual to whom it relates consents to the disclosure;

(b) the information is publicly available; or

(c) the disclosure is in accordance with section 8 of the Privacy Act.

[Emphasis added]

[31] The effect of s. 19 of the Access to Information Act is to incorporate the restrictions on the disclosure of personal information found in the Privacy Act.

[32] As in the Access to Information Act, in the Privacy Act, there are situations where the head of the government institution is required to refuse access to the personal information[^39] and others where there is discretion as to whether the personal information should be disclosed.[^40]

[33] The general observation is that, in certain circumstances, the head of the government institution must refuse to disclose. In other circumstances, there is discretion and a judgment to be made. In this case, by disclosing the information without requiring a written request, the RCMP has sidestepped the responsibility of the “head of the government institution” to make the determinations required to decide if the information delivered to Jim Patterson should have been disclosed. The significance of this is underscored by reference to s. 16(1) of the Access to Information Act (see: para. [29], above). As a result of its terms, the head of a government institution that receives a request has discretion to refuse to disclose information arising from a lawful investigation that pertains to the enforcement of any law of Canada. The “head” of the RCMP is the Solicitor General of Canada[^41]. There is no suggestion that any holder of this office was involved in whatever decision was made to deliver the FINTRAC information to the lawyer. There is no way of knowing how the Solicitor General would have exercised this discretion had a request for its disclosure been made or how the terms of the Privacy Act would have impacted on any decision taken. There is a process set out for a determination of whether the RCMP should have released the information. The process was ignored. To my mind, this confirms that there is serious reason to question the correctness of the decision for which leave to appeal is requested.

CONCLUSION

[34] At its root, the question this case asks is whether the release of information to a private lawyer, for use in a civil action, can be justified as consistent with the purpose for which the information was obtained, particularly in the absence of a request to, and consideration by, the “head of a government institution”. Since the information disclosed contributed in a substantive way to the granting and sustaining of the Mareva injunction, it stands to reason that, if it should not have been released, there will be reason to doubt the correctness of the decision that it be sustained.

[35] For the reasons reviewed, I find that there is good reason to doubt the correctness of the order for which leave to appeal is requested.

[36] I turn now to the second element of the test. I have little difficulty in finding that establishing how the tension between privacy, on the one hand, and access to information, on the other, is to be resolved is important, even fundamental, to the relationship of Canadian citizens and residents to our government institutions. The proposed appeal involves matters of such importance that leave to appeal should be granted.

[37] For the reasons reviewed herein, leave to appeal is granted.

ADDITIONAL MATTERS

[38] The Amended Amended Notice of Motion for Leave to Appeal includes the request for an order permitting the defendants to file fresh evidence. This concerns the filing of an affidavit, which is intended to respond to what the defendants say is the “adverse inference” drawn by Madam Justice Stewart on the basis that there was no evidence provided contradicting or explaining the information supplied by the plaintiff. Little was said about this. In any event, it should be left to the panel hearing the appeal to determine whether to consider this evidence.

[39] Finally, I note that the RCMP was not present in court and has not taken part in any of the other appearances. It is not clear to me if it has been served with any of the material. At this point, their procedures and actions may, in some measure, be implicated in the appeal. They should be served with the material on the appeal. Whether the RCMP appears and seeks to intervene is up to it. Whether the RCMP would be heard or permitted to intervene is for the panel hearing the appeal to decide.

COSTS

[40] Pursuant to the agreement of counsel, costs are ordered paid by the plaintiff to counsel for Sandra Sualim in the amount of $8,000 and to counsel for Alex Sualim, 2078749 Ontario Ltd., Bauhaus Home Builder Ltd., and Ozili Inc. in the amount of $4,000.

LEDERER J.

Date: 20140912

[^1]: Massa v. Sualim 2013 ONSC 7520, at paras. 5 and 6. [^2]: see: Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 39.03(1). [^3]: Massa v. Sualim 2013 ONSC 7926, at para. 32. [^4]: Ibid, at para. 35. [^5]: Ibid, at para. 40. [^6]: for example, litigation assistant was asked: To provide full particulars of any communications, direct or indirect, between Bennett Jones and the FBI, the RCMP, or any other law enforcement organization or personnel with respect to this matter, through to the date of the hearing of this injunction (January 24th). The answer given was: Other than what has already been disclosed, Mr. Daves has no knowledge about any such communication and in any event such information would be subject to litigation privilege. [^7]: S.C. 2000, c. 17 at s. 40. [^8]: Ibid, at s. 40(a) and (b). [^9]: Ibid, at s. 55 (3)(a). [^10]: I say apparently because there does not appear to be a copy of this affidavit in the record placed before me on this motion. [^11]: Compendium of Evidence, at Tab D. [^12]: Factum of the Defendants/Applicants, Alex Sulamin, 2078749 Ontario Ltd., Bauhaus Homebuilder Ltd. and Ozili Inc., at para. 12; and, Factum of Sandra Sualim, at para. 14. [^13]: Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act, s. 55 (3)(a) (as referred to above at fn. 9). [^14]: Massa v. Sualim 2014 ONSC 2103, at para. 35. [^15]: Ash v. Lloyd’s Corp., 1992 7652 (ON SC), [1992] O.J. 894 (Gen. Div.), 8 O.R. (3d) 282, where Farley J. said: I confirm that as to the first prong I do not need to conclude that the decision was wrong or probably wrong (Canadian Egg Marketing Agency v. Sunnylea Foods Ltd. (1977), 3 C.P.C. 348 (Ont. H.C.J.)) or that I would, if hearing the original motion, have decided it otherwise. The threshold of this prong is that I be satisfied that the correctness of the order is open to very serious debate (Germond v. Avco Financial Services Canada Ltd., an unreported decision of the General Division, per Misener J., dated August 5, 1991 [summarized at 28 A.C.W.S. (3d) 564]). [^16]: See: fn. 7, at s. 55(3). [^17]: See fn. 7, at s. 40(c). [^18]: R.S.C., 1985, c. P-21. [^19]: S. 7 of the Privacy Act contains a similar injunction against the “use” of personal information by a government institution. [^20]: A similar exception is part of s. 7 of the Privacy Act. It is found at clause 7 (a). The exceptions found in s. 8(2) also applies to s. 7 as a result of the operation of clause 7(b). [^21]: See para. [13], above and the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act, (fn. 7); s. 40(c) fn. 14. [^22]: See: the Privacy Act s. 8(2)(a), quoted at para. [15], above. [^23]: Massa v. Sualim, supra, (fn. 14) (Stewart), at para. 35. [^24]: See para. [8], above and fn. 9. [^25]: FINTRAC Disclosure Summary re: Alex Sualim, Sandra Sualim, 2078749 Ontario Ltd., Bauhaus Home Builders Ltd. and Ozili Inc., at p. 1 of 11. [^26]: Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act, (fn. 7), s. 55(3)(a). [^27]: See: the Privacy Act, s. 8(2)(a), quoted at para. [15], above. [^28]: Massa v. Sualim, supra, (fn.13) (Stewart), at para. 35. [^29]: I say “Apparently” because this is what the Factum of Sandra Sualim says at para. 9; however, only extracts of the Indictment are reproduced in the record. These extracts include “Selected Victim (And Attempted Victim) Summaries”. None of these refer to Leon Massa. On the other hand, there is a document referred to as an “Unsigned Synopsis” which contains a list of victims, one of which is Leon Massa. I do not know what this is, where it comes from or whether it was exhibited to one of the affidavits. Again, the record does not appear to include a copy of the “Compton Affidavit.” (see fn. 10). [^30]: Factum of Sandra Sualim, at para 9. [^31]: Ibid, at para. 52, [^32]: This was referred to and relied on by Madam Justice Stewart at para. 12 of her reasons. [^33]: R.S.C., 1985, c. A-1. [^34]: Privacy Act, (fn. 16), at s. 13(1). [^35]: Access to Information Act, (fn. 20), at s. 4. [^36]: “Head” in respect of government institution is defined in the Access to Information Act, s. 3. [^37]: The Privacy Regulations (SOR/83-508) s. 5 and Schedules II, III and IV provide lists of investigative bodies for the purposes of the Privacy Act, paragraphs 8(2)(e), 22(1)(a) and s. 23. Each list includes, as an investigative body, the RCMP. Both paragraphs 8(2)(e) and 22(1)(a) deal with discretion to disclose information for the purposes of enforcing Canadian law or carrying out a lawful investigation. [^38]: The Access to Information Act contains more examples where the head of a government institution may refuse to disclose a request at s. 16(2) and (3). [^39]: See Privacy Act: sections 19(1), 22(2), 22.1(1), 22.2 and 22.3 (1). [^40]: Ibid, at sections 18(2), 20, 21, 22(1), 23 and 24. [^41]: Privacy Act Heads of Government Institutions Designation Order (SI/83-114).