CITATION: Moniz v. Williams, 2015 ONSC 126
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 124/14
DATE: 20150106
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE DIVISIONAL COURT
SPENCE, SACHS AND LEDERER JJ.
BETWEEN:
ANTONIO MONIZ and MARIA MONIZ Landlords (Respondents in Appeal)
– and –
STEPHEN WILLIAMS Tenant (Appellant)
David S. Strashin, for the Landlords (Respondents in Appeal) Joseph H. Kary, for the Tenant (Appellant)
HEARD at Toronto: January 6, 2015
SACHS J. (ORALLY)
1The appellant/tenant appeals from two decisions of the Landlord and Tenant Board (“the Board”) granting the respondent landlords an order terminating his tenancy and evicting him under s. 48 of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 17 (“the Act”).
2The appellant appeals both the initial decision of the Board dated October 23, 2013 and the review order dated October 31, 2013. Before bringing this appeal, the appellant also applied for a Board initiated review of the order which was denied on February 17, 2014.
3Section 210 of the Act provides that an appellant’s right of appeal from a decision of the Board is only on a question of law.
4The appellant appeals on the basis of what he alleges are four questions of law:
(i) The evidence before the Board did not meet the threshold required by s.48 of the Act for the termination of a tenancy, namely, that the landlord in good faith required possession of the unit for the purpose of residential occupancy by the landlord’s child. In particular, the landlords’ son failed to file an affidavit that contained the certification referred to in s. 72(1) of the Act.
(ii) The termination should have been refused because the landlords were in serious breach of their duty to maintain the residential premises.
(iii) The Board failed to consider whether there was an obligation to accommodate the tenant under the Human Rights Code.
(iv) The Board failed to consider the fact that the premises were owned by a corporation which cannot have children and therefore cannot terminate for any reason involving children.
The Good Faith Requirement
5If the appellant is submitting that the landlords’ son’s affidavit is deficient because it fails to use the words “in good faith”, accepting this submission would be to treat the requirement set out at s. 72(1) of the Act as one of form rather than one of substance.
6In this case the Board had an affidavit from the landlords’ son that he was moving into the premises in question and speaking to why he was doing so. The Board also had evidence from Mr. and Mrs. Moniz. The Board weighed the evidence and came to the conclusion that it was satisfied that the son in good faith required the premises and the landlords in good faith required possession of the rental unit. This was a question of fact, not a question of law and therefore the Board’s conclusion on this issue cannot be appealed.
Breach of the Duty to Maintain
7The same is true of the finding by the Board that the landlords were not in serious breach of their duty to properly maintain the premises. The Board heard the evidence, weighed the evidence and made factual findings in respect of that evidence.
8In doing so, it considered, as it was entitled to, the impact of the alleged breach on the tenant. In this regard, it is important to note that the City closed its file on the matter.
The Human Rights Code
9This case raises no issue of a duty to accommodate under the Human Rights Code. The termination of the tenancy had nothing to do with the tenant’s disabilities. Rather, the landlords required the premises for the use of their son.
10Furthermore, it is clear that to the extent the appellant’s disabilities were relevant, they were considered by the Board and formed one of the bases for its decision to delay the termination of the tenancy.
The Fact that the Landlord is a Corporation
11According to the appellant, because a corporation cannot have children, it cannot evict for the purposes of moving in a child.
12This submission ignores the fact that the definition of landlord in s. 2 of the Act includes “any other person who permits occupancy of a rental unit”. In this case, it is clear that Antonio and Maria Moniz were the people who permitted the tenant to occupy the unit. They were the people the tenant dealt with. In fact, the tenant did not even raise the fact that his landlord was a corporation in the initial hearing before the Board. This is consistent with the evidence before the Board that the people he saw as permitting him to occupy the premises were Mr. and Mrs. Moniz.
Conclusion
13For these reasons, the appeal is dismissed.
SPENCE J.
COSTS
14I have endorsed the back of the Appeal Book, “For oral reasons given, appeal dismissed. Costs of $1,500 payable to the respondent for today plus the $1,500 agreed for the matter before Nordheimer J., all inclusive. Approved by the appellant with the form and content of the order is dispensed with.
___________________________ SACHS J.
SPENCE J.
LEDERER J.
Date of Reasons for Judgment: January 6, 2015
Date of Release: January 21, 2015
CITATION: Moniz v. Williams, 2015 ONSC 126
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 124/14 DATE: 20150106
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
SPENCE, SACHS AND LEDERER JJ.
BETWEEN:
ANTONIO MONIZ and MARIA MONIZ Landlords (Respondents in Appeal)
– and –
STEPHEN WILLIAMS Tenant (Appellant)
ORAL REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
SACHS J.
Date of Reasons for Judgment: January 6, 2015
Date of Release: January 21, 2015