Susan Magotiaux

The appellant appealed his conviction on the ground that the trial judge's numerous and discourteous interventions during the trial rendered it unfair.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the interventions undermined defence counsel's integrity and interfered with his ability to cross-examine police officers effectively.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellants were convicted of two counts of first degree murder following a lengthy trial.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of three unsavoury witnesses, including a jailhouse informant.

On appeal, the appellants sought to introduce fresh evidence of post-trial recantations by two of these witnesses and argued that the trial judge made several errors, including failing to give an adequate Vetrovec warning and improperly admitting highly prejudicial evidence of a prior manslaughter conviction.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence of one witness's recantation and found that the trial judge erred in his Vetrovec warning and evidentiary rulings.

The cumulative effect of these errors warranted a new trial.

The appeal was allowed and the convictions were quashed.

The appellant was convicted of dangerous driving causing death and bodily harm after losing control of his vehicle while speeding on a wet road.

He appealed his convictions, arguing his s. 11(b) Charter rights were violated and the Attorney General lacked authority to prefer the indictment under s. 577 of the Criminal Code after his committal was quashed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, agreeing with the trial judge's analysis.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed, as the trial judge erred in principle regarding the appropriateness of a conditional sentence.

The sentence was reduced from two years less a day to 15 months imprisonment.

The appellant appealed his convictions on the basis of unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter and the admissibility of evidence seized pursuant to a wiretap authorization and search warrants.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge reasonably applied the Morin framework to find no s. 11(b) violation.

The Court also upheld the wiretap authorization, finding that jailhouse telephones are not places ordinarily used by solicitors under s. 186(2) of the Criminal Code, and that investigative necessity was established.

Finally, the Court held that the police inspection of the appellant's personal belongings held by jail authorities did not violate his reasonable expectation of privacy under s. 8 of the Charter.

The appeals from conviction were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding that the verdict was reasonably supported by the evidence.

The young person appealed a 20-year weapons prohibition order.

With the consent of the Crown, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and substituted the legal maximum two-year weapons prohibition order.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for the rape of a 15-year-old girl.

He argued the trial judge erred in refusing to order production of the complainant's psychiatric records under s. 278.5 of the Criminal Code and in failing to set out the theory of the defence to the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the likely relevance test for the records was not met and the defence theory was speculative.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the serious nature of the offence required a penitentiary term despite the appellant's health and immigration consequences.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for attempting to break into the complainant's home with the intent to assault her.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred by not specifically instructing the jury that the complainant's evidence regarding prior uncharged assaults was unreliable, as the parties had agreed her evidence regarding the main events was unreliable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury would have understood that all of the complainant's evidence was unreliable if unconfirmed, and that there was ample independent evidence of the appellant's intent.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The Crown appealed an order quashing an indictment for historical sexual offences.

The original information spanned a time frame when the respondent was between 12 and 20 years old.

The application judge quashed the indictment, holding that proceedings should have commenced in youth court.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the indictment was not a nullity and could be amended under the Criminal Code to cover only the period after the respondent turned 16, as there was no prejudice to the respondent.

The appellant appealed his conviction for arson.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in the first two grounds of appeal, holding there was sufficient evidence that the fire threatened firefighters and was of incendiary origin caused by the appellant.

However, the Court allowed the appeal on the third ground, finding the trial judge improperly treated the case as a credibility contest and failed to apply the W.(D.) framework.

The trial judge erred by inferring guilt directly from his rejection of the appellant's evidence without analyzing the Crown's evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant challenged convictions for indecent assault and sexual assault arising from intrafamilial allegations supported by extensive similar fact evidence from multiple family witnesses.

The Court of Appeal held that the jury charge failed to give an adequate limiting instruction against impermissible bad-character reasoning and failed to instruct on the significance of possible collusion among witnesses who had discussed the allegations and had related civil proceedings.

Applying the governing similar fact evidence principles, the court found the instructional deficiencies undermined the safety of the convictions.

The conviction appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexually assaulting his eight-year-old niece.

He argued that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate and that the trial judge erred by allowing the Crown to split its case by recalling him for further cross-examination on a prior statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the reasons were adequate under the Sheppard functional analysis and that the procedural irregularity of recalling the appellant caused no prejudice in a judge-alone trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous driving, arguing that the trial judge failed to properly apply the third step of the W.D. framework by not fully assessing and reconciling the evidence of the police officers after rejecting the appellant's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge gave full reasons, properly articulated his application of W.D., and made clear findings of fact based on the accepted and reliable evidence of the police.

The appellant was convicted of possession of instruments adapted and intended to be used to commit forgery and sentenced to 11 months' imprisonment followed by one year of probation.

After the Supreme Court of Canada restored his convictions, the Court of Appeal considered his sentence appeal.

The Court found no error in principle by the trial judge but reduced the sentence to six months' imprisonment to account for the almost five years the appellant spent on bail pending appeal without breaching his conditions.

The respondent was convicted of possessing instruments adapted and intended to be used to commit forgery under s. 369(b) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge instructed the jury that 'adapted' meant 'suitable for'.

The Court of Appeal overturned the conviction, finding the word ambiguous and interpreting it in favour of the accused to mean 'altered or modified'.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the French version of the statute clearly resolves any ambiguity, confirming that 'adapted' in s. 369(b) means 'suitable for'.