S. S. Nakatsuru

The applicant sought certiorari to quash warrants authorizing forensic searches of his cellphone following charges arising from a political protest that disrupted an off-campus university event.

The court held that the ITO did not establish reasonable and probable grounds to believe the phone would contain evidence of the investigated offences, as the asserted conspiracy rationale was conclusory and the limited evidence of cellphone use was too remote and contextually weak.

The court further held that the warrant lacked sufficient particularity because it authorized analysis 'based upon' the offences, listed sweeping data categories, and imposed no temporal limits.

Both search warrants were quashed, with leave to the respondent to seek a stay.

Sentencing for second degree murder arising from the killing of the offender's mother while the offender was suffering from schizophrenia.

The court treated the parent-child relationship and the resulting breach of trust as aggravating, but found the offender's severe mental illness significantly diminished moral blameworthiness and elevated rehabilitation and treatment as major sentencing considerations.

Rejecting the Crown's submission that planning and deliberation should aggravate sentence, the court fixed parole ineligibility near the low end of the range.

A life sentence was imposed with 11 years' parole ineligibility, together with DNA, lifetime weapons prohibition, and communication prohibition orders.

A former municipal councillor sought judicial review of an integrity commissioner’s report and council decision imposing a 90-day suspension of remuneration for breaching a municipal COVID-19 vaccination policy and refusing to disclose vaccination status.

The applicant argued, for the first time on judicial review, that the decision infringed freedom of expression by punishing her right not to speak.

The Divisional Court held that the commissioner had sufficiently considered the relevant Charter values through the privacy, autonomy, and silence arguments actually advanced, and had reasonably balanced those values against the statutory objectives of enforcing the code of conduct and maintaining a workable vaccination policy.

The court also held that it was reasonable to interpret the policy as requiring councillors to disclose vaccination status and that the maximum penalty was reasonable.

The application was dismissed with partial indemnity costs of $7,500.

The self-represented accused was charged with multiple gun trafficking and related offences following an undercover police operation.

Over eight transactions, the accused sold 20 handguns and rifles, along with magazines and ammunition, to an undercover officer for over $100,000.

The court found the undercover officer's testimony credible and corroborated by surveillance, messages, and physical evidence.

The court was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knowingly sold illegal firearms and possessed proceeds of crime.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

The accused, residing in a hotel converted into a homeless shelter, was subjected to a warrantless search of his unit by police responding to an anonymous 911 call about a firearm.

The officers entered the unit, handcuffed the semi-nude accused, and discovered a handgun.

The accused brought a pretrial application to exclude the evidence, alleging violations of his rights under ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the police lacked exigent circumstances for the warrantless search, unreasonably handcuffed the accused during investigative detention, breached his right to counsel by failing to hold off questioning, and relied on an invalid search warrant.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter due to the egregious nature of the multiple Charter breaches.

The accused, suffering from severe untreated schizophrenia, stabbed and killed his mother in a park.

At trial, the defence argued he was not criminally responsible (NCR) under s. 16 of the Criminal Code, claiming he acted on an auditory command hallucination.

The court rejected the NCR defence, finding the psychiatric opinions relied too heavily on the accused's uncorroborated hearsay self-reports.

However, the court also found the Crown failed to prove the murder was planned and deliberate, as the accused's mental illness raised a reasonable doubt about his capacity to plan and deliberate.

The accused was found not guilty of first-degree murder but guilty of the included offence of second-degree murder.

During a jury trial for sexual assault and unlawful confinement, the accused brought mid-trial applications under sections 276 and 278.92 of the Criminal Code to cross-examine the complainant on text messages in his possession.

The text messages referenced sexual activity and were inconsistent with the complainant's allegations regarding the timeline and nature of the assault.

The court found the evidence had significant probative value that was not substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice, as it directly challenged the complainant's narrative without relying on twin myths.

To protect the complainant's dignity, the court admitted the evidence in the form of agreed factual admissions rather than the verbatim graphic texts.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing her application for disability-based discrimination.

The applicant alleged she was terminated after disclosing her bipolar disorder and requesting accommodations.

The Divisional Court found that the Tribunal breached procedural fairness by allowing the respondent employer to file a second, more detailed witness statement during the hearing without permitting the applicant to cross-examine the witness on the discrepancies between his two statements.

The application for judicial review was granted and the matter remitted to a differently constituted panel of the Tribunal for a new hearing.

Sobeys Capital Inc. applied for judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision certifying Local 633 as a craft bargaining unit for 15 meat department workers at a Toronto supermarket.

Sobeys argued the decision was unreasonable, contrary to precedent, and created an absurd result by leaving the remaining 92 percent of employees non-unionized.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the OLRB's decisions under both s. 9(3) and s. 9(1) of the Labour Relations Act were reasonable, given the union's long history of representing supermarket meat department employees and the lack of evidence that certification would cause labour relations problems.

ITCAD, a vendor of record for the Ontario government, appealed a summary judgment decision awarding punitive damages to the respondent consultants for withholding their pay.

The consultants cross-appealed the motion judge's finding that they breached a non-competition clause.

The Divisional Court dismissed ITCAD's appeal, upholding the punitive damages award as ITCAD's conduct in withholding pay to force the consultants to sign with another vendor was unacceptable.

The Court allowed the cross-appeal, finding the non-competition clause unenforceable because ITCAD lost its vendor of record status and was using the clause to circumvent the government's decision, which was contrary to public policy.

The appellant appealed a trial decision dismissing its breach of contract and construction lien claims and granting the respondent's counterclaim for fraud relating to a real estate development project.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by allowing an amendment to plead fraud without formal leave under the Construction Act, admitting propensity evidence, misapprehending evidence of fraud, and failing to meaningfully analyze the breach of contract claim.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge implicitly granted leave for the amendment on consent, properly used past misconduct for credibility assessment rather than propensity, and made factual findings of fraud and fundamental breach that were free from palpable and overriding error.

The appellants appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision regarding the quantum of damages for warranted defects in the exterior brick cladding of their new home.

The Tribunal had awarded $16,724 to repair the front of the house, rejecting the appellants' claim for over $200,000 to rebrick the entire home.

On appeal to the Divisional Court, the appellants argued the Tribunal erred in law by failing to apply the test from Ducas and by taking a functional rather than prescriptive approach to the Building Code.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Ducas test inapplicable to the one-year warranty at issue and holding that the Tribunal properly assessed the scope of damages based on the evidence.

The appellant was partially successful on appeal, having a set-off amount of $325,824.41 quashed, though failing to overturn the dismissal of their claim.

The parties could not agree on costs following the appeal's mixed outcome.

The court found that while success was divided, the appellant's success on the set-off ground was of greater monetary value, justifying a costs award.

The court awarded the appellant $6,000 all-inclusive, noting the amount sought was disproportionate to the final outcome.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision granting the respondent an extension of time to file an amended statement of claim.

The respondent had brought a motion to vary a previous order under Rule 59.06, but the motion judge granted relief under Rule 3.02(1) without prior notice to the appellants.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding a breach of procedural fairness because the appellants were denied the opportunity to file evidence of prejudice caused by the delay.

The matter was remitted to a different motion judge.

The applicant corporation sought judicial review of a decision by the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA), acting as agent for the Minister of Finance for Ontario, refusing to take further action under an intergovernmental Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to resolve a double taxation issue with Revenu Québec.

The double taxation arose because the applicant filed inconsistent tax returns in Ontario and Quebec for the 2011 taxation year.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the CRA's interpretation of the MOU—that it only applies when a tax authority proposes to change a taxpayer's allocation formula, not when the taxpayer files inconsistently—was reasonable.

The court also found no breach of procedural fairness.

The appellant factoring company appealed a trial decision that dismissed its construction lien claim and found it jointly liable for damages caused by the contractor who abandoned the project.

The Divisional Court upheld the trial judge's factual findings regarding the lack of authority to approve invoices.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part, finding that the trial judge erred in using equitable and statutory set-off as a sword to award damages against the assignee factoring company that exceeded the value of its lien.

The damages award against the appellant was quashed.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal the decision of Tzimas J. dated August 1, 2025.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $5,000 to the responding party.

The moving party, McMaster University, brought a motion for leave to proceed with an application for judicial review of an adjudicator's determination, and requested a stay pending the review.

The Divisional Court granted leave to proceed with the judicial review but denied the request for a stay.

Costs of the leave motion were fixed at $8,800 to follow in the cause.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding parties fixed at $3,142.00.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of the lower court.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party in the amount of $1,582.