Spencer Nicholson

The accused, who pleaded guilty to causing bodily harm while operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol, brought a motion for directions regarding the sentencing procedure.

The accused has a prior conviction under former s. 253(b) of the Criminal Code and sought to have the court first determine whether, pursuant to R. v. Bundy, 2025 NSSC 325, that prior conviction constitutes a "first offence" for sentencing purposes under s. 320.2(a)(ii), which would trigger a mandatory minimum 30-day imprisonment and preclude a conditional sentence order.

The Crown opposed, arguing judicial economy favoured proceeding to sentencing first.

The court granted the motion, holding that the Bundy issue is not moot and directly impacts the available sentencing range, and directed that arguments on the Bundy interpretation be heard before sentencing submissions.

The responding party brought a motion seeking enforcement of a final consent order made on December 19, 2024, which divided the matrimonial home's contents between the parties upon separation.

The moving party alleged that the responding party breached the order by removing nearly all household contents, fixtures, furniture, and appliances from the home contrary to the agreed terms, causing estimated damages of $111,000.

The court found a clear and wilful breach of the final order under Rule 1(8) of the Family Law Rules, rejected the clean hands argument premised on alleged child support non-compliance, and awarded $60,000 as compensatory damages or, in the alternative, as a fine or penalty, enforceable as a judgment not to be set off against child support obligations.

The applicant, as estate trustee, sought to remove a co-trustee and recover approximately $689,000 in transfers made by the deceased to the respondents during her lifetime, claiming the transfers were subject to resulting trusts.

The respondents moved for a declaration that the claims were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court determined that the applicable limitation period was the two-year period under the Limitations Act, 2002, not the two-year period under section 38 of the Trustee Act.

The court held that the cause of action arose during the deceased's lifetime when the transfers occurred, and therefore the Limitations Act, 2002 applied.

Since the applications were commenced more than two years after the last impugned transaction, the court dismissed the applications as statute-barred.

This is a class proceeding settlement approval decision arising from a fire on November 12, 2019, in the parking garage of Westcourt Place, an apartment building in downtown Windsor.

The building contained approximately 150 residential apartments and 80,000 square feet of commercial space.

The occupants were displaced and sued the defendant owner and manager.

The parties reached a settlement of $7,300,000 after mediation and protracted negotiations.

The court approved the settlement despite objections from the City of Windsor and some residential tenants.

The court rejected the City's objection on the basis that it failed to opt out of the class proceeding by the deadline and did not establish excusable neglect.

The court also approved counsel fees of $2,190,000 plus disbursements and taxes under a 30% contingency fee agreement, and declined to award honoraria to the representative plaintiffs.

The sole beneficiary of an estate sought a motion for partial distribution of trust funds held by the estate trustee prior to reaching the age of 25 specified in the will.

The beneficiary invoked the rule in Saunders v. Vautier to argue entitlement to funds.

The estate trustee resisted distribution, citing pending litigation regarding the improper sale of estate property and the need to hold funds for potential legal costs.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while the beneficiary could invoke Saunders v. Vautier, the estate trustee's discretion to withhold funds pending resolution of the litigation and for a reasonable holdback for legal costs was not unreasonably exercised.

A mother and her adult son with his spouse disputed the distribution of proceeds from the sale of a jointly-owned home.

The mother had contributed substantially to the down payment and closing costs from the proceeds of her own home sale, while the son and his wife contributed to ongoing household expenses.

The parties had not documented their arrangement or discussed what would occur if the living arrangement failed.

The court applied the doctrine of purchase money resulting trust and found that the son and daughter-in-law failed to rebut the presumption by establishing that the down payment was intended as a gift.

The court awarded the mother her initial contribution plus a proportional share of the remaining proceeds.

The Estate of Karen Rail brought a summary judgment motion to recover amounts owing under two promissory notes issued by the defendant corporations.

The first note, dated January 12, 2012, was for $100,000 plus interest issued by 284 Ontario Limited.

The second note, dated December 8, 2017, was for $100,000 plus interest issued by Interra Management Group Limited.

The Estate also sought to pierce the corporate veil to hold Patrick Cronin, the sole director and shareholder of both corporations, personally liable.

The court granted summary judgment against the corporate defendants on both promissory notes but dismissed the action against Cronin personally.

The court found that the July 21, 2020 text message from Cronin constituted a valid acknowledgment of the debts under the Limitations Act, 2002, thereby resetting the limitation period.

The court declined to pierce the corporate veil, finding no evidence of fraudulent or improper use of the corporations.

The moving party sought to set aside a judgment obtained by the trustee in bankruptcy declaring a transfer of funds at undervalue under section 96(1)(b)(i) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The moving party argued he did not receive adequate notice of the motion and was unaware it was proceeding.

The court found that the moving party received multiple attempts at service via email, regular mail, process servers, and postings on his door, and that he deliberately evaded service and ignored the notices.

The court held that the first prerequisite for setting aside the judgment—proof of accident, mistake, or insufficient notice—was not met, and dismissed the motion.

The court sentenced Michael Allan McIndoo for multiple offences including child luring, making and possessing child pornography, extortion, and breaches of a prohibition order.

The decision reviews the facts, aggravating and mitigating factors, the applicable legal principles, and comparable case law.

The court imposed a global sentence of 9.25 years, emphasizing denunciation, deterrence, and child protection, and made several ancillary orders including SOIRA, DNA, forfeiture, and non-communication orders.

The applicant, Matthew John Blumenstock, sought to exclude evidence seized from his residence under section 8 of the Charter, arguing that the search warrant was issued without sufficient grounds linking him or the property to drug offences.

The court reviewed the investigative background, the Information to Obtain (ITO), and the legal standards for issuing a search warrant.

Justice Spencer Nicholson found that, considering the totality of the evidence—including surveillance, phone records, and the presence of suspicious cardboard boxes—there were reasonable grounds to believe that illicit cannabis would be found at the property.

The application was dismissed.

This mid-trial ruling addresses two issues in a medical negligence jury trial: (1) the proper form of the jury questions on causation, and (2) whether the jury should be required to provide reasons or particulars for their verdict on causation.

The court reviews the relevant case law and determines that the "but for" test should be used in the jury questions on causation, rather than the "caused or contributed to" language, given the facts of the case.

The court also declines to require the jury to provide reasons or particulars for their finding on causation, citing the risk of confusion and the lack of necessity in the circumstances.

This decision addresses whether software developed by an employee (Vladimir Krougly) while employed at Nexus Solutions Inc. was created in the course of employment, such that Nexus would own the copyright in the software (Limedas) later commercialized by Limesoft Inc. The court finds that although Krougly was the author of the software, it was not created in the course of his employment with Nexus, and thus Nexus is not entitled to a proprietary remedy under copyright law.

The court reviews the factual background, credibility of witnesses, expert evidence, and the legal framework for copyright ownership in the employment context.

The court considered whether the applicant, Vatcho Kelian, had an easement over the respondent Paul Eldred Trafford’s property for the purpose of maintaining a septic system.

The court reviewed the history of the properties, prior agreements, and the requirements for the creation and continuation of an easement, including by express grant and by prescription.

The court found that no easement was created or registered, and that any rights conferred by prior settlement had terminated.

The application for an easement was dismissed.

This decision addresses Charter applications by Jonathan Cumming and Lenore Westendorp to exclude evidence obtained during a traffic stop and subsequent search.

The court found that Ms. Westendorp’s section 8 Charter rights were breached by an unreasonable search of her vehicle, as her consent was not fully informed or voluntary.

The evidence was excluded as against her.

Mr. Cumming, as a suspended driver, was found to have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle and thus lacked standing to challenge the search under section 8.

The court clarified that exclusion of evidence can apply to one accused but not another, depending on whose Charter rights were violated.

The Superior Court of Justice sentenced two offenders, Ryan Daigneault and Daniel Bell, who pleaded guilty to transferring a handgun and two counts of cocaine trafficking.

Daigneault, identified as the president of the London chapter of the Outlaws motorcycle club, played a primary role in negotiations, while Bell acted as a courier.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as primary sentencing principles for drug and firearm offenses, particularly given the involvement of a criminal organization.

Daigneault received a total sentence of nine years, reflecting his leadership role, extensive criminal record, and the significant quantities of drugs and firearms involved, with credits applied for pre-trial detention and strict bail conditions.

Bell, a first-time offender with a secondary role, received a five-year sentence in accordance with a joint submission from the Crown and defence, with the court applying principles of restraint and totality.

Both offenders were subject to secondary DNA orders and 10-year weapons prohibitions.

At a case conference and pre-trial for a motor vehicle accident personal injury claim proceeding under the Simplified Rules, the court addressed whether the trial could be completed within the allotted five days.

The plaintiff had initially proposed a witness list that exceeded the time limit.

After the plaintiff reduced her witness list, the court imposed a strict trial timetable to ensure the matter could be heard within five days, noting that the plaintiff chose the Simplified Rules and must bear the burden of fitting her case within its constraints.

Idrisso Palmer was found guilty of possession of an unauthorized firearm and a loaded firearm.

The Crown sought a 3-year sentence, while the defence sought a conditional sentence, citing anti-Black racism and strict bail conditions.

The court considered sentencing principles, aggravating and mitigating factors, including Mr. Palmer's social context, lack of male role models, economic disadvantage, and prior lengthy pre-trial custody for charges that were ultimately withdrawn.

The court found a fit sentence to be two years less a day, and imposed a conditional sentence with strict conditions, emphasizing rehabilitation over incarceration given the unique circumstances.

The defendants moved to vacate a construction lien registered against their property by the plaintiff contractor, arguing the lien had expired.

The court found that the contract was either terminated by the defendants or abandoned by the plaintiff on August 18, 2022, when the defendants changed the locks and the plaintiff retrieved its tools with police assistance.

Because the plaintiff failed to perfect the lien by commencing an action and registering a certificate of action within 150 days of that date, the lien expired.

The motion was granted, the certificate of action was vacated, and costs were awarded to the defendants.

The applicant, charged with firearms offences, sought to exclude firearm evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, alleging a breach of his s. 8 rights due to an unlawful search.

The court found that while the general warrant for a cellphone was valid, the police search of the vehicle exceeded its scope, constituting a Charter breach.

Applying the Grant test, the court determined the breach was serious, the impact on the accused's Charter interests was significant (especially given his status as a victim in the underlying murder investigation), and despite society's interest in adjudication on the merits of serious firearm charges, the admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The application to exclude the evidence was granted.

The applicant, Ali Bhatti, charged with firearms offences, sought to exclude firearm evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, alleging a s. 8 Charter breach due to an unreasonable search.

The court found that while the general warrant used to seize his cellphone was properly issued and based on reasonable grounds, the police exceeded its scope by searching a hidden compartment in his vehicle's door frame.

This search was deemed unreasonable, infringing the applicant's s. 8 Charter rights.

The determination on the s. 24(2) remedy (exclusion of evidence) was deferred for further written submissions.