Dr. Iezzi

During a jury trial for a motor vehicle accident, the plaintiff called her treating psychologist to give evidence as both a participant expert and a Rule 53.03 litigation expert.

On cross-examination, it was revealed that the expert had not reviewed the plaintiff's pre-accident medical records or the full medical brief before authoring her reports, relying instead on summaries and the plaintiff's self-reports.

The court exercised its ongoing gatekeeping function and disqualified the psychologist as a litigation expert, finding her evidence lacked the requisite objectivity because she could not identify what documents she had reviewed.

The court instructed the jury to disregard her litigation expert opinions, though she was permitted to give participant expert evidence.

During a jury trial for a motor vehicle accident, the plaintiff sought to call her treating psychologist to give opinion evidence beyond that of a participant expert.

The defendant objected, arguing the psychologist's reports did not comply with Rule 53.03, the plaintiff had not sought leave to call more than three experts under s. 12 of the Evidence Act, and the psychologist lacked the requisite impartiality.

The court held that the reports collectively complied with Rule 53.03 and granted leave to call the witness, finding no trial unfairness or prejudice to the defendant.

The court also found no clear evidence that the treating relationship would prevent the psychologist from fulfilling her duty to the court, leaving the final assessment of her impartiality to a qualification voir dire.

The applicant witnessed the aftermath of a motor vehicle accident involving his family members and sought statutory accident benefits for psychological impairments two years later.

The insurer denied the claim on the basis that the applicant failed to notify it of his intention to apply within the prescribed seven-day period under section 32 of the Schedule.

The Tribunal found that the applicant had sufficient knowledge and ability to apply earlier and failed to provide a reasonable explanation for the delay under section 34.

The Tribunal concluded that the prejudice to the insurer outweighed any hardship to the applicant, and therefore the applicant was statute-barred from proceeding with his claim.

The defendant insurer brought a motion for an order compelling the plaintiff to undergo an independent psychiatric examination.

The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing it was brought too late and would jeopardize the trial date.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the insurer had possessed the plaintiff's medical records for a considerable time and had already benefited from independent examinations in the accident benefits context.

The court concluded that ordering the examination so close to trial would prejudice the plaintiff and diminish the prospect of a meaningful pre-trial.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and received income replacement benefits (IRBs) from the insurer.

After two years, the insurer transitioned the applicant to loss of earning capacity benefits (LECBs).

The insurer later attempted to argue that the applicant's disability was unrelated to the accident.

The arbitrator held that the insurer was precluded from raising a causation defence because it had paid IRBs to the 104-week mark without protest and had already begun paying LECBs.

The arbitrator determined the applicant's residual earning capacity at various stages, awarding LECBs based on a 30-hour work week initially, and a 20-hour work week after the three-year review.

The arbitrator also awarded supplementary medical expenses and a $3,000 special award for the insurer's unreasonable refusal to fund psychological counselling.

The insurer appealed an arbitrator's decision awarding the insured weekly income benefits beyond the 156-week mark and a $20,000 special award.

The insured had suffered physical and psychological injuries in a severe motor vehicle accident and was unable to continue working.

The Director's Delegate upheld the arbitrator's finding that the insured was continuously prevented from engaging in suitable employment, noting the insurer failed to provide evidence of alternative suitable jobs while the insured adduced substantial medical evidence of disability.

The special award was also confirmed because the insurer unreasonably terminated benefits and disregarded the recommendations of its own medical experts.