CITATION: R. v. L.D., 2026 ONSC 837
Information No. CR-24-00000457-0000
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
v.
L.D.
R E A S O N S F O R S E N T E N C E
BEFORE THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE S. NICHOLSON
on January 28, 2026, at LONDON, Ontario
INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN CANNOT BE PUBLISHED,
BROADCAST OR TRANSMITTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 486.4(1
OF THE CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA BY ORDER OF
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE T. OUDEKERK, ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE,
DATED MARCH 6, 2023
APPEARANCES:
C. Mildred
Counsel for the Crown
A. Mamo
Counsel for L.D.
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S
Reasons for Sentence
1
LEGEND
[sic] Indicates preceding word has been reproduced verbatim and is not a transcription error.
(ph) Indicates preceding word has been spelled phonetically.
INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN CANNOT BE PUBLISHED,
BROADCAST OR TRANSMITTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 486.4(1
OF THE CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA BY ORDER OF
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE T. OUDEKERK, ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE,
DATED MARCH 6, 2023
Transcript Ordered:
Transcript Completed:
Ordering Party Notified:
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 28, 2026
R E A S O N S F O R S E N T E N C E
NICHOLSON, J. (Orally)
After a trial spanning parts of six days, L.D. was convicted of one count of sexual exploitation, pursuant to Section 153(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, and one count of sexual assault pursuant to Section 271(1) of the Code. Both counts related to the same victim, his step-granddaughter, S.H. These offences occurred between January 1st, 2000 and December 31st, 2001, when S.H. was 15 years old and in grade 10. She was living with L.D. and her grandmother, L.D.’s wife, at the time in London. When her parents and younger sister moved out west, they left S.H. to live with her grandparents so that she could complete her school year.
I note that L.D. was born on June 12th, 1952. He is currently 73 years of age. He would have been approximately 48 when these events occurred.
S.H. testified that she and L.D. were very close, at least outwardly. However, S.H. testified that after she moved in with them, L.D. would come home late from work after his wife had gone to bed and enter S.H.’s bedroom, crouch down beside her bed, and run his hands underneath the blankets. She testified that he rubbed her side, her stomach, the side of her breast and her thighs. He would place his hand under her t-shirt, but not under her pajama bottoms. This continued for several months, and she testified that he rubbed her breast approximately 10 to 15 times and her stomach over 20 times. She also testified that eventually the sexual touching started to take place in the kitchen as well. L.D., when his wife was absent, would approach S.H. from behind, wrap his arms around her with his arms under her breasts, and press his chest into her back and his groin into her buttocks, again over her clothes. He would just hold her there. She described that this occurred approximately 20 times, and again happened from October to April or May.
Finally, S.H. testified that while they watched television, he would spoon her on the couch with his chest against her back, his groin against her bottom, with his hand between her breasts. This was always over her clothes. This happened between five and ten times. S.H. testified that there were never any penetrative acts.
I note that L.D. denied that any of this touching ever occurred. He obviously pleaded not guilty to both charges.
Section 724(2) of the Code requires the sentencing judge in a jury trial to do his or her best to determine the facts necessary for sentencing from the issues before the jury and from the jury’s verdict. The section was explained by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Ferguson, 2008 SCC 6 at paragraphs 14 and 15. The sentencing judge may not have to arrive at a complete theory of the facts, but the sentencing judge is required to make only those factual determinations necessary for deciding the appropriate sentence in the case at hand. The sentencing judge is bound by the expressed and implied factual implications of a jury’s verdict of guilty and must not accept as fact any evidence consistent only with a verdict rejected by the jury. Second, when the factual implications of a jury’s verdict are ambiguous, the sentencing judge should not attempt to follow the logical process of the jury, but should come to his or her own independent determination of the relevant facts.
At the sentencing hearing in this case, both Crown counsel and defence counsel agreed that the factual findings were clear from the jury’s verdict, as the jury clearly accepted S.H.’s evidence. I agree with that position. I observed S.H. to be an excellent witness, and I find that the jury accepted the allegations as she described in their entirety. Accordingly, I find as a fact that L.D. went into S.H.’s bedroom and touched her under the blanket. He would touch her side, her breast and her thighs, under her top but not her bottoms. This occurred approximately 15 to 20 times. I find that he would approach her from behind while she was in the kitchen, wrap his arms around her with his arms around her breasts, press his chest against her back and his groin against her bottom. I find that this occurred approximately 20 times. Finally, I find as a fact that L.D. would spoon S.H. on the couch with his groin against her bottom and his chest against her back. I find that he would place his hand between her breasts over her clothes. I find that this occurred between five and ten times. All of this behaviour occurred over approximate six or seven months. I find that it was all done for a sexual purpose.
Respective positions on sentence
The Crown seeks a custodial sentence of four and a half years. The Crown relies heavily on R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, a Supreme Court of Canada decision, as calling for tougher sentences for sexual offences committed against children. The Crown suggests that one of the two counts should be stayed pursuant to the Kienapple principles because the offences arise from the identical facts. Alternatively, the Crown suggests that the sentences run concurrently. The Crown seeks the following ancillary orders: a primary compulsory DNA order, a mandatory Section 109 weapons prohibition for ten years, a non-communication order with respect to S.H. pursuant to Section 743.21 while L.D. remains in custody, a 20-year SOIRA order which is mandatory given the sentence sought by the Crown, and an order under Sections 161(a), (a.1) and (b) preventing L.D. from attending at certain types of locations and holding certain types of employment or volunteering.
The defence position is for a sentence of two years less one day followed by probation. The defence does not suggest that a conditional sentence is appropriate. The defence agrees with all of the proposed ancillary orders.
Circumstances of the offender before the court
As noted, L.D. is now 73 years of age. He was convicted of historical offences that occurred approximately 25 years ago when he was 48. He was born in Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario, and his parents separated when he was young. He was primarily raised by his mother, as his father was absent from his life. He became estranged from his mother as an adult. He no longer has any connection with his side of his family.
When L.D. was young, similar to what happened with S.H., his parents dropped him and his brother off at a neighbour’s farm and did not return to pick them up for approximately one year. He told the author of the pre-sentence report that he was a victim of sexual, physical and emotional abuse while with his foster parents.
L.D. is currently married to C.D., and according to her, he has been highly involved with three of her four children and their families, which include S.H.’s mother. C.D. described that he was a father to three of her children. One of those children was murdered in 1989. L.D. and his wife have lived all over Canada, including Ontario, British Columbia, the Yukon, Saskatchewan and Alberta. He currently lives in Alberta. C.D. spoke positively about her relationship with L.D.
L.D. had been married before ending in divorce. He has two children from that relationship, but no relationship with them. His sons have told them that he is “dead to them”.
From the PSR, L.D. has a long employment history, working in many different occupations. This includes working in such roles as Emergency Medical Technician, at Canada Post, ambulance services, a truck driver, driving school buses, transit buses, in construction, and as a building superintendent. Despite his current age, L.D. advises that he intends to continue working. I note that financially, L.D. has no real savings. He is currently receiving his old age security, CPP and some other pensions. It’s fair to say that L.D. and C.D. have significant debt.
C.D. characterized L.D. as a loving, honest, giving man who is a great communicator. He can be stubborn. She has never seen him become physically aggressive. She has also never witnessed him becoming sexually aggressive towards her or anyone else.
L.D. has some age-related health issues. He takes medication for blood pressure, cholesterol and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. He had a quadruple bypass surgery in 2015, and he suffers from squamous cell carcinoma. L.D. does not consume alcohol since 1985, and he has no history of drug use. L.D. has no prior criminal record.
I canvassed with counsel because the PSR indicates that L.D. has an indigenous background, but it is agreed that that is on his father’s side with whom he had no relationship. Apparently, his father had Métis heritage. L.D. has not had any indigenous experiences or embraced being Métis. Accordingly, it is agreed that no Gladue considerations apply, and I so find.
C.D., his wife, is 80 years old and has health issues of her own as well as mobility issues. I’m told she has fibromyalgia and arthritis. L.D. has taken on a caregiver role for her. I note in the PSR that L.D. is prepared to attend counselling.
Applicable legal principles of sentencing
Section 718 of the Criminal Code sets out the fundamental purpose of sentencing as being to protect society and to contribute to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions with one or more of the following objectives: (a) to denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or the community that is caused by unlawful conduct, (b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences, (c) to separate offenders from society where necessary, (d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders, (e) to provide reparations for harm done to the victims or the community, and (f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders and acknowledgement of the harm done to victims of the community.
Section 718.01 of the Code calls upon the court when imposing sentences that involve the abuse of a child to give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence of that conduct. However, this section was not enacted at the time that these offences were committed, and I understand it does not apply. Nevertheless, I am satisfied that the primary consideration for offences of this nature involving children is deterrence and denunciation.
In Friesen, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized the severity of sexual offences involving child victims. The court recognized the particular vulnerability of children, that offences of these natures involve substantial violence, a long-lasting harm to children who are the victims of sexual violence, and their families and society at large. The court also recognized that Parliament had called for an increase in sentences for those that perpetrate such offences against children. Increased sentences reflect a society committed to protecting children and ensuring their rights and interests are respected. As the Supreme Court noted at paragraph 50, sentencing judges must properly understand the wrongfulness of sexual offences against children and the profound harm that they cause.
Sexual offences deprive the victim of their personal autonomy, bodily integrity, sexual integrity and dignity. Children are particularly vulnerable in that they are susceptible to manipulation by adults in whom they trust. The harm done to a child can remain with them for the remainder of their life and can in turn lead to disfunction and/or disability and perhaps repetition of the offences done to them to others. It can also lead to permanent loss of familial relationships beyond the immediate one of the perpetrator and the victim. At paragraph 67, the court described that sexual violence against children is all too often invisible to society:
“To resist detection, offenders perpetrate sexual violence against children in private, coerce children into not reporting, and rely on society’s false belief that sexual violence against children is an aberration confined to a handful of abnormal individuals.”
As a result, violence against children is “hidden, unreported and under-recorded”.
Friesen also described the role that an abuse of a position of trust or authority should play in sentencing. The court noted a spectrum of positions of trust. At paragraph 126, the court observed that any breach of trust is likely to increase the harm to the victim, and thus the gravity of the offence. The spectrum of relationships of trust is relevant to determining the degree of harm. A child will likely suffer more harm from sexual violence where there is a closer relationship and a higher degree of trust between the child and the offender.
Clearly, L.D.’s relationship with S.H. falls at the high end of the spectrum of trust. He was acting as her custodial parent at the time, and they had a close grandparent-grandchild relationship. She was financially dependent upon him, and I note that her family had moved across the country from her.
The court noted that such positions of high trust present a barrier to reporting, similar to what was evident before this court. The breach of trust enhances moral blameworthiness in an offender who abuses a position of trust to commit a sexual offence against a child should receive a lengthier sentence than an offender who is a stranger to a child.
The court at paragraph 136 reminded courts not to discount the impact of sexual offences where the victim is an adolescent girl, who are disproportionately victimized by sexual violence.
The court from paragraphs 140 to 147 made five points about how judges should not approach sentencing in these cases. For example, the sentencing court should not overly emphasize a difference between penetrative versus other types of sexual activities or acts, including touching. It is not a hierarchy. The court should not focus on the physical act itself. Sexual violence that does not involve penetration is still extremely serious and can have a devastating effect on the victim. The court should not downgrade the wrongfulness of the offence or the harm to the victim where the sexually violent conduct does not involve penetration, fellatio or cunnilingus, but instead touching or masturbation. The court should be mindful of the language it employs, and I have tried to do so today.
At paragraph 178, the court noted that a child’s home is a place where the child should feel safe and secure under the caring guardianship of the parent. Therefore, sexual violence that takes in the home may be particularly damaging. Referring to the case of R. v. M. (T.E.), 1997 CanLII 389 (SCC), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 948 (S.C.C.)at paragraph 113, where Justice McLachlin, as she then was, stated:
“The assaults occurred when the young girl was helplessly sleeping, in circumstances where she could not have feared violation. The result of such an assault on a typical victim would likely have been shame, embarrassment, unresolved anger, a reduced ability to trust others, and fear that even in innocent sleep people could and would abuse her and her body.”
S.H. testified to those concerns during her trial and wrote about those in her Victim Impact Statement.
Ultimately, Friesen calls upon judges to impose sentences that are commensurate with the gravity of the sexual offence against children. The court is not to simply use the word “serious” and then fail to address the seriousness of the offence when imposing punishment.
In a very recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, R. v. Sheppard, 2025 SCC 29, the court made clear that the sentencing principles in Friesen apply to historical offences, at paragraph 67 and 68. I note that the court also took the opportunity to emphasize many of the points that it had previously made in Friesen, which I have just articulated.
As L.D. was a first-time offender, the principle of restraint does apply. Judges are reminded that in the case of first-time offenders, the shortest possible sentence that still serves the applicable sentencing objectives should be imposed. However, I must also keep in mind that while L.D. has no criminal record at the age of 73, these offences occurred when he was 48.
Finally, I note that I consider rehabilitation of the offender to always be a consideration. L.D.’s age does not rule out rehabilitation. He has indicated a willingness to engage in therapy, although his failure to accept any responsibility so far often suggests that rehabilitation is unlikely to occur or be effective. However, I have not ruled out rehabilitation, but I do not feel that I can or should give it significant weight in making my sentencing decision.
Review of other cases
The principle of parity requires that offenders in similar circumstances are treated similarly for the same type of offence. While sentencing is an individualized process, it is important to consider other sentencing decisions.
I begin with the cases put forth by the Crown. And although I’m providing a brief summary of all of these cases, I have read them all in authoring this decision.
In R. v. D.(D)., 2002 CanLII 44915 (ON CA), 2002 CarswellOnt 881, the offender was found guilty after trial of 11 sex-related offences involving four young boys. He was sentenced to eight years and one month on each count concurrent. The Crown does not rely on this case for the length of the sentence, rather it is because the Court of Appeal noted at paragraph 44 that as a general rule, adult offenders in a position of trust who sexually abuse innocent young children on a regular and persistent basis over substantial periods of time can expect to receive mid to upper single digit penitentiary terms. I note that in D.(D)., the abuse included, for example, anal intercourse. However, this case does pre-date Friesen. The case frankly factually bears no semblance to the case before this court, a fact acknowledged by the Crown.
I note that in Friesen, where the accused pled guilty to sexual interference with a very young child and attempted extortion of the child’s mother, the Supreme Court restored the original sentence of six years. At paragraph 114, the court noted that mid single digit penitentiary terms for sexual offences against children are normal, and that upper single-digit and double-digit penitentiary terms should be neither unusual nor reserved for rare or exceptional circumstances. Substantial sentences can be imposed where there was only a single victim.
In R. v. B.O., 2016 ONSC 6861 which pre-dates Friesen, the offender began touching the victim sexually when she was 16 years old, and the touching was similar to what occurred in the case before me. Factually, the conduct is very similar. The offender was the victim’s stepfather. The court sentenced the first-time offender to two years less a day in prison.
In R. v. N.F., [2016] O.J. No. 4706, 2016 ONSC 5607, another case pre-dating Friesen, the victim was younger than S.H., only seven or eight years old when the offences occurred. There was more touching when the victim was 14 years old. I note that the offender was 74 years of age at the time of sentencing and was the victim’s grandfather. The sentence imposed was three years.
In R. v. R., 2020 ONSC 7411, the offender lived with the victim’s mother. There were only three incidents of inappropriate touching. The offender was 50 years old and a first-time offender. The sentence was five and one-half years. Friesen had just been released.
In R. v. J.C., [2021] O.J. No. 7396, the offender committed the offences against his 14-year-old niece. There were only three incidents. The offender was 48 years old and had prior convictions. Relying heavily on Friesen, a sentence of four and a half years was deemed fit. I note that there were charges relating to another victim as well.
The Court of Appeal in R. v. T.J., 2021 ONCA 392, overturned a sentence of only nine months and increased it to 24 months incarceration on the basis that the trial judge failed to recognize the inherent wrongfulness and harmfulness of the conduct.
And in R. v. S.B.2, 2022 ONSC 821 decision, the offender’s conduct was similar to L.D.’s, although the touching included to the victim’s vagina and under her underwear. The touching was when the victim was between the ages of 5 and 13; a sentence of three years was imposed.
I have also reviewed the cases and read the cases submitted by the defence.
I begin with R. v. R.L.S., 2020 ONCA 338. The victim in that case was 4 to 6 years old when the offences occurred, and the offender’s biological daughter. The sentence imposed was nine months in custody. This was following a guilty plea, which is an important factor. I note that Friesen was released approximately six weeks before this appeal was heard. The court described that the sentence imposed was lenient. However, the court was deferential to the sentencing judge.
In R. v. Lavergne, 2023 ONCA 592, there were two victims. The 17-month sentence imposed upon a high school teacher was upheld by the Court of Appeal. This matter had proceeded through trial. After reciting many of the principles described in Friesen, the court felt that the sentences were not demonstrably unfit. I note that the appeal was the offender’s appeal, about whether the sentence was too high. I take that to mean that the Court of Appeal would only have considered reducing that sentence.
In R. v. Gunaratnam, 2021 ONSC 8270, another case where there was a conviction following trial, the accused was 60 years old with no criminal record. The victim, his niece, was between 7 to 13 years of age. There were two incidents of touching involving the victim’s vaginal area. While the sentence was a conditional sentence order of two years less a day, this was a joint position. That is a crucial distinction as judges in Canada rarely reject joint positions.
In R. v. Reid, 2020 ONSC 5471, there was a conviction after trial of sexual exploitation. The offender was the victim’s high school teacher. The sentence was 18 months imprisonment.
In R. v. R.N., 2022 ONCJ 145, the 57-year-old offender pleaded guilty to sexual interference of his 13-year-old step-granddaughter. There were five occasions of touching, including the breasts and digital vaginal penetration over a period of approximately three months. The sentence was two years less a day in custody followed by three years of probation.
Aggravating Factors
I have already cited extensively from Friesen about the damage done to children by offences such as these. I will not repeat those quotes again. These offences carry very high moral blameworthiness. Sexual assaults are acts of violence, compounded here by the fact that the victim was still a child, and that the offender was in a position of trust vis-à-vis that child. I considered the Victim Impact Statement from S.H., as well as her evidence at trial about the impact upon her. She highlights that she was sexually assaulted by someone she should have been able to trust, and how it became her “dirty little secret”. She felt conflicted, confused and disgusted, and what is worse about those feelings is that she felt disgust in herself when she was the innocent victim in this case. She writes of taking a long time to accept that she did not do anything wrong and that she is not weak. She was isolated and could not make the abuse stop.
And I pause here to address S.H., although I’m not sure she’s here and that’s fine. Her testimony at trial demonstrated that she is not in fact weak. In my view, she demonstrated that she is remarkably resilient in all of the circumstances. In her statement, S.H. describes how that breach of trust has impacted future relationships, since she also loved her grandfather. She now changes behind closed doors, and she triple checks the door locks. She can pretend to be asleep like she had to when she was a child trying to avoid these assaults. Clearly, these are not sentiments that any society wants our children to feel, even as adults, and for those feelings to persist as those children become adults and have their own children. I find that there has been significant impact on this victim, and that was caused by the breach of trust, the frequency of the touching, as well as her age and the isolation from her family who had moved far away.
It is an aggravating factor that the victim was only 15 years old when the offences occurred. It is an aggravating factor that these incidents took place while she was home sleeping in her bedroom, and where she ought to have felt safe and secure. I take into account that L.D. was effectively S.H.’s grandfather, and that she was depending upon him in all ways during the time when her parents had left her in London. Their relationship falls very close to the highest end of the spectrum of trust in my view, behind perhaps only parents. I take into account the frequency of the abuse. S.H. testified that there were approximately 50 incidents in total of sexual contact between her and her grandfather over a period of approximately six or seven months. I am mindful of the Supreme Court’s admonition not to overemphasize the importance of penetrative acts. The sheer volume and frequency of the touching in this case was, in my view, significant enough to cause any child long lasting damage.
Mitigating Factors
Again, I note that L.D. does not have a criminal record. Although usually applied more often to younger offenders, he is nevertheless a first-time offender, and I agree that his sentence should not be crushing. However, these offences happened when he was approximately 48 years old, not 73, so I do not consider that he has lived crime free for 73 years. Nonetheless, this will be his first custodial sentence, and I do take that into account. I do agree that since these offences L.D. appears to have avoided any further criminal offences for approximately 25 years.
I am mindful of L.D.’s age, very much so, and frankly concerned. He will enter custody in his mid-seventies. He does have health issues, but I do not place any significant weight upon them, as there is no evidence that they cannot be dealt with adequately while he is in custody. I have considered that a prison sentence upon a man of L.D.’s age, or a person of L.D.’s age, may have a disproportionate impact upon him than a younger offender. Having said that, these are offences which were committed by L.D. when he was a much younger man. As a matter of general deterrence, men who decide to perpetrate such crimes upon children need to understand that when their historical abuses come to light, they will not be able to hide behind their age to shield them from adequate accountability when the time comes.
I note that L.D. described suffering some abuse as a child himself. I accept that victims of sexual abuse often become perpetrators of such abuse. It can be a learned behaviour. This is one of the reasons why sexual offences against children is so dangerous to society. Any abuse suffered by L.D. lessens his moral blameworthiness to some extent. I do not have a great deal of information about the abuse, but I have taken it at face value and into consideration.
L.D. exercised his right to a trial and does not get the benefit of a guilty plea. A guilty plea is a very important consideration, as a guilty plea can spare victims such as S.H. from being retraumatized through reliving the abuse by testifying about it. Exercising his right to trial is not aggravating, however. I further note that when asked if he wished to address the court during sentencing, he declined, and I respect that. Again, while not aggravating, L.D. has not expressed any remorse to the court or to the victim, including in the PSR. Again, he does not get any mitigating benefit from having demonstrated that he might otherwise have gotten if he had demonstrated remorse.
I have considered that L.D. has a long history of various employment, although he has moved about Canada. I find that he has led a pro-social life. In that regard, I note the reference letters submitted on L.D.’s behalf. There is a letter from a former employer and a friend, Mr. Campbell. The letter speaks to L.D. as being a straight and honest gentleman, worthy of friendship and trust. Although I appreciate the letter, respectfully, Mr. Campbell clearly knew L.D. in a different context than S.H. had to endure. I agree with the Crown that these offences occurred in private.
The other far more relevant letter was from another of L.D.’s grandchildren. I consider that letter to be important, and I want to thank [name redacted] for providing it. S.H.’s testimony must have been difficult for her to hear, although I’m not sure she actually heard it. She is S.H.’s cousin. In [name redacted]’s experience, her grandfather has never been inappropriate with her. He has always been loving, supporting, selfless and kind. She has always felt protected. Respectfully, to her, and thankfully, her experience with her grandfather has not been the same as S.H.’s. I accept that L.D. has been at time and is capable of being at times a loving grandparent. S.H. described some positive times too. Unfortunately, L.D. also preyed upon one of his grandchildren, and it is not for the court to determine or speculate why one grandchild was spared and another victimized. Accordingly, I can only give his letter so much weight.
Finally, I consider the impact that a lengthy period of custody would have on C.D., his wife, who relies on L.D. for caregiving as she advances in age as well as financially. She is approximately seven years his senior. The consequences of family separation is a valid consideration, although this factor cannot overwhelm other applicable sentencing principles, and I refer to the case of R. v. Habib, 2024 ONCA 830. These consequences cannot be an excuse to overlook the harm that the criminal conduct has caused. However, the PSR describes the economic situation of L.D. and C.D in considerable detail. They are not well off financially, and L.D.’s incarceration will further impair C.D.’s financial security. Accordingly, I have factored in the impact of family separation in this case.
I do not place L.D. in the likely to reoffend category, although again, this is not mitigating.
Fit and proportionate sentence
L.D. I’ll have you stand, please, sir, okay? Thank you.
L.D, I simply cannot ignore Friesen. The Supreme Court has been crystal clear about the dangers that sexual offences pose to children, the harm such offences cause for the rest of a child’s life and have instructed sentencing judges to be particularly mindful of the harm to teenage girls such as S.H. was at the time. And as Sheppard makes clear, the Friesen sentencing principles apply to historical cases such as this one. I cannot and will not ignore the breach of trust and the frequency of touching, and the fact that this touching took place where S.H. ought to have felt safe. I have considered her already sense of being isolated from her family and having nowhere else to turn when this abuse was occurring. I have considered that while this abuse happened over 25 years ago, its impact continues to reverberate. Respectfully, the defence position does not adequately address these factors.
The main reason, in my view, to temper the sentence, to show some judicial restraint which is required, is to recognize that your incarceration will have a significant impact on your wife, both in terms of caregiving and financially. Nevertheless, I repeat that I must not allow that factor to discard a fit and proportionate sentence for one that is unfit.
With respect to the cases provided by both counsel, although no two cases are ever exactly alike, I find that R. v. S.B.2, and R. v. N.F. resonate with me the most. The touching in the case before me was far more frequent than in S.B.2. R. v. N.F. should be adjusted upward to accord with the impact of Friesen.
L.D., I have determined that a fit and proper sentence is four years of penitentiary time in relation to both charges. I agree with both counsel that the sexual assault conviction and the sexual exploitation conviction arise from the same circumstances such that the principles in R. v. Kienapple apply. Accordingly, the count of sexual assault is stayed. Furthermore, I impose all of the ancillary orders sought by the Crown and not opposed by the defence. This includes the primary compulsory DNA order, the mandatory Section 109 weapons prohibition for ten years, a non-communication order with respect to S.H. pursuant to Section 743.21 while you are in custody, a 20-year SOIRA order which is mandatory given the sentence that has been imposed, an order under Section 161(a), (a.1) and (b) preventing you, sir, from attending at certain types of locations and holding certain types of employment or volunteering.
E N D O F E X C E R P T O F P R O C E E D I N G
*Judicial Note: Subsequently, the parties reattended and the s. 161 orders were vacated as it was agreed that they were unavailable at the time of the offences.