Sheila Ruth Block

The defendant, Chubb Insurance Company of Canada, brought a motion to transfer the action from the Central East Region (Newmarket) to the Toronto Region, pursuant to Rule 13.1.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiffs, Smartcentres Management Inc. and North Park Shopping Centres Limited, opposed the motion.

The court granted the transfer, finding that the events, subject matter, and damages were primarily located in Toronto, and that Toronto was "significantly better" in the interests of justice after a holistic application of the factors outlined in Rule 13.1.02(2)(b).

The Canadian National Railway Company (CNR) moved to stay an application brought by the Regional Municipality of Halton and its constituent municipalities (Halton) concerning the applicability of provincial and municipal laws to CNR's proposed intermodal rail hub in Milton.

Halton's application sought declarations on constitutional division of powers issues, arguing that provincial and local laws of general application should apply to the federal undertaking.

CNR contended the application was premature and interfered with an ongoing federal environmental assessment process.

The court granted CNR's motion to stay Halton's application, finding that while the constitutional issues were not hypothetical, the federal environmental review panel was mandated to consider local concerns and impacts, and allowing the application to proceed would be an unwarranted intrusion into the federal process and an inefficient use of judicial resources.

The stay is temporary, pending the completion of the federal environmental assessment and the Minister's decision.

The applicant, Monika Caryk, sought a Norwich Order compelling the respondent, Melinda Karlsson, to disclose information relevant to allegations that Caryk engaged in cyberbullying of Karlsson.

Caryk's reputation was allegedly damaged by media reports attributing online posts to her, stemming from Karlsson's now-expired peace bond application.

The court applied the five-part test for a Norwich Order, finding that Caryk failed to establish a tenable cause of action, that Karlsson was the only practicable source of the information, or that the interests of justice favored granting the order.

The application was dismissed, and no costs were awarded.

The defendant municipality brought a motion to strike the plaintiff bridge company's statement of claim, which sought contribution and indemnity for damages and legal costs arising from five nuisance actions brought by local residents.

The residents alleged that the plaintiff's boarded-up houses caused urban blight.

The plaintiff claimed the municipality unlawfully withheld demolition permits, causing the nuisance.

The court dismissed the motion to strike, finding it was not plain and obvious that the claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action, and that the action was not an abuse of process nor barred by issue estoppel.

The plaintiff was granted leave to amend its pleadings to better particularize misfeasance in public office and negligence.

Self-represented long-term disability beneficiaries sought leave to appeal a sanction order from the Superior Court of Justice in the Nortel Networks CCAA proceedings.

The applicants challenged their binding status under the 2009 Representation Order for Disabled Employees and the 2010 Employee Settlement Agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that the stringent test for leave in CCAA proceedings was not met.

The proposed appeal lacked merit, the applicants were bound by the settlement agreement, and further delays in the protracted litigation were to be avoided.

The court also rejected a late-filed notice of constitutional question challenging sections 6(1) and 11 of the CCAA.

The defendant, owner of the Ambassador Bridge, brought a motion to strike the jury notice in a nuisance action commenced by property owners in Old Sandwich Town.

The plaintiffs claimed the defendant unlawfully allowed properties it purchased to deteriorate, reducing property values.

The defendant argued that widespread negative, defamatory, and accusatory pre-trial publicity in Windsor regarding its conduct and motives made it impossible to find an impartial jury.

The court agreed, finding a real danger that the cumulative effect of over a decade of negative commentary could predispose jurors against the defendant.

The motion was granted and the jury notice was struck.

The plaintiff obtained a default judgment against the defendant for breach of confidence, intentional infliction of mental distress, and invasion of privacy after the defendant posted an intimate video of the plaintiff online.

The defendant successfully moved to set aside the default judgment.

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal the order setting aside the default judgment.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's application of the test to set aside a default judgment, and concluding that a trial on the merits would be of general importance to the development of the law.

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal a decision that set aside a default judgment against the defendant.

The original default judgment found the defendant liable for breach of confidence, intentional infliction of mental distress, and invasion of privacy, awarding significant damages and an injunction.

The motion judge (Dow J.) set aside the default judgment, allowing the defendant to defend on the merits, conditional on a costs payment.

The plaintiff argued that the motion judge erred by considering the defendant's proposed defence despite intentional default, failing to distinguish liability from damages, and not adequately considering psychological harm.

The court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision and emphasizing the importance of a trial on the merits for the development of tort law in this unique area.

The plaintiffs, having successfully appealed the dismissal of their class action as time-barred and obtained certification and leave to proceed, sought costs on a partial indemnity basis for the certification and leave motions.

The defendants argued for a significant reduction, citing an "indulgence" (nunc pro tunc order), costs for required steps, limitation period issues, expert reports, divided success, and comparable cases.

The court rejected the defendants' arguments, emphasizing the extraordinary nature of the case, the public interest in access to justice for complex class actions, and the substantial success achieved by the plaintiffs.

The court awarded the plaintiffs the full amount of costs claimed, $2,679,277.82, payable by the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce.

The Nortel group of companies filed for insolvency protection across multiple jurisdictions.

Following the sale of Nortel's assets, approximately $7.3 billion was placed in escrow.

The trial judge ordered that these lockbox funds be allocated on a pro rata basis among the various debtor estates, finding that Nortel operated as a highly integrated multinational enterprise and that the master research and development agreement did not govern allocation upon insolvency.

Several parties sought leave to appeal under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding that the proposed appeals were not prima facie meritorious, did not raise issues of significance to the practice, and would unduly hinder the progress of the proceedings.

The appellant landlords appealed a decision declaring that their consent was not required for the respondent tenants to assign and sublease commercial leases as part of a joint venture.

The tenants proposed assigning the leases to a limited partnership whose general partner was the existing tenant.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that a limited partnership can only hold property through its general partner.

Since the leases were being assigned to the general partner, which was the existing tenant, the assignment fell within the leases' affiliate exception and did not require the landlords' consent.

Various parties brought motions seeking reconsideration or clarification of a prior joint allocation decision determining the distribution of $7.3 billion in escrow among debtor estates in multinational insolvency proceedings.

The moving parties argued that aspects of the allocation methodology—including treatment of bond guarantee claims, certain asset sale proceeds, intercompany claims, tax claims, and settled claims—required amendment or clarification.

The court reiterated that reconsideration is an exceptional remedy and rejected most requests because the issues either had been addressed at trial or could have been raised earlier.

Limited clarification was granted regarding the treatment of bondholder claims against guarantors and recognition of certain court‑approved settled pre‑filing claims that had been paid.

Other requested clarifications or amendments were denied.

The appellant employer appealed decisions of the Financial Services Tribunal ordering a partial windup of its pension plan following a plant closure.

The Tribunal found that a reorganization had occurred prior to the closure and included employees laid off during that period in the windup group.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Tribunal's determination that a reorganization occurred and its definition of the windup group were reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The court also upheld the Tribunal's jurisdictional rulings regarding the Superintendent's authority.

In a joint cross-border insolvency trial concerning the allocation of approximately $7.3 billion in lockbox funds from the sale of global business lines and residual intellectual property, the court interpreted the Master R&D Agreement as an operating transfer-pricing document that granted limited licence rights but did not govern post-insolvency allocation.

The court rejected both the position that one Canadian debtor owned all sale proceeds by virtue of legal title and the position that the EMEA debtors jointly owned all intellectual property by operation of law.

Applying unjust enrichment principles and the broad remedial jurisdiction available in CCAA proceedings, the court held that a just result required a pro rata allocation among debtor estates based on allowed claims.

The court further directed that duplicate claims be counted only once for allocation purposes, that intercompany claims be included, and that interim distribution proposals be brought forward.

The plaintiffs sought leave to appeal a $52,000 costs order made against them following their successful motion to amend the statement of claim.

The plaintiffs argued the motions judge misapplied the 'indulgence' principle by awarding costs against the successful moving party.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no conflicting decisions or reason to doubt the correctness of the highly discretionary, fact-specific costs award.

The court held the stringent test for leave to appeal under Rule 62.02(4) was not met.

The appellants, representing former Barbados participating policyholders of Manulife, brought a class action for negligence.

They claimed Manulife owed them a duty of care to protect their interests when it transferred their policies to another insurer in 1996, three years before Manulife demutualized and distributed $9 billion to its participating policyholders.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding that while harm was foreseeable, policy reasons negated a duty of care.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the claim was for pure economic loss and did not fall within established categories.

The Court found no prima facie duty of care because the relationship lacked sufficient proximity, as the policyholders had no legally recognized right to share in a future demutualization at the time of the transfer, and the governing legislation permitted Manulife to terminate the relationship.

Following a major appellate decision regarding the tolling of limitation periods in securities class actions, the successful parties in two of the appeals sought their costs.

The opposing parties argued for reduced costs on the basis of public interest, over-lawyering, and the fact that the court had overruled its own prior jurisprudence.

The Court of Appeal rejected these arguments, finding the claimed amounts to be fair and reasonable given the complexity and significance of the proceedings.

Costs of $151,250 and $100,000 were awarded to the respective successful parties on a partial indemnity scale.

An employer sought declarations that a senior executive’s employment agreement requiring six months’ written notice of resignation was valid and enforceable.

The employee resigned and intended to join a competitor before the notice period expired, arguing the contract violated the Employment Standards Act, lacked consideration, functioned as an unlawful non‑compete, and that he had “Good Reason” to resign without notice.

The court rejected these arguments, finding the executive had accepted the promotion and contract, the notice provision did not breach the ESA, and the clause was not equivalent to a non‑competition covenant because the employee remained employed and paid during the notice period.

The employee also failed to establish a material alteration of duties or to comply with contractual procedures for asserting “Good Reason.” The court declared the contract binding and confirmed the six‑month notice period applied.

In three related securities class action appeals, the court reconsidered whether a statutory secondary-market misrepresentation claim under s. 138.3 of the Securities Act is time-barred unless leave is obtained within the s. 138.14 limitation period.

The court overruled Timminco and held that, for purposes of s. 28 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, the statutory claim is asserted when the representative plaintiff pleads the statutory cause of action, the supporting facts, and an intention to seek leave within a timely commenced class proceeding.

The court also upheld the motion judge's interpretation of the s. 138.8 leave standard as screening out hopeless claims, while holding that the Green certification decision erred in failing to consider certifying common negligent misrepresentation issues other than reliance.

The plaintiffs' appeal in Green was allowed in part and the defendants' appeals in Silver and Celestica were dismissed.