Sheila Ruth Block

The appellant appealed an order of the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the Divisional Court's decision and agreed with the reasons given by Blair R.S.J. The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellant, a former director and executive, appealed a trial judgment that set aside his employment contract using the oppression remedy under s. 241 of the Canada Business Corporations Act.

The appellant argued the oppression remedy should only be available to minority shareholders unable to use normal corporate machinery, and that the trial judge improperly substituted her view for the Board's business judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the oppression remedy addresses abuse of power and is not limited to minority shareholders.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's finding that the Board's process in approving the contract was seriously flawed and fell outside the range of reasonableness.

Leave to appeal the costs award was also refused despite the respondents failing to prove fraud, given the appellant's egregious conduct.

The appellant investors appealed an order disqualifying their counsel and his merged law firm from continuing to represent them in a complex litigation against the respondent promoters.

The disqualification arose after the investors' law firm merged with another firm that had previously acted for the promoters in preparing the offering memorandum at the heart of the dispute.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the merged firm failed to implement an ethical wall at the time the merger became effective, creating an irreconcilable conflict of interest and a risk of sharing confidential information.

The defendant moved for directions regarding a proposed appeal from an order dismissing its Rule 21 motion to dismiss or stay the action.

The defendant sought a determination on whether the order was interlocutory or final, and if final, an extension of time to appeal.

The Court of Appeal held that the order was interlocutory because the motions judge declined to decide the issues due to conflicting evidence and complexity, meaning no substantive rights were finally adjudicated.

The motion for an extension of time was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, but the defendant successfully obtained the clarification it sought.

The appellant and respondent had an extramarital affair resulting in two children.

In 1974, the appellant executed a release discharging the respondent from all claims in exchange for a lump sum.

Twenty-six years later, the appellant brought an action seeking rescission of the release, breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's decision to strike the claim under Rule 21, finding that the appellant's lengthy delay in bringing the equitable claims constituted acquiescence, making the action certain to fail.

The adult appellants brought an action against the respondent, their alleged biological father, claiming damages for breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment for failing to provide adequate child support during their youth.

The motions judge struck the statement of claim under Rule 21.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding that the claim was essentially one for retroactive child support which circumvented the comprehensive statutory scheme.

The court also held that on the facts pleaded, the respondent owed no fiduciary obligations to the appellants as he never assumed a parental role or exercised control over their lives.

The appellant brought an action against the respondent, with whom she had a secret extra-marital affair for 14 years, claiming damages for failure to provide adequate child support.

The appellant had signed a release in 1974 for $27,500.

The motions judge struck out the appellant's claims under Rule 21.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding that the appellant's 26-year delay in seeking rescission of the release constituted acquiescence under the doctrine of laches, making her equitable claims certain to fail.

The defendant sought leave to appeal an order removing their counsel due to a disqualifying conflict of interest arising from a law firm merger.

The motions judge had applied a strict 'bright line' test, disqualifying the firm because an ethical wall was not erected prior to the merger.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's decision, as it failed to apply the balancing approach mandated by Rule 2.05(4) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and ignored evidence that the motion may have been brought for tactical purposes.

The Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law brought a motion for leave to intervene as a friend of the court in an appeal concerning the fiduciary obligations of a biological parent to his children.

The moving party sought to make submissions on domestic and international human rights obligations, including the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.

The court granted the motion, finding that the moving party had considerable experience in the subject matter and could place the issues in a slightly different perspective without causing injustice to the responding party.

Following the dismissal of their appeal, the appellants made written submissions regarding costs.

They argued that costs should not be awarded on a joint and several basis, and that four appellants whose judgments were satisfied while the case was under reserve should not bear any costs.

The Court of Appeal agreed, ordering costs against the remaining appellants on a several, pro rata basis rather than jointly and severally, noting that a joint and several order would be unusually onerous.

The appellants, Canadian 'Names' in the Lloyd's insurance market, appealed a decision allowing the registration and enforcement of U.K. judgments against them for unpaid reinsurance premiums.

They argued that the U.K. proceedings denied them natural justice by preventing them from litigating fraud claims before judgment, and that enforcing the judgments would be contrary to Ontario public policy because Lloyd's had breached the prospectus requirements of the Ontario Securities Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no denial of natural justice because the U.K. courts assumed the fraud allegations were true but found they did not provide a legal defence.

The Court also held that enforcing the judgments was not contrary to public policy, emphasizing international comity and the fact that Ontario courts had previously determined England was the proper forum for the dispute.

The appellant, representing minority shareholders of Asbestos Corp., sought an order from the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) under s. 127 of the Securities Act to remove the trading exemptions of the Quebec Government and its Crown corporation after they acquired control of Asbestos Corp. without making a follow-up offer to minority shareholders.

The OSC declined to exercise its public interest jurisdiction, finding insufficient transactional connection to Ontario and no intention to avoid Ontario law.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the OSC's decision, ruling that the standard of review is reasonableness and that the OSC properly exercised its preventive, non-remedial discretion based on relevant factors.

The appellant contractor sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision upholding a union grievance.

The appellant alleged a breach of natural justice because a draft decision dismissing the grievance was changed to uphold it after a full board meeting.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that institutional consultation does not breach natural justice provided it is limited to questions of policy and law, and the adjudicators remain free to decide.

The Court found no evidence that factual matters were improperly discussed at the full board meeting, and the change in the decision concerned a matter of law and policy regarding the abandonment of bargaining rights.

The appellant challenged a trial judgment arising from an intended amalgamation and reverse takeover transaction designed to achieve business objectives for both corporations, including a stock exchange listing.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding that the February 21, 1990 contract was binding and enforceable, and rejected the argument that the public float requirement operated as a condition precedent.

The court accepted the trial judge’s credibility findings that the appellant knew of the requirement, could have satisfied it, but instead failed to use best efforts and made compliance impossible through undisclosed agreements.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The respondent, a lawyer, was defamed by the appellants who published documents falsely alleging he had misappropriated funds intended for a community organization.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the trial judge's finding that the publications were defamatory and that the appellants were jointly and severally liable as joint tortfeasors.

The Court rejected the defence of qualified privilege, finding that the appellants had exceeded the limits of the occasion and were motivated by express malice.

The Court restored the trial judge's award of $140,000 in compensatory damages and $325,000 in special damages for loss of business, as well as the award of prejudgment interest for 12.5 years.

The respondent newspaper challenged the constitutionality of s. 442(3) of the Criminal Code, which mandated a publication ban on the identity of a complainant in a sexual assault case upon request.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the mandatory ban infringed the freedom of the press under s. 2(b) of the Charter, it was a reasonable limit justified under s. 1.

The Court found that the objective of encouraging victims of sexual offences to come forward by protecting them from the trauma of publication was of pressing and substantial concern, and that a discretionary ban would not achieve this objective as it would deprive victims of certainty.

The Court also held that the provision did not infringe the accused's right to a public hearing under s. 11(d).