Sean Christopher Doyle

Crown sentence appeal from a decision rejecting a joint submission on sentence for operating a conveyance with a blood-alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The sentencing judge declined the jointly submitted 60-day conditional sentence and instead imposed a $2,500 fine, finding the proposed sentence disproportionate.

The appeal court held the sentencing judge applied the wrong test by assessing fitness of sentence rather than the public interest test from R. v. Anthony-Cook, which requires that a joint submission only be rejected where it would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was allowed and the conditional sentence of imprisonment was imposed as originally jointly submitted.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing death, dangerous driving causing death, and operating a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol concentration over 80 mg/100 mL causing death.

The charges arose from a fatal collision on Major Mackenzie Drive in Markham, Ontario on September 14, 2022, in which the defendant's vehicle crossed the centre line and struck an oncoming vehicle driven by an off-duty police officer, resulting in the officer's death.

The court found the defendant guilty on all counts.

The court rejected the defence argument that falling asleep at the wheel provides an absolute defence to dangerous driving, finding instead that the defendant's decision to drive while tired and under the influence of alcohol constituted a marked departure from the standard of care.

The court also found that the defendant's ability to drive was impaired by alcohol to any degree, satisfying the test for impaired driving.

The blood-alcohol analysis showing 80 mg/100 mL was admitted under the presumption of accuracy.

Denrick Rose pleaded guilty to dangerous driving causing death and bodily harm, and breaching a release order curfew.

The offence involved driving at speeds exceeding 200 km/h on Highway 400 and King Road, with five passengers, two of whom urged him to slow down.

The vehicle crashed into a light standard, killing passenger Amelia Bal and seriously injuring others.

The Crown sought a 5-year sentence plus a 7-year driving prohibition; the defence sought 2 years plus 5 years prohibition.

The court imposed a global sentence of 4.5 years with a 10-year driving prohibition, considering aggravating factors including deliberate prolonged dangerous driving, breach of bail, and victim impact, balanced against mitigating factors such as the offender’s youth, remorse, strong rehabilitative prospects, and harsh presentence custody conditions.

The decision also addresses the impact of systemic anti-Black racism on sentencing.

The defendant, Emilio Gonzalez-Ramirez, was found guilty of aggravated assault and use of an imitation firearm.

This decision outlines the reasons for sentencing, considering factors such as the complainant's young age, the unprovoked nature of the assault, the use of an imitation firearm, the defendant's mental health issues (schizophrenia), and the significant collateral immigration consequences of a sentence of six months or more.

The court balanced the seriousness of the offence with mitigating factors, including the defendant's mental illness and the harshness of pre-trial custody, ultimately imposing a sentence structured to preserve the defendant's right to appeal a potential deportation order on humanitarian and compassionate grounds.

The accused was charged with aggravated sexual assault, sexual interference, and use of an imitation firearm in the commission of an indictable offence.

The charges stemmed from an incident in a park where the 14-year-old complainant alleged she was tackled, sexually assaulted, and struck with an imitation firearm.

The accused denied the allegations, claiming the complainant stole his battery charger and fell.

The court found the complainant's evidence credible and rejected the accused's account.

While finding the accused guilty of aggravated assault (a lesser included offence of aggravated sexual assault) and use of an imitation firearm, the court found reasonable doubt regarding the sexual nature of the touching, leading to an acquittal on the aggravated sexual assault and sexual interference charges.

The young person, C.Z., pleaded guilty to dangerous driving causing two deaths and one bodily harm.

The court considered the principles of youth sentencing under the Youth Criminal Justice Act, including the young person's diminished moral blameworthiness, high degree of responsibility, and numerous mitigating factors such as excellent prospects and genuine remorse.

The court determined that a non-custodial sentence would not meet the purposes and principles of youth sentencing, particularly the need for denunciation and meaningful consequences proportionate to the grave harm caused.

A custodial sentence was deemed necessary.

The accused, Azzam Al-Derzi, pleaded guilty to dangerous driving causing death after running a red light while distracted by a cell phone, resulting in the death of a motorcyclist.

The court considered victim impact statements, a positive pre-sentence report, and aggravating factors (distracted driving by a professional driver) balanced against mitigating factors (guilty plea, genuine remorse, good character).

The court accepted a joint submission for 15 months in jail and imposed a 2.5-year driving prohibition, a DNA order, and a victim fine surcharge.

Drak Paul pleaded guilty to dangerous driving causing death and fail to remain causing death after a fatal collision where he was speeding excessively (125 km/hr in a 60 km/hr zone), fled the scene, and was uninsured.

The court considered aggravating factors including the extreme speed, police pursuit, flight from the scene, and lack of insurance, alongside mitigating factors such as his youth, lack of prior criminal record, guilty plea, and good rehabilitation prospects.

The court imposed a global sentence of two years (18 months for dangerous driving causing death, 6 months consecutive for fail to remain causing death) and a five-year driving prohibition, plus a DNA order.

The accused, Chiduben Anthony Okeke, was charged with Aggravated Assault and Failing to Comply with a Recognizance.

Both the Crown and Defence jointly sought a finding of Not Criminally Responsible (NCR) under sections 16 and 672.34 of the Criminal Code.

Two forensic psychiatrists provided reports concluding that the accused suffered from schizophrenia with paranoid and somatic delusions and auditory hallucinations at the time of the offence, rendering him incapable of knowing the wrongfulness of his actions.

The court accepted the joint recommendation, finding the accused NCR for both charges, and issued a DNA order.

The judgment also highlighted the severe impact on the victim, PC Andrew Varao, and raised concerns about the lack of adequate supervision for mentally ill individuals released on bail.

The accused was charged with firearms and drug trafficking offences following a search of his apartment.

The trial proceeded as a Charter application to exclude evidence under section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Three primary issues were raised: (1) whether the search warrant was validly issued based on confidential informant information; (2) whether covert pre-warrant entries into the apartment building constituted unlawful trespasses and section 8 violations; and (3) whether the accused's section 10(b) rights to counsel were violated when police failed to facilitate access to counsel following arrest.

The court found that while the warrant was validly issued and the pre-warrant entries constituted only minor section 8 breaches, the failure to facilitate access to counsel was a serious and gross violation of the accused's Charter rights.

The evidence was excluded under section 24(2).

The defendant was charged with dangerous driving causing death after making an illegal U-turn that resulted in a fatal collision with a motorcycle.

The court found that the defendant's driving was objectively dangerous, thus establishing the actus reus of the offence.

However, the court acquitted the defendant, concluding that while the driving constituted a departure from the standard of care, it did not amount to a "marked departure" required for criminal fault, but rather a single, momentary error in judgment.

The decision emphasized the distinction between civil negligence and criminal conduct, relying on Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence.

The appellant, Brian Dixon, appealed his convictions for multiple charges including criminal harassment, uttering death threats, assault with a weapon, mischief, and breach of recognizance, as well as his sentence.

The appeal court dismissed the appeal against conviction, finding no misapprehension of evidence, reasonable fear by complainants, no Kienapple principle violation, and proper credibility assessment.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed due to an error in the original sentence and the introduction of a Gladue report.

The court re-sentenced the appellant, imposing a varied term of imprisonment and probation, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence while considering Gladue principles and mitigating factors.

The Crown appealed Kelly's acquittal for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams, which resulted from the exclusion of breath test results due to a s. 8 Charter violation.

The trial judge found that the police officer administered an Approved Screening Device (ASD) test despite knowing the respondent had a lozenge in his mouth, a circumstance the officer himself stated would invalidate the test.

This rendered the subsequent Intoxilyzer demand unlawful.

The appeal court upheld the trial judge's findings regarding the officer's credibility, the s. 8 Charter violation, and the s. 24(2) Charter analysis for excluding the evidence, emphasizing the officer's misleading testimony.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused was charged with refusing to comply with an approved screening device (ASD) demand made by a peace officer pursuant to section 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged that the accused refused to provide a breath sample at the roadside following a motor vehicle collision.

The accused raised two defences: first, that his right to counsel under section 10(b) of the Charter was violated; and second, that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion that he had operated the motor vehicle within the preceding three hours.

The court found that the officer had reasonable suspicion based on the accused's proximity to the vehicle and conflicting statements from his wife.

The court also found that the demand was made promptly and that the refusal occurred within the "forthwith" timeframe, meaning the accused's Charter rights were not engaged.

The accused was found guilty.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving, exceeding 80 mg of alcohol per 100 ml of blood, and resisting arrest following a motor vehicle stop on June 5, 2014.

The Crown presented evidence of erratic driving, physical signs of impairment, breath test results of 180 mg/100 ml, and expert toxicology evidence.

The defence raised multiple Charter arguments and challenged the sufficiency of evidence.

The court found the defendant guilty of impaired driving but acquitted him of resisting arrest due to language barriers and lack of clarity regarding directions.

The defendant was found sleeping in his parked car at a fast food restaurant in Mississauga with a blood alcohol concentration of 180 mg/100ml.

He was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operation with blood alcohol over the legal limit.

The Crown and defence agreed that the defendant was arbitrarily detained for approximately 4.5 to 7 hours after the investigation was complete.

The court found the defendant was in care or control of the vehicle based on the statutory presumption under section 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, which the defendant failed to rebut.

The court also found a breach of the defendant's section 9 Charter rights regarding arbitrary detention but declined to grant a stay of proceedings, instead imposing a reduced sentence as the appropriate remedy.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol concentration in excess of the legal limit (driving over 80) and while impaired by alcohol.

The Crown relied on breath test results from an Intoxilyzer 8000C showing readings of 187 and 175 mg of alcohol per 100 mL of blood.

The defence brought applications seeking COBRA data (downloadable data from the breath testing instrument) in electronic format and seeking a view of the breath room at Traffic Services.

The court allowed in part the COBRA data application, ordering disclosure of all COBRA data generated by the specific instrument from the quality assurance checks through the subject tests in native raw text file format.

The court dismissed the view application, finding insufficient evidentiary foundation and no demonstrated advantage to taking a view over two years after the fact.

The appellant appealed a conviction for driving with excess blood alcohol, arguing the trial judge erred by dismissing a s. 11(b) Charter application alleging unreasonable delay and by providing insufficient reasons for that ruling.

The appellate court agreed that the trial judge’s reasons were inadequate to permit appellate review and therefore conducted its own analysis of the delay under the Askov and Morin framework.

The court found the total delay of approximately 14 months and 20 days warranted scrutiny but concluded that only about nine months and three weeks constituted institutional and Crown delay.

Some delay was attributable to defence conduct, including insisting on an adjournment based on a mistaken interpretation of s. 657.3 of the Criminal Code and failing to raise s. 11(b) concerns when a continuation date was set.

Although some prejudice arose from multiple trial dates, the court held the delay was not unreasonable in the circumstances.

The accused was found intoxicated in the driver's seat of a damaged motor vehicle parked in a gas station lot.

He was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired and excess blood alcohol.

The central issue was whether the Crown proved care or control beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found that the statutory presumption under section 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code applied, as the accused occupied the driver's seat while intoxicated.

The accused failed to rebut the presumption on a balance of probabilities.

The court also found that even if the presumption had been rebutted, the Crown proved actual care or control beyond a reasonable doubt based on the realistic risk of danger presented by the accused's conduct and circumstances.

Verdicts of guilty were entered on both counts.

The appellant appealed a conviction for assault arising from a domestic dispute, arguing that the trial judge demonstrated bias, made unreasonable findings of fact, and misapplied the law relating to defence of property.

The Superior Court of Justice held that the impugned comments by the trial judge were made in the context of explaining the trial process to a self-represented accused and did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court further found that the trial judge’s factual findings were supported by the evidence and were entitled to deference on appeal, and that the correct legal framework for defence of property had been applied.

The appellant also sought costs and compensation for various alleged harms, but the court held that there was no basis for such an award in the absence of prosecutorial misconduct or other exceptional circumstances.

The conviction and conditional discharge were therefore upheld.